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INTRODUCTION 
Two generations have passed since the publication of Rachel Carson’s alarming 
book Silent Spring. Although the problems related to the use of the pesticide 
DDT, raised by the book, seem to be a thing of the past, society is still 
concerned about environmental issues. Single environmental issues of the then 
world have been replaced by a new generation of complex issues, the 
addressing of which may have unexpected environmental impacts and pose 
uncharted risks. On the other hand, the environment has become a hot topic in 
all aspects of life: environmental issues have become a staple feature in media 
reports; the legal space is regulated by numerous environmental rules and 
regulations; being ‘eco’ has become a mainstream fashion trend and natural 
disasters are the favourite plot device for the Hollywood film industry. And yet, 
United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) states in its 2012 report issued 
on the eve of the Rio+20 conference (Global...: 1, 3) that the “world remains on 
an unsustainable track despite hundreds of internationally agreed goals and 
objectives. […] Scientific evidence shows that Earth systems are being pushed 
towards their biophysical limits, with evidence that these limits are close and 
have in some cases been exceeded.” 
Environmental history is written and major political agreements have been 
concluded at international conferences: at the Stockholm, Rio de Janeiro, 
Johannesburg conferences etc. Today, no more major political agreements, such 
as the Kyoto climate treaty, are reached (neither have any tangible results been 
achieved, according to the above-mentioned UN report). After the complete 
failure of the UN climate summit in Copenhagen in 2009, the public debate over 
global warming has adopted an increasingly critical attitude, the impacts of 
climate change are being marginalised and the Cancun conference, organised as 
a ‘correction of mistakes’ made in Copenhagen, did not even make the news. 
Environmental issues have become extremely complex – researchers and 
scientists are groping in the dark, touching and feeling the different parts of the 
‘elephant’, offering contradictory micro-political solutions. Cumbersome 
economic and political solutions, such as the EU emissions trading scheme or 
the ban on incandescent light bulbs, create confusion and substituting activities, 
such as renaming filament bulbs ‘heating elements’, without any tangible results 
to show for the effort. On the one hand, consumption as a reason behind 
environmental issues is frowned upon; on the other hand, it is stressed that we 
need economic growth (which is based on consumption) and natural resources 
are recklessly exploited in the name of that goal. 
In general, it is claimed that these tendencies are the typical characteristics of 
late modernity. Although the basic operations of modern institutions have not 
changed, the institutions are opposed to the side effects of their deeds, as the 
increasing proportion of risk publics demand constant action in subjecting 
those. The difficulty here, especially in the case of environmental problems, lies 
in the fact that environmental risks are caused by the main operations of society, 
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which is the reason why these operations cannot be institutionalised as 
problems. Therefore, the modernity radicalises (Beck 1997, Giddens 1997). In 
his book “World at Risk” Beck (2009) emphasises that social institutions are 
more and more dependent on the staging in public of these risks, and this 
disturbs the tradition of the modern (hierarchical and scientific) treatment of 
risks and problems. It is also noteworthy that the public expansion of risks and 
problems is no longer lead by protest groups in modern society, but also by 
science, industry and politics themselves. Hopeless intertwining of risk 
definitions expands the number or risk publics and even thorough confutation of 
every separate risk would only enforce the interaction of the institutionalisation 
of risks. 
The fall of the Soviet Union, which is the historical point of departure of this 
thesis, is often mentioned as an important milestone of modernisation, the 
beginning of late or reflexive modernity. However, the nature of Soviet 
modernity has received little attention (there are also views that ‘Soviet’ and 
‘modernity’ do not fit together at all). The institutions of a society emanate from 
its cultural tradition. Therefore, different cultures respond to the challenge of 
modernisation in different ways. The peculiarities of the modernisation of the 
western part of the former Soviet Union (including Estonia) and its impacts on 
environmental communication are one of the subjects of this thesis. 
Estonia has quickly developed in the modernisation of its environmental 
politics, especially in the course of the accession to the European Union. Still, 
unexpected setbacks in environmental use and management are not unknown in 
Estonia. Attempts are made to revive the oil shale industry, which has withered 
as a result of the structural changes that occurred after Estonia regained its 
independence, despite the expiry of the ‘grace period’ offered by CO2 
emissions trading. Tentative suggestions have been made to start phosphorite 
mining, which only a quarter of a century ago was a catalyst for the so-called 
‘phosphorite war’. Despite increasing pollution levels and decreasing fish 
resources in the Baltic Sea, all attempts to regulate agriculture, transit and 
fishing industries – the economic levers behind the decline – have failed. This 
raises a question, whether Estonia suffers from insufficient modernisation 
(insufficient acknowledgement of problems) or is already hindered by excessive 
reflexive modernisation (enforced enlightenment in Beck’s terms). 
As the opening examples of the introduction warn about disjunction between 
excessive reflexivity and improvements in natural environment, this thesis, 
which concerns itself with environmental communication, has no option but to 
take a critical stand. 
Unlike the studies into environmental awareness and risk communication 
that treat communication a priori as a positive phenomenon, which should 
improve the well-being of people and society by increasing and developing 
knowledge, my dissertation is written in a critical paradigm, seeking to interpret 
the ‘given’ social institutions, social relations and legitimate meanings, and asks 
(Cox 1981): How did they emerge and where are they headed? Why do we 
3
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consider something to be a serious environmental issue? Which criteria do we 
use to identify risks and assess their potential realisation? How is public opinion 
formed around what to consider adequate and appropriate solutions? Why can 
we not achieve a satisfactory outcome? Which conditions in a late modern 
society make it possible to debate over environmental issues and enable its 
continuation? 
Beck (2009) claims that global risk designs completely a new kind of public 
spheres, that, contrary to Habermasian voluntariness-based public sphere, are 
based on the enforced opposition to risk, being also emotionally and 
existentially defined. These public spheres are joined by public accusation and 
denouncement, formed of selectivity and also misunderstanding. However, 
Habermas stresses this phenomenon already in 1975 in “Legitimation Crisis”, 
but centrally claims that it is the way society opposes individuals that will start 
undermining the ability to find solutions to socially defined problems. Beck’s 
companion in the development of ideas about individualisation and risk, 
Anthony Giddens, has in his earlier work on agency and structure (“The 
Constitution of Society” 1984), emphasised quite the contrary. For him, those 
are only individuals and their actions, which mutually shape the society through 
forming institutions. 
Similarly to Beck (2002), Giddens (1997) claims that individuals in the 
present day complex society acquire a compulsion to lead a life of their own. 
This has an enormous effect on social structures and the institutions that uphold 
it. Still, there remains the question of how the social institutions still stand, as 
the practices of individuals depart in such a high degree. As the complexity 
grows, in order to survive, individuals cannot invent the rules and resources on 
their own as this puts them in jeopardy of slipping in decision-making. The 
complexity must still retreat to a certain degree of simplification of practices 
that enable individuals to understand each other in the context of such 
complexity. Complexity must enforce new institutions, to enable individuals to 
define their life courses in relation to others, and build their personal routines 
irrespective of the fall of old institutions (which as a course is doubtful to 
occur). As the function of the routine is to ease the anxiety about uncertainty, 
the lack of stable signs about anxiety in society shows that the routines still 
exist (be it compulsion, if nothing else). Therefore, the increase in complexity 
must also increase some kind of common mechanisms of reflexivity, to 
guarantee mutual understanding between individuals. As the theory of 
structuration does not explain this problem I have turned to the critical system-
based approaches. The thesis is theoretically inspired by Habermas’ theory of 
communicative action, which drags between lifeworld2 and the system, and 
                                                                          
2  ‘Lifeworld’ is a definition used in the theoretical chapter. According to Jürgen 
Habermas (1984, 1989), lifeworld is a set of culturally ingrained and socially integrated 
meanings, opinions and skills. Comparing other approaches to lifeworld, Habermas’ 
approach pays more attention to the linguistic shaping of the meanings of the lifeworld. 
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Luhmann’s constructivist approach to social system, which centrally addresses 
complexity. The complexity is firstly a matter of the system, not the agent. The 
individual cannot be informed and feel alarmed about all kind of risks; therefore 
the complexity may stand invisible to them. 
Therefore, the complexity will mask the need for the individuals to look over 
the historical paths of dependency that keep the society on an unsustainable 
road, and increase the speed of the exploitation of its resources. The complexity 
will also distract environmentally alarmed individuals, providing them with 
seemingly outstanding solutions but factually with the accumulation of 
instrumentality. 
The objective of the thesis is to identify the conditions that are required to 
avoid incrementalisation3 of environmental communication through its 
reproduction process, so that individuals could find better solutions to 
environmental issues and risks at both personal and collective levels. 
I will look for the reasons in the second, theoretical chapter of the thesis, by 
following the ideas of the three above-named authors – Luhmann, Habermas 
and Giddens. Like the authors, I was inspired by macro level theories because I 
agree that no phenomenon is meaningful unless it is related to society as a 
whole, which connects different phenomena with each other. The theoretical 
chapter discusses the ideas of the phenomenologist Jürgen Habermas, radical 
constructivist Niklas Luhmann, and Anthony Giddens, a critic of structuralism 
and historical materialism. Their ideas serve as a source of inspiration both for 
looking for theoretical solutions to complexity and for interpreting relevant 
empirical evidence in the context of a post-Soviet country such as Estonia. 
Jürgen Habermas fascinates us with his approach to social crisis as something 
created by society’s inability to reproduce itself; his theory of communicative 
action contrasts individual lifeworld with the system and stresses the 
importance of linguistic communication in shaping the shared knowledge of 
people. Niklas Luhmann’s approach to social systems enables us to specify and 
justify Habermas’ assertion that no social crisis is manifested in a way that 
people perceive it. Luhmann enables us to understand why some decisions seem 
to be more ‘right’ and are accepted more easily and why decisions change over 
time and in different contexts. Anthony Giddens is not referred to in the articles 
that form the body of the thesis, but he has inspired me with his approach to 
individuals’ routine practices and their side effects by incorporating reification, 
the human body and sub-consciousness in the social theory as constraining 
factors of social embeddedness and factors under constraint. His arguments are 
interpreted and discussed in the cover article of the thesis. Interpretation of the 
ideas of these authors in the field of environmental communication creates an 
interesting set of contradictions that are discussed in the cover article: 
                                                                          
3  ‘Incrementality’ means accumulation and fragmentation and therefore, stress on 
reflection. Incrementality is discussed in the article ON PLANNING, in the part dealing with 
the paradigm of communicative planning. 
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1. the development of society in phases (Habermas, Giddens) versus its 
uniform and logical radicalisation as a communication system 
(Luhmann) 
2. linguistic expression as the medium for the communication of 
meanings (Habermas) versus language as just one of the meaningful 
practices (Giddens) versus language as a medium of communication 
which is not directly related to meaning (Luhmann) 
3. the human body and its routine practices as the factors structuring 
society (Giddens) versus ‘reification’ of social theory as an impossible 
task (Luhmann) 
4. communication as the operation of a social system (Luhmann) versus 
interhuman activity (Habermas, Giddens)4. 
 
In discussing these theoretical contradictions I have used reasoning and selected 
illustrative examples from the articles that reflect my empirical investigations of 
the field of environmental communication. However, in order to present the 
original empirical findings that have shaped my theoretical search in compact 
and integrated format, I have composed the first chapter of the thesis, which 
raises the same problems from the empirical point of view. In both chapters, the 
general logic of discussion proceeds from the level of system to the level of 
lifeworld based on the common premises and is bounded around two main 
research questions that are opened up and explained below. 
Based on these social-theoretical books and essays I formulate the premises 
that the cover article of my dissertation follows. These premises serve as a basis 
for analysing the communication of environmental issues and they find more 
clarification in the second chapter of the thesis: 
The environment can be given meaning only through communication be-
cause neither man nor society has immediate understanding of the intrinsic 
value of nature. However, the fact that the natural environment or 
                                                                          
4  In the cover article of the thesis I focus mainly on the following pieces: 
by Anthony Giddens: 
‘The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration.’ (1984) 
‘Living in a post-traditional society’ in: Reflexive modernization: Politics, tradition and 
aesthetics in the modern social order (1994) 
by Jürgen Habermas: 
‘Legitimation crisis’ (1975) 
 ‘The Theory of Communicative Action. Volume 1: Reason and the Rationalization of 
Society’ (1981) 
‘The Theory of Communicative Action. Volume 2: Lifeworld and System: A Critique of 
Functionalist Reason’ (1981) 
by Niklas Luhmann: 
‘Ecological communication’ (1989) 
‘Risk: A Sociological Theory’ (1993) 
‘Social Systems’ (1995) 
13 
environmental issues are not interpreted in the course of interaction does not 
mean that individuals do no relate to the environment. 
It should be taken into consideration that communication couldn’t describe 
the environment holistically, but only by differentiation of its selected aspects. 
For example, the meaning of environmental pollution is conveyed through 
understanding that non-pollution is also possible. 
The diverse forms in which the natural environment presents itself to an 
individual are related to the conditions of the structural reproduction of society. 
In a simple system – a primitive and traditional society – the perception of the 
environment is more direct than in a modern society where the environment is 
perceived through science, consumer culture, mass media or even laws and 
regulations. A modern society is characterised by inconsistent definitions of 
nature provided by different institutions and all efforts to remove such 
inconsistencies only facilitate further fragmentation. 
Meaning-creating environmental communication between individuals is 
possible only if interaction between individuals is exposed to institutional rules. 
Without exposure to scientific, business and political or administrative 
institutions, an individual would not be able to make conscious decisions, for 
example about saving energy. The exposure to institutions stimulates 
individuals’ intrinsic need for giving a meaning to any new situation (e.g. to 
formulate new risks) but also enables society to address the anxiety caused by 
the perception of obscurity and contradictions. The forms of the socialisation of 
individuals’ anxiety about the environment cannot be used to eradicate the 
anxiety and environmental risks; they can only be directed, as ‘communication 
topics’, to the reproduction processes of society as a social system. Modernity, 
however, creates situations where individuals are set in contradistinction to their 
own demands and those of others. 
Emanating from these premises I focus in my analysis on the social context 
of the perception of environment and environmental risks, as individual can 
perceive and act with regard to risks and problems only under structural 
conditions, although the individual might not acknowledge these conditions. 
The discourse of the research into risk perception has indeed shifted from 
technical and rational risk definitions to social ones, i.e. risks have no inherent 
definition, and they are imagined, construed and established in social 
communication (Van Loon 2002; Kahan et al 2011; Aven & Renn 2009; 
Boholm & Corvellec 2011). However in the research into environmental 
consciousness, on the contrary, the focus has centrally been centred on 
behaviour change, emphasising individual determinants, not the context. The 
approach to environmental consciousness as a manifest discourse or the result 
of structural conditions has found much less attention in scientific literature (e.g 
Rannikko 1996, Leiserowitz & Fernandez 2007, Wielewska & Sikorska 2007). 
My approach to both research fields has an emphasis on the individual’s 




The research questions of the present thesis approach the issue of 
incrementalisation from both sides – the agent and the structure. The research 
questions of my thesis are, firstly: 
Why doesn’t the institutionalisation of environmental issues in complex 
societies offer solutions without rebound effects? 
Two of the articles of my thesis, the article ON ENVIRONMENTAL 
CONSCIOUSNESS (I) in particular, and the article ON PLANNING (II), to a 
certain extent, both empirically describe communication of environmental 
issues. The analysis and conclusions aim to generalise upon very different 
original and secondary data, to describe the dynamics of communication around 
environment and the factors that have shaped it in the example of the Estonian 
modernisation process over the past 25 years. The articles confirm the existence 
of changes that are absent in late modernity. Present day Estonia is cha-
racterised by the decreasing direct contact with nature and increasing level of 
mediation of environmental issues, the fragmentation of the solutions of 
environmental issues between various institutions and domains of power (e.g. 
legal regulation, development plans and policy programmes, research and 
development projects etc.), growing acknowledgement among the members of 
society about unknown side-effects of the industrial use of natural resources and 
the attempts to manage the associated risks (e.g. food safety, industrial 
pollution, addressing the scarcity of resources). The article ON ENVIRON-
MENTAL CONSCIOUSNESS (I) analyses Estonian modernisation processes 
through the example of environmental consciousness. All modernisation stages 
(early, simple, late) have found respective equivalents in the paradigms of 
environmental consciousness by looking at the activities of different institutions 
carrying environmental consciousness along the temporal-spatial axis from the 
end of the Soviet period until the second decade of Estonia’s continuing 
integration with the rest of the European Union. The article ON PLANNING 
(II) looks in detail into one of the paradigms of environmental consciousness 
(the social paradigm) and its legitimising and reproducing communication. The 
article analyses a case involving the preparation of a development plan for the 
exploitation of natural resources and its opposition by the local community. 
My second research question is: 
Why are individuals unable to converge around environmental issues? 
On the basis of the articles ON RISKS (III) and ON CONSUMPTION (IV), 
and the article ON PLANNING (II), to an extent, I discuss whether the anxiety5 
and anguish of the lifeworld have a potential to reduce the complexity, 
fragmentation and incrementalisation of (late) modernity. These articles concern 
the interpretation of environmental risks and issues at the level of individuals 
and their relation with explanations and solutions proposed at the institutional 
                                                                          
5  Anxiety is for Luhmann (1993: 127) a theme, whose role is to alleviate the contradiction 
between norm and deviation. He claims that there is a new type of morality, whose aim is 
not to avoid deviations, but the anxiety itself. 
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level in various processes of participation (exposure to risk and pollution, 
everyday consumption of goods and services, a community protest against 
regional industrial development projects). The analysis reveals various patterns 
of how members of society relate to systematically (re)produced environmental 
risks. It appears from the analysis that the assertions of theorists like Beck 
(1986/92) concerning the redistributing power of a risk are valid, although 
individuals may not be aware of the risk and be unable to perceive it in their 
everyday life. Although the risk that has seemingly an equal potential to harm 
very different individuals, it still has various degrees of potential to alarm and 
test trust. Based on quantitative and empirical data I found, as was to be 
expected, that the exposure to different risks and respective practices is related 
to individual’s positioning with regard to social structure. 
As the articles of the thesis are empirical and the contact of these with the 
theoretical research questions is not direct and self-evident, I need to generalise 
first the empirical conclusions based on the articles in order to link those to the 
theoretical concepts. Therefore, in the first chapter of this dissertation, I will 
analyse the development of communication of environmental issues and risks in 
Estonia over the past 25 years and highlight the characteristics related to 
modernisation. Compared with Western Europe, which has developed slowly 
over a long period of time, Estonian public environmental communication has 
developed rapidly, which allows us to analyse in a greater detail the dynamics 
of the development of modernity. Therefore, analysis is also easier than in the 
case of Western Europe as the trends are more prominent. The Soviet ‘heritage’ 
offers a researcher an opportunity to look at the modernity of the ‘capitalist 
society’ from the side. The Estonian re-orientation practices enable us to see the 
dynamics and impact of the conditions shaping public communication. A 
distinct case enables a researcher to explore whether the difficulties in solving 
the problems related to public communication of environmental issues are 
caused by ‘slow development’ (inability to catch up with the West) or by 
inevitable (or avoidable) obstacles occurring in the dynamics of modernity. 
Building on the conclusions of the empirical analysis, I will turn to the 
theoretical interpretation of the empirical material. 
In the second chapter, I will seek answers to the theoretical questions, based 
on macro-level social theories – the system and structuration theories. 
In the conclusion I integrate the theoretical problems and empirical analysis 
of the Estonian context.  
 
The objective of the thesis and research questions 
 
The objective of the study is to identify the conditions that should be created 
in order to prevent the incrementalisation of environmental commu-
nication through reproduction and to enable individuals to find better 
solutions to environmental issues and risks at both personal and collective 
levels. 
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To identify these conditions I answer first of all two theoretical questions (in 
Chapter 2) 
I. Why doesn’t the institutionalisation of environmental issues in complex 
societies offer solutions without rebound effects? 
II. Why are individuals unable to converge around environmental issues? 
 
Anticipating the lack of contextualisation of the theoretical discussion, I will 
introduce empirical evidence, by focussing on the changes in the commu-
nication of environment and risk in Estonia over the past 25 years and seek 
answers to the following questions (in Chapter 1): 
1. What are the dynamics of the public communication of environmental issues 
and risks used in Estonia over the past 25 years? (Studies I, II, IV) 
2. Which economic, political, historical and cultural factors shape the commu-
nication of environmental issues and risks? How did the modernisation of 
Estonia within the Soviet Union and as an EU member state influence the 
communication of environmental issues? (Studies I, III, IV) 
3. How have the opportunities for individuals to converge around and discuss 
environmental issues and risks and their possible solutions changed over the 
past 25 years? What challenges are the participants in the discussions facing 
due to those changes? (Studies I–IV) 
4. Why can’t institutions meet individuals’ expectations regarding environ-
mental issues and risks, and vice versa, why is it so difficult for individuals 
to communicate their expectations and anxiety in a way that is acceptable to 
and taken into account by institutions? (Studies II, III) 
5. What problems are caused by the fact that there are fewer shared experiences 
(experiences are fragmented in modernity) and that solutions are sought at a 
more abstract, linguistic level? (Studies II, III) 
6. Why is a broad-based discussion on the environment missing in society, 
although it is often clamoured for, and unsolved issues increase the general 
level of anxiety? Which conditions can create a common concern, as 
occurred during the Phosphorite War6? 
 
 
Choice of material and research methods 
Anxiety over the environment is expressed in various mechanisms of the 
functioning of society – in consumption decisions, in public decision-making 
concerning the use of the environment, in acknowledging environmental issues 
and increasingly, in receiving institutional messages that shape public commu-
nication (through various media channels). There are more but this dissertation 
focuses on the nodal points of the expression of anxiety. I will explore 
                                                                          
6  The Phosphorite War was an environmental campaign in 1988–1992, a catalyst that led 
to many political and social changes and eventually, to Estonia regaining its independence. 
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communication of environmental issues and risks in Estonia in its different 
forms: 
Political documents (the article ON ENVIRONMENTAL CONSCIOUS-
NESS, I; the article ON PLANNING, II): This thesis analyses the formation of 
environmental development plans and legislation over time. Background 
information about how the implementation of a political declaration may differ 
from the initial objective was gathered by interviewing experienced environ-
mental protection specialists, analysing the reports issued by the National Audit 
Office and obviously, by observing the implementation of legislation/ 
development plans – I have been involved in the activities of different 
environmental organisations for more than a decade. In greater detail, I have 
analysed the preparation of one particular development plan – The National 
Development Plan for the Use of Oil Shale, 2008–2015. I conducted focus 
group discussions with community members opposing the extraction of oil 
shale; spoke to the representatives of different stakeholders (officials of the 
Ministry of the Environment, the Secretary General, environmental protection 
specialists, representatives of citizens’ associations, rural municipality mayors, 
researchers etc.); participated as an observer in meetings I had been granted 
access to; analysed the recordings and minutes of the meetings I was denied 
access to. I have also analysed the communication between different parties, 
and representation in the media, which, is not, however, discussed in this paper. 
The extensive analysis served as a basis for the article ON PLANNING (II), in 
which I contextualised the opinions of local people about the strategy 
development process. The article ON ENVIRONMENTAL CONSCIOUSNESS 
(I) discusses, inter alia, the changes in the programmes of political parties over a 
period, which includes several elections. In 2005, I analysed the programs of 
political parties prior to local elections, using a chart of environmental 
consciousness paradigms, which I had developed myself7. In 2011, a student 
under my supervision, Kristjan Gold, also analysed the programmes of political 
parties in the eve of parliamentary elections, using the classification of value 
orientations developed by Lauristin & Firsov (1987) in a study on the use of the 
media, conducted in 1983. I have used the method also myself in a media 
analysis (Kiisel et al 2011), see: journalistic approaches. 
                                                                          
7  The paradigms of environmental consciousness, operationalised in the article ON 
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSCIOUSNESS (I), are inspired, firstly, by Ulrich Beck’s 
approach to modernisation, and secondly, by environmental ethics. The first has helped me 
to ground the ideas that I had about the changes in environmental consciousness, the second 
loaned me the names for the paradigms. I did not find it useful to focus on already existing 
approaches to paradigms of e.g environmental ethics, as these traditionally begin with the 
anthropocentric/social paradigm. In the theoretical chapter I posit that a human being cannot 
be anthropocentric or ecological, as these concepts are always abstractions that emanate 
from the particular point of view, having no groundedness in the real world, neither in 
humans, nor in nature. 
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Journalistic approaches, media representation (the article ON ENVI-
RONMENTAL CONSCIOUSNESS, I): in 2010 and 2011, my research group 
and I conducted a media study in which we compared the representation of the 
environment and nature in the media. I compared the journalistic content 
created in 1995, 2000, 2005 and 2010. For the research material national dailies 
were chosen, and the copies for analysis were selected on the same basis for 
each year under investigation (every week day and month was presented). The 
object of the study was the whole paper, from which the situations that 
described in one or the other way the relationship between humans and nature 
were differentiated. Every unit of analysis was observed by two researchers in 
order to avoid excess subjectivity. The study followed the example of the 
above-mentioned media study of 1983 (Lauristin & Firsov 1987). The 
methodology overlapped partially and therefore, I could include years 1982 and 
1983 in the comparison. In my opinion, what are especially interesting are the 
changes in value orientations represented in media texts. The starting point here 
was that each text situation (there could be several for one article) has its 
agenda, be it latent or evident; the value orientation is a viewpoint or angle 
according to which the environment or nature is interpreted by the author. There 
were 15 different value orientations: ecological, scientific, ethical, aesthetic, 
cultural-historical, ideological, biological, consumerist, social, economic-
productive, technological, institutional-administrative, juridical, politics 
oriented (separately national and foreign-global). 
Instrumental danger warnings (the article ON RISKS, III): While risk 
awareness is analysed mainly by using quantitative research, and the focus is 
mainly on risks, whose effect does not manifest itself immediately and there-
fore, does not require immediate action (see literature research of Hawkes & 
Rowe 2008, Chryssochoidis et al. 2009), the empirical focus group discussions, 
conducted by my colleagues in different regions of Estonia, used a different 
approach. The respondents in the focus groups were instructed to discuss 
various messages warning against real and serious risks, notwithstanding the 
fact that the focus group method can hardly imitate real life – in a real 
dangerous situation people are often surrounded by strangers whose demo-
graphic background and awareness of risks can be very different. The analysis 
focused on how different people can find solutions and to what extent this 
process is supported by collective interaction. The interviews were coded using 
a scheme developed after initial reading. Two basic categories were used in 
coding: 1) perception of the acute risk message and 2) positioning of oneself in 
relation to previous experience, communication networks and the decisive 
structures of the social system. I have also studied the relation of individuals to 
risks within the research project ‘Me. The World. The Media’ (see the next 
paragraph). 
Consumption and other practices (the article ON CONSUMPTION, IV): I 
have analysed the practices used by individuals on the basis of the 
representative quantitative social research ‘Me. The World. The Media’, 
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conducted by the researchers at the Institute of Journalism, Communication and 
Information Sciences, University of Tartu. The analysis of the article ON 
CONSUMPTION (IV) was prepared in cooperation with my colleagues. I have 
compared the single variables from 2002, 2005, 2008 and 2011, but also created 
indices, which I have also used in the article ON ENVIRONMENTAL 
CONSCIOUSNESS (I). 
 
The following methods of data collection and analysis were used in the 
empirical studies (Table 1):  
 
Table 1. Research methods of the articles 












X X  X 
PLANNING   X  
RISKS   X X 
CONSUMPTION  X   
 
Each method is described in detail in the relevant part of each publication. 
In addition, I have used the findings of a cluster analysis based on the study 
‘Me. The World. The Media’ (2002–2011). The overview of the principles of 
the composition of the main indices and clusters will be found from the 
appendices. I have also used media analysis ‘Environmental issues in print 
media’ conducted with the financial support of the Environmental Investment 
Centre (Kiisel et al. 2011). 
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1. COMMUNICATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
ISSUES AND RISKS IN ESTONIA,  
AND CHANGES IN AND FACTORS  
AFFECTING COMMUNICATION 
Below, I will give an overview of the empirical conclusions drawn from the 
publications used in the dissertation, broken down by research questions. 
 
What are the dynamics of the public communication of environmental 
issues and risks used in Estonia over the past 25 years? 
 
As explained in the introduction, this thesis focuses centrally on the social 
context of the public communication of environmental issues and risks. 
Therefore, very different factors are brought together in one picture. The article 
ON ENVIRONMENTAL CONSCIOUSNESS (I) focuses on the development 
of Estonian environmental policies, changes in the environmental media and 
media representation of environmental issues, and the development of citizens’ 
action and consumption behaviours. The articles ON RISKS (III) and 
PLANNING (II) discuss the practices of interaction between institutions and 
individuals; the article ON CONSUMPTION (IV) focuses on the replacement 
of the nature relations peculiar to the natural economy by modern environ-
mental consumption practices. 
Naturally, these factors that shape public communication do not function 
alone. They are in constant interaction with each other: a shaping factor 
becomes a factor being shaped. In Giddens’s terms, changes in social structure 
enforce individual reactions, which in turn shape the social structure of society. 
I will look at the development of the communication-shaping factors in terms of 
the dynamics of the development of modernity. I will identify, from the 
perspective of environmental issues, the social dynamics and learning processes 
characteristic of modernity, which can be followed with the help of empirical 
data. 
In addition to modernisation, the second important macro-level change that 
has shaped public communication about the environment in Estonia is the 
change from Soviet modernity to the modernity of the West. The fall of the 
Soviet Union is often mentioned as an important milestone of modernisation, 
the beginning of reflexive modernity for the Western world. The peculiarities 
and paths of the modernisation of (the western part of) the former Soviet Union 
are not, however, much discussed academically. 
In order to visualise the dynamics of modernisation in the context of 
environmental issues, I have formulated in the article ON ENVIRONMENTAL 
CONSCIOUSNESS (I) three paradigms of environmental consciousness, 
influenced by Ulrich Beck and modernisation theories in general. The 
paradigms are labelled according to widespread concepts of environmental 
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ethics and philosophy (social/anthropocentric, environmental and ecological). 
However, my approach to these terms expresses my dissatisfaction with the 
general use of these concepts in environmental philosophy. In my view, the 
dynamics of environmental consciousness are not about the change from 
anthropocentrism to ecocentrism, as both of them assume the defining of nature, 
which can only be done through anthropocentric construction. We can’t escape 
the fact that we are human. The approach of Luhmann (see Chapter 2) helps to 
explain this more clearly. My approach to these widespread concepts is tied to 
the process of how “environment” is defined, and I use three stages in this 
process. The elements of what to consider important in these dynamics are 
derived from the stages of modernisation: early, simple and late modernity. All 
of these are modern paradigms that observe nature from a distance (otherness), 
i.e. they are opposed to the imaginary “traditional” approach according to which 
natural processes are the immediate drivers of the functioning mechanisms of 
the lifeworld. 
I have followed the dynamics of the modernisation of environmental 
consciousness through several decades. The focal point in the development of 
the paradigms is formed by the ways of reflecting on the environment. An 
outlined overview of the paradigms is provided in Table 1 of the article ON 
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSCIOUSNESS. Below is a short summary of those 
paradigms. 
The social, or anthropocentric, paradigm corresponds to the general world-
view of the early industrial society, which defines nature as a resource. A 
culturally external perception of the environment makes it difficult to 
acknowledge problems. If acknowledged, environmental problems are 
perceived as contradictions to purity and order, or to personal well-being. 
Actualised environmental problems are interpreted as occasional threats 
(accidents happen). Environment-related practices are not defined as environ-
mentally alarmed; they are pragmatically shaped routines. 
The environmental paradigm gathers strength in simple modernity, the 
developed industrial society. Although nature is still treated as a resource, it is 
also seen as a culture theme: frequent coping with environmental problems has 
brought the environment back to the culturally internal. Therefore, environ-
mentalism and environmentally acknowledged practices are perceived as social 
norms. This world-view represents trust in science, technology, the liberal 
economy and sustainable development. According to the environmental 
paradigm, environmental endangerment and threats from nature originate from 
the insufficient adjustment of technology (for example, insufficient information 
distribution) and excessive exploitation of natural resources. 
The ecological paradigm arises in late modernity, the risk society. This 
paradigm originates from the cognition of ambivalence in risk and “healing” 
messages. The ambiguity of the interpretation of environmental problems 
endangers the rationality of the environmental paradigm and trust in the liberal 
economy. As the environmental paradigm justifies action through trust in expert 
6
22 
systems and sub-policies, the ecological paradigm adjusts individualised risk 
strategies to given circumstances. This might result in a constant struggle to be 
aware of a risk situation, in re-invention of the traditional lifestyle, in protest 
against institutionalisation, or in mourning (acknowledgement of a personal 
lack of ability). Therefore, the link between certain practices and environmental 
concerns blurs in late modernity. 
The alternation of the paradigms in different time periods is illustrated in 
Table 1, in the example of different factors that shape environmental 
consciousness. The table also reveals the peculiarities of Soviet modernity. 
While the institutional level shifted from the social to the environmental 
paradigm, individuals and their ways of converging were more similar to the 
ecological paradigm (although other paradigms were also represented). 
Moreover, the movement from the social to the ecological paradigm was not 
linear: there were also some setbacks (the period of the Phosphorite War). This 
emphasises the contextual design of reflection and reflexivity: the Estonian 
experience reveals that there was not a sequential development from the 
anthropocentric to the ecocentric world-view. 
In the context of this paper, the ecological paradigm does not indicate the 
formation of an extra environmentally friendly form of society. It means that 
making ecological processes objects of communication created numerous 
possibilities for interpretation. Some of these interpretations were undoubtedly 
hidden or intrinsic; some constituted objects of social discussion and others, 
despite being causes of social anxiety, couldn’t be discussed publicly (see 
Chapter 2). The inertness of the social paradigm at the institutional level is 
expressed in the latter. This does not mean there was blatant hostility of the 
institutions towards the environment but merely that the institutional reflection 
had its own limits of development. The development of institutional reflection 
requires human and financial resources and, more importantly, time. These are 
the resources that Estonia has lacked in its rapid development. 
Other reasons for nature and the environment becoming objects of 
increasingly diverse communication are urbanisation and economic develop-
ment. Immediate exposure to nature and the practices of the natural economy 
are no longer prevalent and, therefore, the reproduction of nature occurs through 
communication (reproduction in the media, marketing communication and 
participation). A significant decline in the two main nature-related practices is 
illustrated in Figure 1. In the case of gardening, the declining trend has clearly 
stopped: it seems that gardening as a part of consumption culture is making a 
comeback. Today, gardening is not just about planting vegetables and phloxes. 





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The best overview of public communication and its pragmatic formation is 
provided by how the media deal with nature. The media study referred to in the 
article ON ENVIRONMENTAL CONSCIOUSNESS (I) highlights the changes 
in the communication of nature and environmental issues, broken down by the 
time periods also covered by this dissertation (other factors are discussed under 
the subsequent question). Nowadays, it is common that environmental acts are 
rationalised through institutional communication rather than through inde-
pendent observation of the environment. This has resulted in a rapid fragmen-
tation of the communication of environmental issues. The communication of 
environmental issues as a whole has become more complex, although 
communication “occurs” more often. 
For example, the late 1980s, which are described as a globally restless and 
reflective period characterised by major global political decisions (including 
those concerning sustainable development), also constituted a pioneering period 
in public communication, a phenomenon that has not recurred since. The period 
of regaining independence had some features of the ecological paradigm 
peculiar to late modernity. After 1995, the political (and also legal) approach to 
the environment decreased significantly and was replaced by sub-political 
approaches – technical and economic – which did not ask where the problem 
was and what should be done to solve it, but how to implement the decisions 




















1983* 1994* 2002** 2005** 2008** 2011**
staying in the wild, 
hiking, observing nature
working in the garden
 
Figure 1. Decrease in nature-related practices 1983–2011 Estonian population  
(* answers: “regularly” + “often” on a five-point scale; ** answers: “often” + 
“sometimes” on a four-point scale) (Lauristin and Firsov 1987, Kaasik et al 1996, Me. 
The World. The Media 2002–2011) 
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regulations, not in their environmental protection effect. Therefore, the public 
communication of the 1990s was characterised by the social paradigm, which in 
my analysis is linked to early modernity. But it is emphasised in my analysis 
that the developing sub-politics was not based on the politics that had been 
reflected within the Estonian “public spheres”, but imposed top down by the EU 
without local reflection or the ability to modify it. There was little foundation of 
sub-politics in the lifeworld of individuals. Therefore, the practice of environ-
mental politics that was concerned with the translation of Western procedures 
was blind to lifeworld concerns and communication. 
In parallel with the increasing implementation of environmental restrictions 
after the legal vacuum of the nineties, the economy began seeking new outputs 
in nature, disguising its requirements as the demands of consumers. In media, 
the rise of the consumerist world-view (expressing the prerogative of humans 
regarding natural resources) and the decline in ethical, ideological, aesthetic and 
cultural-historical viewpoints that started in the late 1990s were the major trends 
that characterised the long-term changes in the attitude towards nature. 
Arguments for not defining the environment according to economic purposes 
were more and more de-legitimised. Figure 4 in the article ON ENVIRON-
MENTAL CONSCIOUSNESS (I) illustrates the major changes in the attitudes 
towards nature in national dailies. As the concern about the environment among 
individuals had not declined, especially regarding Estonian forests, which were 
massively harvested for timber that was exported to the West, the decrease in 
public attention can be explained by structural conditions which did not let the 
concern of individuals coalesce into public pressure. 
The 1980s were characterised by a strong humanitarian approach towards 
nature, which is rather surprising considering the inhuman nature of the socialist 
system. A society that had an active relationship with nature, yet whose 
institutional practices did not admit the existence of environmental issues (the 
social paradigm) still treated nature from a humanitarian point of view, which 
opened and reiterated the otherwise inherent relationship with nature and the 
ethical tradition. The fact that Soviet society was less complex, i.e. it did not 
allow asking specific questions that would have raised the level of complexity, 
may have played a role here. But it is possible that the humanitarian viewpoint 
was triggered as a shared opposition to the inhuman practices of Soviet 
modernity. 
The growing anxiety at the end of the 1980s raised ecological and scientific 
(as well as humanitarian) questions. The scientific arena became intertwined 
with a clear ideological viewpoint: that environmental protection was 
indispensable. This wave of anxiety was accompanied by institutional confusion 
and the relaxation of rules. But in a country that had regained its independence, 
i.e. a society that had been rejuvenated through the reduction of complexity, the 
importance of nature as an object of discussion was decreased because attention 
was focused on the rebuilding of institutions. During that period, the expression 
of instrumental and consumerist viewpoints increased in the media (similarly to 
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the beginning of early modern society, the exploitation of the environment 
ensured the economic growth required for the dynamics of society). 
The media analysis of the article ON ENVIRONMENTAL CON-
SCIOUSNESS reveals that in a highly developed society (nowadays) the 
importance of instrumental viewpoints decreases, while the importance of 
consumerist (temptations of the consumer culture) and scientific viewpoints (as 
a prerequisite for economic growth) strengthens. We can argue that the 
instrumental approach is disguised in various forms, as it is not usually publicly 
discussed, but is rather the designer of discussion. However, scientific 
viewpoints have lost their connectedness to ideological goals, changing along 
with economic goals. Individuals who are genuinely concerned about the 
environment are also surrounded by such market rhetoric. At the same time, the 
practical immediate relationship with nature that helps to implement fragmented 
environmental messages is decreasing. 
In parallel with people moving away from nature and the increasing 
fragmentation/controversy of environmental communication, the discursive 
level of political problem solving is diverging from actual environmental 
practices. An example given in the article ON PLANNING (II) of how the 
meta-concept of “sustainable development” has changed indicates that political 
discussion is shifting towards instrumental debates, which are definitely easier 
to achieve than humanitarian goals, but more distant from the anxiety perceived 
in the lifeworld. The analysis of the logic of the participation process in the 
same article revealed that, although the public discussion in itself was 
instrumental, the decision-making path from the problem proposition to the 
solution was not. The instrumentality lay in the linguistic level of discussions, 
but the decision itself led to uncertainty in favour of economic interest. Here the 
theories of modernisation allow choosing between two options: whether the 
society has developed in an overly complex manner so that the reaction to 
lifeworld anxiety exceeds its rationalisation capabilities (peculiar to late 
modernity), or whether there is a mistake in the assumption of what we can call 
the core of the social system. I prefer the second explanation, according to 
which the reflective “public sphere” was staged next to another, unpublicised 
sphere that followed the logic of early modernity. 
It can be concluded that the development of modernity in a transition 
country leads to the emergence of the ecological paradigm in environmental 
consciousness, although at the institutional level the changes are more inert and 
masked, and the social or environmental paradigm is prevalent. The institutional 
capacity of a small, developing country for contradictory reflection develops 
slowly, as its state apparatus is not as responsive to the demands of complexity as 
in the case of old big European states. The collapse of the existing social system 
and transfer to a new system played a role in the dynamics of environmental 
paradigms, in particular in the appearance of the ecological paradigm of the 
Phosphorite War of the 1980s (which involved extremely complex issues, 
although they were few in number compared to the present time).  
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Which economic, political, historical and cultural factors shape the 
communication of environmental issues and risks? How did the 
modernisation of Estonia within the Soviet Union and as an EU member 
state influence the communication of environmental issues? 
 
Economic factors. The Soviet system rationalised itself through five-year 
production plans that subordinated nature to the Soviet system. Therefore, the 
exploitation of natural resources was discursively justified as a public good. In 
Eastern Europe, decisions about nature were made in the closed circle of 
politicised science, industries and state apparatuses (Kochtcheeva 2002; 
Rinkevičius 2006; van Assche et al., 2010; Waller 2010). Still, the peculiarity 
of Soviet industrialism was that the causes of environmental problems were 
attributed to cultural and social, not economic-technological reasons as in the 
Western industrial societies. As industry had direct access to political power, 
unreasonable extensive production and experiments with nature were possible. 
Although norms to protect nature existed, the norm levels were basically 
classified. However, despite rapid urbanisation, a relatively large number of 
inhabitants were employed in the sector of (intensive) agriculture. Due to the 
low quality of and deficit in retail products, the practices of the natural economy 
were relatively vital and people were kept from extensive consumerism. 
Therefore, exploitive production existed along with a frugal lifestyle. The lack 
of opposition to economic power shaped the face of Soviet modernity: a low 
degree of system complexity, a high degree of uncertainty in decision-making 
and the repression of feedback to the system. 
The analysis of scientific articles for the article ON ENVIRONMENTAL 
CONSCIOUSNESS (I) showed that the environmentally hostile decisions and 
plans of the industrial sector formed the propelling force of the popular 
movements in Eastern Europe in general in the 1980s. The following decade 
witnessed, on the one hand, the collapse of economies (large enterprises going 
out of business) and the disappearance of major sources of pollution and, on the 
other hand, a decline in the capability of collective reflection. Individual 
survival allowed for the observing of the environment from an instrumental 
viewpoint. This also supported the continuance of the social paradigm peculiar 
to early modernity. 
Industry’s historical dictating relationship with the political-administrative 
system persisted during the period of transition to a market economy because 
Estonia's economic condition was extremely difficult. The already weak 
connection of economic interests with environmental protection was further 
weakened by the lack of administrative capacity. The legislation adopted in 
anticipation of the accession to the European Union did not include sanctioning 
mechanisms. Therefore, the lack of modern institutions was accompanied by 
discursive promises that did not have compatible legitimating practices. 
Because the downsides of the functioning of a market economy were little 
known in the former Eastern bloc, the approach to a free market economy was 
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overly liberal. The institutionalised uncertainty in decision-making followed its 
historical path of dependency, but the lifeworld level lacked institutions to 
support the continuation of a frugal lifestyle. 
While the EU has started to verify the efficiency of environmental protection 
more strictly (e.g. emissions trading), the demands of market operators of the 
21st century regarding environmental resources are still ahead of the 
government’s policy-making ability in the fields of energy and natural 
resources. The lack of national development plans has led to cumbersome 
administrative solutions and legal disputes between economic entrepreneurs, 
citizen associations and local administration, on one hand, and the state, on the 
other hand. However, the lobby of economic interests is fighting environmental 
protection at the EU level and, therefore, as decisions are made at the EU level 
the ensuing opposition to the economic interest at the local level is difficult. 
Political factors. Under the Soviet regime, it was difficult to raise 
environmental problems, as the political system maintained its legitimacy 
without the need to react to public concern. The denial of environmental 
problems, lack of information, and absence of inner reflection of the society 
increased environmental problems and prevented the formation of a modern 
environmental paradigm (peculiar to simple modernity). 
However, during the Soviet era, environmental protection functioned 
relatively well even without a special policy because it was supported by other 
factors. For example, the issue of waste management was solved by the fact that 
the quantities of household waste were not large (goods were sold basically 
without packaging). Although unofficial local dumping grounds were common, 
several re-collection systems worked remarkably well; all bottled drinks and 
tinned products were packaged in high-deposit standardised containers (reused 
until destroyed) and the collection of scrap paper was a civic duty (mainly by 
schoolchildren). Waste was tied to a framework of aesthetics, not to 
environmentalism. As the re-collection systems were embedded in the practices 
of the natural economy, these worked quite well without excessive reflection 
about the systems or environmental problems. 
Due to “glasnost” at the end of 1980s, the access to information increased, 
and Western and Eastern environmentalism met in public communication. The 
concern about national natural resources and the water supply united 
environmentally concerned people in a national wave of anxiety. These new 
movements served as the first political parties in the newly independent 
(August, 1991) Estonia. These were the institutions that enabled individuals to 
ease their anxiety about the exaggeration of uncertainty. But environmentalism 
lost its importance in public communication by the next year, as a society can’t 
be built on a single institution. After the collapse of the USSR, a new system 
still needed to be created. The Greens did not return as a political party until 
2007. Then the Green Party focused on practical solutions and technological 
innovation: they presented an agenda of sub-politics, although the politics was 
not yet there. The Green Party’s influence also forced other parties to form their 
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platforms under the environmental paradigm (Gold 2011). The platforms are 
dominated by sub-political suggestions, based on the assumption that solutions 
to environmental problems lie in additional adjustments of technology and 
control. This is a feature peculiar to simple modernity. 
After regaining its independence and initiating rapid reforms in the early 
1990s, Estonia took a course toward the European Union and adopted a number 
of environmental laws, following the legal and administrative traditions of the 
EU. These laws entered into force and became operational only after the 
accession to the European Union in 2004. While the accession to the EU and 
agreement to follow a number of European rules of procedure that were adopted 
to facilitate the involvement of the public accelerated the development of 
environmental policy (which faced strong opposition in economic circles), 
different administrative traditions clashed in Estonia. The urgent need to meet 
the European “top-down” requirements did not leave any room for listening to 
“bottom-up” initiatives and protests (see the article ON PLANNING, II). It 
appears from the reports of the National Audit Office (Keskkonnaseire... 2007, 
Ehitusmaavarade... 2009, Kalanduse... 2009, Pakendijäätmete... 2010, Arves-
tus... 2011, Riigi... 2012 and Väärtuslike 2012) that there were considerable 
shortcomings in the practical implementation of the policies. Therefore, the lack 
of environmental protection can’t be explained by the problems of an overly 
complex society, but only by the institutional inability to deal with complexity. 
Historical factors. Until recently, Estonia was an agrarian country. Due to 
slow modernisation and the collective lifestyle imposed by the Soviet regime, 
the life experiences of individuals, including practices related to nature and the 
natural economy, were strikingly similar. 
During the Soviet era, the issue of nature was compensatory and safe and, 
therefore, associated with cultural interests rather than with political activity. 
The Soviet practice of not acknowledging the personal needs of the individual 
and prohibiting and strictly controlling any “bottom-up” initiatives has left on 
the present-day political and citizen activities the somewhat negative mark of 
“forced collectivism”. 
At the institutional level, any civic initiative required skilful manoeuvring 
between the local authorities and Moscow, which, on the one hand, led to a 
situation where people got used to having no decision-making rights and, on the 
other hand, led to protests and double standards. 
Cultural factors. The rigorously censored media and controlled citizens’ 
movement of the Soviet era created a fertile ground for the development of 
interests in culture, nature and education, which were all intertwined. The 
authorities exercised less rigorous control of these “safe” substitute activities. 
For example, the magazine Eesti Loodus included articles on broader social 
issues, rather than only nature and the environment. The shortage of essential 
foodstuffs that forced people to grow their own food kept people close to nature 
and a natural lifestyle, although urbanisation started to have an impact on 
lifestyle. The lack of private ownership created a “Soviet mentality”: a reckless 
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disregard for the environment. As environmental practices were not 
acknowledged at the level of the individual, we can speak of the social 
paradigm of early modernity. 
While for a person who was not able to “read between the lines” the Soviet 
world may have seemed safe, environmental problems manifested themselves 
both in the city and in the countryside in the form of cement dust, acid rains, 
polluted bodies of water etc. This led to a legitimate uncertainty regarding 
institutional decision-making. People also had to cope with global risks (e.g. the 
Chernobyl disaster) on their own. Therefore, the active relationship of the 
Soviet citizen with nature was not connected with the environmental paradigm, 
i.e. being aware of risks or implementing sustainable practices. This may have 
been the reason why the impact of the Phosphorite War, which sailed on the 
wave of nationalism, on the development of environmental paradigms, was 
short-lived. 
The infrastructure supporting the sustainability of the environment 
disappeared during the transition period and the developing hedonism-
individualism did not support the emergence of the post-materialist value 
structures (Kalmus and Vihalemm 2006) on which the Western environmental 
policies are based. The environmental media lost its readership (Figures 1 and 3 
of the article ON ENVIRONMENTAL CONSCIOUSNESS, I) and the existing 
environmental movements sank into oblivion. 
Western mass culture and EU policies created conditions for the “second 
coming” of the environment. Since 2005, the media have paid increasingly 
more attention to environmental issues (Figure 2 in the article ON 
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSCIOUSNESS, I). The environmental media, with 
their declining readership, have become more segmented, which threatens the 
survival of local publications. Supported by mass media, the perception of 
nature as landscape is being replaced by more complex scientific approaches, 
which, unfortunately, increases scepticism about the available information (on 
climate change etc.). While new infrastructure requires new environmental 
practices (the sorting of waste, energy-saving solutions etc.), conscious 
consumption is still, to a large extent, driven by the shortage of means (besides 
high risk awareness). Contact with nature is decreasing, while consumerism and 
its sub-type, sustainable consumption, are increasing (Figure 5 of the article ON 
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSCIOUSNESS, I). 
The relationship with nature differs by age group (see the article on 
CONSUMPTION, IV). While the older generation's cultural interests are 
intertwined with an interest in nature and practices related to nature, as well as 
indifference to consumerism, the younger middle-aged group has adopted a 
consumption-centred attitude towards the environment. Despite the fact that the 
youngest age groups are characterised by high consumerism and indifference to 
environmental issues, it is this group that provides the most active environ-
mentalists (see Figure 2). Several years have passed since the publication of the 
article ON CONSUMPTION (IV), and a comparison of data indicates that 
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different types of environmental relationships are diffusing between different 
age groups. Thus, we can speak of the normalisation of the environmental 
paradigm and the emergence of the ecological paradigm (in certain niches) at 
the level of the lifeworld. Therefore, the features of simple modernity are 
certainly present in cultural factors. 
 
It can be concluded that the factors that still shape the Estonian environmental 
consciousness are the Soviet inheritance of industrial hegemony in 
environmental decision-making, the operationalisation of sub-politics without 
the internal development of politics, double-standards in decision-making with 
regard to the superior system (whether the USSR or EU), a decision-making 
culture that does not reflect on uncertainty, and the change in positions between 
direct nature relations and consumer culture. 
 
 
How have the opportunities for individuals to converge around and discuss 
environmental issues and risks and their possible solutions changed over 
the past 25 years? What challenges are the participants in the discussions 
facing due to those changes? 
 
The article ON CONSUMPTION (IV) describes how the practical relationship 
































Figure 2. Indices of green consumption, interest in nature and activeness in protecting 
the environment by age group (percentages of age groups with high or very high index 
value) (Me. The World. The Media 2008, Estonian... 2009). 
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nature and simple consumption patterns characteristic of Protestant ethics were 
able to co-exist with the socio-technical system of the Soviet period8, in which 
individuality and everyday practical needs were disregarded and even 
disapproved of. The environmental aspect of practices and knowledge were not 
institutionalised but their environmental impacts were (subliminally) quite small 
(e.g. a lack of packaging, limited choice and shortage of goods and a lack of 
advanced technologies). Apart from a few nature protection associations and the 
broad readership of the magazine Eesti Loodus (Estonian Nature), which 
included people who were interested in nature and culture, individuals did not 
feel the need to join together to discuss and solve environmental issues. 
However, they were connected by similar deficit-oriented consumer experiences 
(Keller 2004), which reproduced a natural-economic lifestyle and decreased the 
need to attribute special meaning to nature. Asking critical questions was 
restricted by official censorship and self-censorship; therefore, Soviet Estonia 
can be described as a form of modernity without a particular degree of 
reflection. The transitional period at the beginning of the 1990s unsettled and 
mixed the socio-technical systems, which had subliminally reproduced 
sustainability, and shrank the massive environmental movement that had 
emerged during the process of regaining independence. This abolished nature 
and its interpretation from both the public discourse (in the media and political 
discussions) and the practical life of individuals (decreasing the number of 
people employed in agriculture, continuing urbanisation, and the disappearance 
of the rural infrastructure). However, the quite high number of media texts that 
focused on the loss in values reflects the retention of concern at the level of the 
individual and the inability to form institutions to support the environment. 
Although anxiety existed, it was reduced by an institutionally organised side 
effect: silence in the “public sphere”. 
The implementation of an environmental concern that is developing in line 
with late modernity and is now based on mediated communication rather than 
immediate contact with nature requires a certain analysis and discussion 
practices from individuals that are not similar to those during the Soviet period. 
A clear differentiating factor is consumerism, which divides people by 
generations (see the figure above). Therefore, Estonia’s shift towards Western 
modernity did not replace the former single and direct, yet unacknowledged 
experience with nature with equally distributed conscious interest in or concern 
about the environment. People experience environmental issues through other 
social relationships, primarily through consumption. According to the typology 
described in the article ON CONSUMPTION (IV), “access” to different types 
of relationships with nature and the environment is intertwined with access to 
                                                                          
8  Geels (2005: 446) socio-technical systems are systems actively reproduced, maintained 
and changed by various social groups and actors. A socio-technical system consists of 
regulations and policies, infrastructure, production and distribution systems, culture, symbols 
and other elements. 
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other relationships in society (see in the appendices the analysis of the research 
Me. The World. The Media). Moreover, the environment does not necessarily 
have to be perceived as a separate entity. 
According to the consumer typology presented in the article, young people, 
whose relationship with society is (still) quite similar and simple, relate to the 
environment through consumerism. The fact that the share of environmentalists 
is the biggest in this age group is overshadowed by the overall hedonistic 
consumerism and this environmentalism merely reflects alternative cultural 
identities (vegans, animal rights groups etc.). High consumerism without any 
relation to nature is most widespread among the Russian-speaking population, 
who have fewer opportunities to establish other (pressurising) relations (civic 
movements, politics etc.). On the other hand, the older generation has preserved 
traditional environmental relations and ethics. They are probably also more 
immune to the challenges presented by consumerism. The relationship with 
nature of younger middle-aged people is characterised by modern romantic 
ethics – green consumption – in which conscious concern about the environ-
ment is intertwined with selfish consumption behaviour. This group is 
characterised by high awareness of risks and the lifestyle of the young family. 
The fourth type is comprised of a diverse group of people whose contact with 
various aspects of society is more one-sided and passive than that of the rest of 
the population. They do not have consumerist characteristics, probably because 
they do not have the necessary means, and at the same time there are no 
compensating natural-economic practices. Therefore, the modern institution of 
environmentalism is more characteristic of the younger middle-aged group, with 
their more active lifestyle. 
Using cluster analysis, the article ON CONSUMPTION (IV) was developed 
further based on the data of the study “Me. The World. The Media”. The 
clusters were formed on the basis of six aggregate factors of relating to the 
environment and society: activity of personal relationships, activity in consumer 
relationships, involvement in citizen associations, realisation of the interest in 
nature, voting behaviour and cultural interests. The typology is based on 
Giddens’s structuration theory; therefore, the indices include only factors that 
concern practical consciousness: what people claim they do. The clusters turned 
out to be sequential: 1) people who have diverse active relationships with 
society, 2) a similar group whose practical relations are more moderate, 
3) people who are quite passive in their social relationships, but are active in 
citizen duties and nature-relations, 4) people who are oriented towards 
consumerism and 5) people who have passive or insular relationships to society. 
It appears that people who have diverse and active relationships and are 
characterised by high consumerism are well aware of different risks and know 
how to deal with them (i.e. through informed consumption behaviour). High 
awareness of and sensitivity to risks does not mean, however, that the people of 
this type have a pessimistic view of the future. On the contrary, they are 
optimistic about the future and willing to take risks and use new technologies. 
9
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Thus, risks as the identified dangers of the future have been turned into a 
connecting element and are probably a reason for establishing social 
relationships. People who are actively involved in society are pioneers who 
adopt new practices of avoiding risks and establish the addressing of risks as a 
social institution. People who are passive and have few relationships that 
connect them with society and its members are also characterised by low risk 
awareness. They rarely act to avoid risks, but their outlook on the future is more 
pessimistic than in other groups and they tend to place themselves in the lowest 
positions in society. Risks as possible future defined scenarios developing out 
of uncertainty play an important role in socialisation, in which the reflexive 
types are the winners and the non-reflexive ones the losers, although the 
institutionalisation of risks is a practice of those who, at the discursive level, 
win through risk situations. The growing distance between Estonians and 
Russians, and males and females, in their ability to institutionalise or follow risk 
practices reveals the turbulent nature of the risk institutionalisation process. 
The article ON RISKS (III) indicates, however, that besides the risks that 
through institutional definition gradually become the objects of personal 
projects of individuals, individuals also have to cope with uncertainty by 
imagining possible threats and suitable solutions to those threats. This means 
that the optimistic attitude and technological optimism of those parts of the 
population who are more willing to take and tolerate risks may also be an 
unconscious cover to ease their anxiety about uncertainty. Indeed, the Me. The 
World. The Media (2011) research revealed that in a situation of real danger 
those in the activist group, compared to other groups, were most likely to 
mention prayer as the solution to a threat (although other solutions were more 
common). The active groups also suffered most from a lack of time, having no 
time to reflect on uncertainty. This leads me to believe that anxiety is not a 
characteristic of the individual, but related to the structural relations of society. 
Similarly to the ecological paradigm described in the article ON 
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSCIOUSNESS (I) and the typology in the article ON 
CONSUMPTION (IV), individuals have several options: they do not 
understand risks in the same way and contextualise them through their indivi-
dual relations with society and the environment. The article ON RISKS (III) 
outlines a typology that reveals four different risk strategies based on the 
individual’s relationship with society and the lack of certainty of the situation. It 
appears that when people receive warning messages from the institutional level 
about possible pollution or risk instructions, and those messages do not fit their 
experience with the situation or contradict the beliefs of those receiving the 
message, a process of critical analysis is activated, contradicting institutional 
facts. Solutions to risks are personalised (which may also involve the 
institutional messenger). A qualitative analysis of the article ON RISKS (III) 
indicated that, while in the past individuals could rely on the shared experience 
of who to trust, nowadays shared experience may be related to a failure of the 
system to offer solutions, i.e. the shared experience is sought more randomly. 
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 The number of risk messages is growing as society becomes more complex, 
often to an extent that exceeds the ability of people to receive these messages. It 
is physically impossible to deal with all risks as personal projects. This would 
require certain strategic decisions: What is important and what is not? As the 
study “Me. The World. The Media” indicates that the number of individuals 
with passive relationships in society is growing and the number of activists is 
decreasing9, we can assume that risk strategies are becoming more varied and 
indicate opposition to society in different ways. This may create new 
phenomena, e.g. general passivity (because risks require preliminary knowledge 
which members of society do not have due to insular relationships) or a fertile 
ground for terrorism. 
It can be concluded that, while during the Soviet period individuals’ similar 
frugal lifestyles and natural economic practices were not acknowledged as 
converging elements, present-day practice communities assume acknowledged 
action within Western environmental socio-technical systems. Still, the modern 
tendency to converge around mediated communication about the environment 
and environmental consumption is not as uniform for individuals as were the 
unacknowledged nature relations. Consumerism appears to provide individuals 
with an acknowledged restructuring potential only in combination with other 
active relations in society, although it also operates as the only catalyst for those 
groups who have no easy access to rule formation. Groups with various types of 
active relations in society also take part in the institutionalisation of risk, which 
supports individuals’ uneven distribution with regard to activated uncertainty. 
Individuals’ decisions that are made in the context of extra uncertainty may 
endanger social institutions, producing negative rebound effects. However, the 
history of the 1980s reveals that too much collectively perceived uncertainty 
still makes it possible to form institutions that help individuals to unite (e.g. 
environmentalism at the end of the 1980s). However, these institutions can’t 
unite individuals for long, as a society cannot survive on single institutions. 
Environmentalism can develop only in parallel with complexity. 
 
 
Why can't institutions meet individuals’ expectations regarding environ-
mental issues and risks, and vice versa, why is it so difficult for individuals 
to communicate their expectations and anxiety in a way that is acceptable 
to and taken into account by institutions? 
 
The anxiety about environmental issues experienced by individuals does not 
necessarily coincide with the possibilities created by institutions for alleviating 
tension, such as (non-)consumption of certain products/services, public 
                                                                          
9  This may also be a sign of individuals channelling their activities into different types of 
activity which researchers have not included in their questionnaires, e.g. moving to virtual 
environments. 
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decision-making processes concerning the use of the environment, and media 
coverage. Each of these institutional communications is logical in its specific 
area of operationalisation, but the complexity of risk warnings does not take 
into account the ability of the individual to interpret these messages temporally 
and spatially as a whole. The complexity of a society can develop to the level 
where the individual is not able to react to institutional warning messages. As 
the individual's life context has become much more complex and changeable, 
institutional predetermination may start to prevent people from seeking 
individual solutions that are appropriate in given situations. 
The articles ON RISKS (III) and ON PLANNING (II) indicate that it is 
difficult for individuals to describe a risk if they have never been exposed to the 
risk before or have to face it in a new situation. Tension is often manifested at 
the emotional level and emotional reactions are what institutions have problems 
dealing with because emotion often indicates a conflict between the offered 
solution and its unsuitability in a specific context, therefore offering no 
solutions (“Do not start mining!” is not good enough). Reacting at the 
institutional level requires abstraction and generalisation in order to ensure 
equal treatment of individuals. At the same time, solutions to specific problems 
faced by individuals cannot be similar. Moreover, the lexicon and set of rules 
used by institutions do not include the definitions necessary for rendering 
meaning to everyday phenomena (e.g. “home”; an example from the article ON 
PLANNING, II). The empirical analysis in the article ON RISKS (III) indicates 
that a typical strategy used for giving meaning to a risk message of an 
institution in an unfamiliar situation is to put the message in the context of the 
previous experience of the individual (secondary observation). This means that 
the institutional message is not received directly, as it is delivered. Given the 
complexity of modern society, such an approach is positive because it helps 
people to adapt risk communication to the variability of reception contexts. 
Extreme uncertainty and deep distrust of institutions means, however, that 
individual choices alone are not sufficient to react to a risk and this may result 
in putting other people in danger (e.g. rushing thoughtlessly into traffic). 
A solution proposed in the article ON RISKS (III) is to strengthen relations 
within a community so that in a risk situation individuals can rely on established 
communication practices in order to deal with unexpected issues, alleviating 
their anxiety by reducing uncertainty. Taking into account that the number of 
individuals with active social relations is decreasing (Me. The World. The 
Media 2002–2011) and that people’s “field of vision” is narrowing due to their 
withdrawal from various information environments, exposure to risk 
communication may become a significant barrier for an individual because of 
the extent of uncertainty they are expected to deal with. Here, too, supporting 
community relations can help. As the uncertainties of the lifeworld and the 
system are always different and as in institutional communication the 
instrumentalisation will just create new uncertainties, the ability of the lifeworld 
communication to move between different social systems is greater than in the 
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case of an institution. In addition, the ability to use communication constraining 
mechanisms (such as ethics- or tradition-based arguments) is strengthened in the 
course of lifeworld communication. When reacting to the problems faced by 
individuals, institutions are not capable of abandoning unsuitable rules of 
procedure even if the institutions themselves are struggling with incremen-
talism. 
The article ON PLANNING (II) indicates that interaction between 
individuals can help them to find comprehensive solutions despite the system. 
This is supported by their shared experience, which enables individuals to use 
their ability to analyse so that no impossible situations are created. For example, 
numerous development plans and legal frameworks regulate individuals’ lives. 
It is impossible to follow all of them without contradictions, even though all 
solutions may seem logical when put on paper. This risk does not arise in the 
course of lifeworld conversation. 
 
 
What problems are caused by the fact that there are fewer shared 
experiences (experiences are fragmented in modernity) and that solutions 
are sought at a more abstract, linguistic level? 
 
An analysis of the changes in nature-related experiences described in the article 
ON ENVIRONMENTAL CONSCIOUSNESS (I) indicates that having shared 
knowledge, even if it is based on routines and individuals are often not even 
aware of it, diminishes the need to discuss and analyse complex matters. 
Diminished shared knowledge increases the need for interaction and 
communication between communities. Unfortunately, communication is not 
able to convey all knowledge but only selected “bits and pieces” (which is also 
predetermined by institutional power relations). Shared knowledge decreases 
the need for communication about time and space in decision-making. Un-
fortunately, the differences between communities increase the need for analysis, 
explaining and discussion, which makes the matter more complex because each 
interpretation increases the number of differing viewpoints, causing anxiety and 
controversy. At the institutional level, participation results in an increased 
administrative burden, which inevitably raises the question as to where the line 
is at which contradictory arguments can be disregarded. Different arguments 
involve different levels of institutionalisation, and different levels of power. 
Institutions must translate very complex social relations into abstract 
communication (including figures, graphs, maps etc.), which is, unfortunately, 
not always sufficient to deal with the relations between individuals. For 
example, the word “democracy” is used to describe different countries despite 
the fact that the rules of procedure implemented by these countries to allow for 
participation are very different and provide different results. Therefore, 
institutions are not able to translate the temporal and spatial experience found in 
20
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social relations into (linguistically expressed) decisions so that they can be 
adapted to the needs of different parties. 
Language, and its power to hide complex relations behind simple and 
reliable (legitimate) words, makes it possible to hide power games and to 
achieve illusory consensus (see: the changing of the definition of sustainable 
development in the article ON PLANNING, II). For example, some products 
are marketed by using agreed upon definitions that describe them as 
environmentally friendly, leading consumers to think that their purchasing 
behaviour is actually a practice of environmental protection. On the other hand, 
the sustainability of the environment can be ensured at higher levels by 
purchasing products that do not make promises regarding the environment, but 
are just structurally more efficient (e.g. using vinegar and sodium carbonate 
instead of “ecological” cleaning agents). 
 
 
Why is a broad-based discussion on the environment missing in society, 
although it is often clamoured for, and unsolved issues increase the general 
level of anxiety? Which conditions can create a common concern, as 
occurred during the Phosphorite War? 
 
An analysis of the data of the media study described in the article ON 
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSCIOUSNESS (I) reveals that as a society develops 
the issues related to the environment (or any other topic) become more 
fragmented. For example, while in the media study of 1983, 23 codes were 
required to analyse environmental issues (Lauristin and Firsov 1987), in 2010 
the number of codes was 126, as using fewer codes would have been impossible 
in the analysis to differentiate between mediated environmental issues (Kiisel et 
al 2011). At the same time, the viewpoints used to interpret the environment 
have changed. Instrumental approaches are partially disguised as consumerist 
approaches, and have increased remarkably. The decline in ethical, aesthetic, 
cultural and ideological viewpoints may also limit communication, e.g. by 
offering tautological arguments, such as “You cannot do that!” or “It has never 
been done this way!”. In a fragmented discussion, opinions do not merge. These 
discussions just lay a foundation for ensuing communication. Instrumental 
arguments do not offer solutions to conflicts, which involve ethical or cultural 
opinions, although these opinions are often the ways individuals translate their 
anxiety. Therefore, a broad-based discussion of the environment cannot emerge. 
The “phosphorite spring” was a result of the opening of the restrictive Soviet 
system to reflection. Glasnost aimed to open channels between individuals and 
the Soviet power structures. Every debate requires a framework. The anxiety of 
the 1980s could not turn into a fragmented debate because there were no 
suitable complex institutions. Anxiety (the reasons for its rise are often hard to 
define) aggregated by itself with the help of individuals. There had to be an 
umbrella topic that could be used to fight the ideological enemy. Environ-
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mentalism and ethnic nationalism became the ideological frames of reference of 
the independence movement. This movement had features similar to the 
ecological paradigm, as very complex issues were publicly discussed. But the 
discussion of the environment was possible due to the uniting effect of 
opposition to uncertainty (opposition to the abstract Soviet structures, which the 
individuals were a part of). As can be seen from the analysis of the transition 
period, at the lifeworld level the contextualisation of abstract environmental 
issues lost its uniting power in parallel with the breakdown of institutions. 
Therefore, the main environmental concern of the Phosphorite War was the 
question of how to channel anxiety. This was supported by the opportunity for 
shared opposition (e.g. to Stalinism). The opposition of groups of individuals 
was rather simple: Intermovement versus Popular Front, “we” versus “they”, 
and “wrong” versus “right”. Therefore, massive anxiety led to decisions that 
ended the existence of central institutions. In a situation where new institutions 
were required, i.e. meanings had to be instrumentalised, debate fragmented and 
subsided. A common opposition is needed to repeat the experience of the 
Phosphorite War and to overcome the fragmentation of the debate that places 
individuals in opposition to each other. 
 
 
1.1. Conclusions and rising of meta-questions  
for theoretical analysis 
Table 3 below enumerates the conclusions that can be drawn from the articles 
about the communication of environmental issues in Estonia. More general 
questions that are interpreted from the perspectives of society and 
communication theory are raised based on these conclusions (the questions are 
also presented in Table 3). 
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Table 3. Central empirical conclusions of the thesis and resulting theoretical questions 
Empirical conclusion Theoretical 
question 
Rapid (late) modernisation of Estonian society and accession to the 
European Union have led to the emergence of the environmental para-
digm, fragmentation of environmental publics, instrumentalisation of the 
approaches to the environment and domination of consumerist arguments 
in environmental debates. The prevailing environmental paradigm at the 
institutional level that is peculiar to simple modernity is accompanied by 
the ecological paradigm at the level of the lifeworld. This, unlike the early 
modernity of the Soviet period, which was characterised by the social 
paradigm (nature as a production resource), involves a shared nature 
experience and practices of the natural economy. The humanitarian 
approach to nature made the contact with anxiety about the environment 













effects? The transitions to a free market economy and accession to a superior 
political system (EU) have supported a mechanical approach to 
environmental issues. The implementation of sub-politics without prior 
institutionalisation of politics has reduced bottom-up initiatives of policy 
formation. By applying double standards in institutional management, 
uncertainty-based tensions are alleviated. 
Estonia has moved from the Soviet-time frugality and direct 
environmental relationship to a late modern situation, which is 
characterised by mediated environmental relationships and the 
fragmentation of the analysis of, and seeking solutions to, environmental 








Institutionally defined risks and solutions are not able to alleviate the 
anxiety of individuals, and opposition to institutional risk 
communication may become a uniting factor. The participation in the 
institutionalisation of risk is a practice of those who, at the discursive 
level, win in risk situations. Risk-taking groups have an acknowledged 
restructuring potential in the society. 
The fragmentation of temporal and spatial experiences characteristic of 
late modernity creates conditions for the distortion of time and space 
through linguistic expression. For example, institutions offer common 
interests and secondary sub-policies based on these common interests as 
solutions. 
The development of community relationships may offer solutions to 
alleviate tensions between institutional needs and opportunities, and to 
decrease the anxiety of individuals through the reduction of complexity. 
Yet translating the differences between communities through 
institutional mediation may make communication even more complex 
and increase anxiety. 
In the next chapter, I will seek answers to the above two general questions 
based on macro-level social theories – system and structuration theories – in an 
effort to interpret the findings of the empirical analysis. 
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2. SYSTEM-THEORETICAL REFLECTIONS  
ON THE COMMUNICATION  
OF ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES 
Through an analysis of Estonian public communication of environmental issues, 
I have reached quite expected conclusions about the characteristics of late 
modern conditions. Environmental communication is characterised by an 
increasing proportion of mediated nature relations, institutionalisation of 
environmental consumption practices, fragmented publics, an instrumentalised 
and consumerist approach and the resulting conflicts between environmentally 
concerned individuals and institutional solutions. Next, I will look at these 
empirical conclusions through a theoretical analysis. I have chosen a system- 
and structuration-centred approach because it enables me to examine the 
conditions of understanding and giving meaning to the environment and 
environmental issues in society, how these conditions can be rearranged and the 
results for both individuals and societal integration. My analysis of the relations 
between society and individuals is structured mainly around two theoretical 
problems raised in the above two empirical chapters. Each question is divided 
into sub-questions. I will start with an overview of the main concepts of the 
theoretical authors and then interweave them in the consequent discussion. 
Conclusions regarding the theoretical analysis of each question are presented 
separately. 
 
I Why doesn't the institutionalisation of environmental issues in complex 
societies offer solutions without rebound effects? 
 
 
2.1. Basis for appraisal:  
Habermas, Giddens and Luhmann 
In order to answer this question, I will start from more general ones: How are 
institutional rules of discussing environmental issues formed? What is the role 
of an individual in (re)forming these rules? 
The issue raised in the “Introduction” concerning the growing anxiety of 
individuals and increasingly complex environmental communication, coupled 
with the inability of society to solve environmental issues are, according to 
Habermas, not caused by whether and how environmental issues are perceived 
by the members of a society but by how they are forced to solve these issues. 
Although at first glance an environmental crisis is reflected in individuals’ 
concern about the environment, the reason for the growing anxiety is the 
diminishing legitimacy of the social system: the institutional truths regarding 
environmental issues and their solutions diverge more and more from how these 
issues are formulated in the ideal discourse of the lifeworld. Thus an 
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environmental crisis can grow into a real social crisis only when “the structure 
of a social system allows fewer possibilities for problem solving than are 
necessary to the continued existence of the system” (Habermas 1976: 2). As 
long as society can offer legitimate viewpoints on environmental crises, 
environmental issues pose no threat to society. A crisis of society differs from a 
crisis of individuals. 
According to Habermas (see 1989: 240), the individual’s lifeworld10, which 
is founded on and develops from people’s natural ability to communicate 
meaningfully, is jeopardised by the integration of the social system. In 
particular, system integration is based on the steering media of a bureaucracy 
and the power that mediates the goal values of the lifeworld through instru-
mental rationality11, increasing the complexity of society in an internally logical 
manner, but at the same time diminishing the individual’s ability to solve the 
problems perceived in the lifeworld contextually through discussion. For 
example, bureaucracy measures meanings through capital intensity, while 
power does it through votes. Measuring the values of nature applicable in the 
lifeworld in terms of money is difficult and voting on a decision in a political 
body only establishes the majority’s intentions with regard to nature. Therefore, 
according to Habermas, the integration of society is opposed to the integration 
of the individual’s lifeworld. 
Differently from Habermas, Anthony Giddens considers the role of the 
individual as central to the solution of society’s problems. According to 
Giddens’s structuration theory (The Constitution of Society, 1984), it is 
precisely individuals whose mutual relations shape the society, although they 
may not be fully aware of this role. According to Giddens’s view, individuals 
acquire important social skills in the course of socialisation, and also reproduce 
and shape social relations (consumption, family relations, educational choices 
etc.) and institutions further through personal performances and their routinised 
recurrence. For example, when involved in environmental impact assessment, 
individuals reproduce the justification of the relevant approach to the natural 
environment. By doing this, they de-legitimise alternative ways of discussing 
the environment because social relations can function only through common 
institutionalised rules. The emergence of new rules is, however, not entirely 
under the control of individuals. 
In the Giddensian approach, the activities of individuals have latent side 
effects that play an important role in the integration of society, creating 
conscious motivation for new activities, which, after being implemented and 
analysed, bring both desired and unplanned results. For example, improved 
                                                                          
10  According to Habermas, a lifeworld is a set of background knowledge or a horizon, 
whose meanings are formed in communicative action, in the course of continuous testing of 
its truths. Mutual understanding and its development require culturally and linguistically 
organised communication between people. 
11  See, for comparison, e.g. Ulrich Beck’s (1992) social and instrumental (economic) 
rationality. 
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consumption opportunities increase the need for mineral resources and power 
plants, which lead to relevant protest movements that raise the alarm about the 
decline of cultural and environmental values. Public discussion of the 
environment must, therefore, move through very diverse realms of life. This is 
actually a factual trend adding complexity to decision-making. 
According to Giddens, the human body plays an important role as the means 
of social integration. This perfectly contextualises the topics of time and space 
in social integration. Humans can use only the time and space that are accessible 
to them, influencing the environment, although at the level of discursive 
consciousness there is no contact with nature or the environment. And, vice 
versa, individuals can give environmentally sophisticated meaning to their 
activities, for example through the practices of environmental impact 
assessment, “green” shopping or being in nature. Nevertheless, practices that 
are not discursively related to nature and yet use the time and space accessible 
to individuals may have a greater impact on nature. For example, an individual 
may be busy with activities that leave no time for being in nature. Or, the other 
way round, an individual may spend so much time in nature that there is no time 
for consumption. This is an important factor in the labyrinth of increasingly 
diverse and controversial institutional requirements. The limited time and space 
available to the individual makes it apparent that the institutionalisation of new 
practices must necessarily supersede some old ones. The article ON ENVIRON-
MENTAL CONSCIOUSNESS (I) reveals that direct nature relations have been 
replaced with (environmental) consumption in the course of modernisation. 
As neither of the above theorists has dealt with the topic of the environment 
directly, it is appropriate to include Niklas Luhmann (1995), whose elaborate 
treatment of communication addresses complexity, as well as ecological issues 
(1989). His opposing views on the relations between agency and structure are 
useful in explaining the shortcomings of Habermas and Giddens. While 
Habermas (1976: 9) sees nature as the outer nature of a system – as a material 
resource of the non-human environment – Luhmann does not allow any kind of 
reification of the system, e.g. that individuals or nature constitute parts of the 
social system, because that would presume a one-to-one relationship between 
individuals and the system, and so the meanings of natural phenomena or 
resources are fixed12. Luhmann treats the social system as an abstract 
communication system. 
Luhmann’s theory of autopoietic communication enables us to understand 
nature and the environment only as a construction that depends on origin and 
viewpoint (the functional system and its code). The elements that are important 
in this view or, vice versa, redundant or too complex for analysis, are identified 
                                                                          
12  It is easier to understand the separation of the individual and the social system as a 
relationship between the person as a physical system and the body as a physiological system. 
For example, the human mind is not able to enter into a dialogue with an internal organ but 
psychological stress may cause a physiological reaction in an organ. 
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by system observation. Autopoiesis differentiates between the known and the 
unknown, i.e. between the inner nature of a social system and its complex outer 
nature. Consequently, the system is a means of simplifying the uncertainty of 
the outer environment and the system’s truth depends on the viewpoint and its 
analytical scope. For example, a report on environmental impact assessment 
determines the scope of observation by selecting the types of possible impacts 
and defining the geographical region to be studied.  
Communication does not dissolve the undetermined outer environment into 
non-existence or into the inner nature of the system. It just morphs into another 
opinion that is in line with previous communications and, therefore, increases 
complexity. The empirical analysis of the article ON PLANNING (II) indicated 
that the opinions of officials and local people regarding local nature were 
distinct and mutually incompatible. Any attempt to reconcile them would have 
only increased the scope of autopoietic observation, which may have led to 
entropy, i.e. the loss of the system’s identity (cf. Habermas’s rationalisation 
crisis). According to Luhmann, truth remains outside individual acts of speech 
and is in constant movement. Complex late modernity requires individuals to 
confine the discussion of environmental issues to a reasonable form. To do that, 
the conditions shaping the understanding of nature need to be identified. 
According to Jürgen Habermas (1976: 9), a natural environment is connected 
to a system through production relations. This opinion is shared by subsequent 
modernisation theorists, Ulrich Beck (1986/92) and others, according to whom 
modernity was born from opposition to nature, although production relations 
shape nature more and more into an object of the system’s internal commu-
nication. Thus, nature is re-socialised through encroaching consumerism and 
also by protesting citien associations (see: the articles ON ENVIRONMENTAL 
CONSCIOUSNESS, I, AND CONSUMPTION, IV). In different countries at 
different stages of modernisation, the levels of re-socialisation of nature are 
determinable. For example, Eurobarometer 2007 (issued in 2008) shows that, 
for Europeans in general (i.e. in the EU27), the word “environment” is mostly 
related to such highly mediated issues as climate change and pollution in cities, 
while Estonians differ in terms of its association with direct nature experience. 
Fourteen per cent of Estonian respondents associated the environment with 
“green and pleasant landscapes”. The relations with nature were more visible in 
the countries catching up with modernisation: in Hungary and Poland, beautiful 
landscapes were mentioned as the first association by twenty-five per cent of the 
respondents, and in such highly modernised states as Germany, Belgium and 
France only by six per cent. 
In Luhmann’s non-reified approach to the social system, nature and its 
resources should be seen only as objects of observation. This allows Luhmann 
to avoid what is criticised in the approach of Habermas: that nature cannot be a 
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part of the ideal speech situation13. Nature becomes observable only through 
inclusion and exclusion by the system (nature cannot speak itself and its 
motives are unknown to humans). Therefore, the definition and exploitation of 
nature cannot end because communication can’t be ended. In the course of the 
development of the system’s inner environment, nature merely becomes a part 
of an infinite number of discussions. According to Luhmann, the natural and 
human environments cannot be considered separately because they can exist 
only through observation that aims at differentiation between the natural and 
“human” environments. While according to Habermas (1976: 37) with growing 
complexity the system of the world society shifts its boundaries so far into its 
environment that it runs up against the limits of outer (as well as inner) nature, 
according to Luhmann society cannot do that because such boundaries exist 
only in communication. Therefore, both nature and environmental issues, as 
objects of communication, are always in an unfinished state. The commu-
nication will always find extra opportunities for production, even if the physical 
limits seem to be already there (this calls to mind the warnings of the Club of 
Rome). 
While according to Luhmann individuals can partake in meanings that are 
constantly updated in the uninterrupted and endless system communication, 
Giddens is of the opinion that in their everyday lives individuals are not too 
bothered by the infinity of communication, focussing instead on the creation of 
meanings only in certain situations and not very often. The practical 
consciousness that controls people’s everyday lives does not enable them to 
examine themselves critically or to behave differently, for example to be less 
environmentally hostile. This would require the intervention of the discursive 
consciousness. While Habermas may see the issue of nature as a conflict of 
values that arises in social interaction and Luhmann may see it as meanings that 
open up in system communication, Giddens speaks of the need to pay more 
attention to immediate practical experience (with the environment) about which 
there is no communication between the agents (yet). While the discursive world, 
or a communicative system, can develop into one that is infinitely encumbered 
with the demands of complexity, for individuals who are constrained by their 
unconscious and bodily existence the increasing complexity of the system might 
pose a problem if they started to ask questions about their routinised practices 
with the same degree of complexity. Using their discursive consciousness, 
individuals may not be able to solve the perceived conflict because 
discursiveness can be used to create descriptions of situations only in the 
context of recursive grounding that meets the perceived requirements of 
resources and rules (domination and legitimisation relations). For a bystander 
(an observer of different structural conditions), the solution found may seem 
                                                                          
13  Habermas (1983) argues that people can be brought together to communicate in the 
“ideal speech situation”, where the openness of different parties to mutual (linguistic) 
communication should ensure the best solution to the search for truth. 
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unreasonable because he may not see the intentionality of the decision-maker 
but just the routinised practice of decision-making. Therefore, through 
discursiveness individuals support the formation of institutions that help them to 
understand each other but do not directly support environmental protection in 
real life. 
The ways in which environmental issues are defined and resolved are often 
criticised for being subjected to power and capital games. This is the discourse 
of Habermas and Weber: it is often thought that environmental value should be 
legitimised in decision-making as superior or equal to other values (ecotopias, 
the assumptions of sustainable development and ecological modernisation), and 
that it should be allotted equal power. While Weber (1930/92, 1978) sees a 
conflict between (given) value rationality and instrumental rationality, for 
Habermas (1984) this conflict is between the communicative and instrumental. 
The main problem in establishing the autonomy of environmental value is that 
people cannot understand the intrinsic value of nature; they can only create 
abstractions that become more and more complex with each new observation. 
Therefore, environmental value cannot be an alternative to the controlling 
media – capital and power – because due to its complexity it is a burden to the 
rationalisation capacity of the social system. While Habermas criticises the 
steering media for their distorting effect, Giddens points out that power 
relations are inevitable, as they help to create social institutions which enable 
people to understand each other. 
Societal life is, in Giddens’s terms, organised around rules and resources 
found in everyday practices and intertwined with each other. These practices 
inevitably contain power. Practical activity is governed by rules until discursive 
questions arise that challenge these rules (questions posed, for example, by a 
bystander). Resources (either power or material resources) are perceived in 
inter-human relations through signification and legitimation, i.e. through rules. 
For example, the payment of money may be allowed in some situations (when 
buying an environmental permit), and forbidden in others (as a bribe offered in 
land transactions involving nature protection areas). In order to enforce 
decisions that are advantageous to the environment, the meanings of situations 
that are either beneficial or harmful to the environment need to be signified and 
legitimised. This requires resources, e.g. civic initiative, authority or money 
(e.g. so that Greenpeace could buy advertising space). In other words, for 
Giddens (1984: 31) domination is the very condition of the existence 
of codes of signification and mutual understanding. 
Therefore, public discussion of environmental issues is always primarily 
about domination. Based on Giddens, we can’t assume that environmental 
decisions can be “free of distortions”. In his opinion, a distortion occurs not in 
the perception of practitioners who are just following everyday practices 
established in social systems (e.g. discharging pollution into the environment), 
or have a reasonable discursive justification for their actions (e.g. “Well, you 
have to eat!”), but in the assessments of observers who see critical issues related 
47 
to those practices (e.g. pollution). This does not mean that individuals who are 
involved in society through various practices do not have common values or 
opinions (Habermas’s goal values that are anchored in the lifeworld). These 
may exist and have a linguistically similar equivalent but a different meaning 
for each individual. While §5 of the Constitution of the Republic of Estonia 
provides that “[t]he natural resources of Estonia are national wealth which shall 
be used sparingly”, it is not possible to find practices that deal directly with the 
implementation of that goal value. Each social system interprets the notion of 
“national wealth” in its own discursive way (e.g. through procedures). 
Luhmann is not very critical of power issues. To him, power is not a political 
phenomenon because it cannot function through itself. Luhmann (1995: 453) 
has stated: “Power is reflexive to the extent that is applied to power, that is, 
concentrates precisely and exactly on directing others’ means of power. This 
can occur from above, but also from below.” Therefore, Luhmann sees power 
not as a means of repression but as a self-description necessary to maintain the 
system and on the basis of which information is processed (i.e. staying in 
power/having no power). Power, however, may be decisive in drawing a line 
from which the rationalisation of information becomes too burdensome for the 
system because crossing that line would mean losing the ability to abstract and, 
thus, also losing power. Based on Giddens and Luhmann, the environmental 
debate could be staged as logical discussions of the volume of use of water or 
the content of sulphur compounds in water because these subjects can be easily 
rationalised. At the same time, the critical question concerns the institutional 
capacity to legitimise a decision (i.e. a Habermasian colonisation attempt by the 
system). 
In Habermas’s (1976: 8) system theory, the social system relies on goal 
values which are essentially the values established in cultural traditions. The 
system learns and shapes its identity based on goal values: the steering media 
make their choices of observation based on these. As was pointed out in the 
article ON PLANNING (II), in Luhmann’s terms the goal values of the 
lifeworld become topical only in confrontation with the identity-threatening 
communication of a system. This, in turn, causes the rationalisation of the 
lifeworld in the social system through rational observation, which can never 
understand the lifeworld as a whole, but only as a confirmation of a certain 
abstraction. Therefore, adapting Luhmann’s approach to the issue raised by 
Habermas, the tragedy of the lifeworld is the impossibility of the existence of an 
expert on the lifeworld, as its values are always in transition. 
According to Luhmann, there is no system communication regarding a goal 
value, such as a clean environment (although at first glance it may seem so); it 
occurs through the self-referential reflection between the system and its 
environment. System communication does not make judgements about what is 
right and what is wrong (i.e. what is more beneficial and what is less beneficial 
to nature). It merely provides a reference as to whether there is a distinction or 
not (asymmetrical communication). If such reflection occurs from the 
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perspective of the unity of distinction, the decision is rational for the system 
(1995: 455). For example, what is important in the process of environmental 
impact assessment is the completion of procedures (whether the report has been 
submitted or not, deadlines have been met or not, or limits have been exceeded 
or not), which serve as a basis of legitimacy. We call this instrumental, but the 
communicative system requires instrumentality to limit the scope of commu-
nication in order to maintain the unity of difference regarding uncertainty. 
In the article ON PLANNING (II), the attempts to formulate goal values are 
illustrated by the definitions of sustainable development and national interest 
(i.e. the discussions held in the framework of the environmental development 
plan). Developments in the wording of both definitions are characterised by an 
absurd compromise, which is presented in a linguistic form that promises a 
great deal. Both examples represent the translation of the rationality of the 
economic system into the language of the lifeworld (“utterances”, in Luhmann’s 
terms) without any information value (except for consumers who are not 
included in decision-making but are represented as the legitimisers of the 
system identity). 
The discussion raises the question of whether society is reaching the stage 
where its ability to learn (i.e. to rationalise itself in confrontation with outer 
nature) is hindered. What is it that would “free” the system from its burdening 
complexity and utterances that mask the controversy? I will focus on these 
questions in the following sub-chapters. 
 
 
2.2. Increase in complexity and the institutionalisation  
of consumerism 
Do individuals have the ability to reduce disturbing complexity? Despite being 
criticised for addressing the question of complexity inadequately (e.g. the main 
point of criticism by Archer, 2012), it may be logically inferred from Giddens’s 
structuration theory that the individual’s “democratised” choices have 
unexpected side-effects, which increase the need for discursive interpretation, 
reflectivity. An important factor is also individuals’ opportunity to channel their 
authoritative and distributive resources into rule reformulation. This, in turn, 
amplifies the need to analyse the dynamics of the system, which may, naturally, 
reduce individuals’ capacity for intentional restructuration. Hence, in order to 
facilitate mutual understanding under the conditions of complexity, there is still 
a need for a converging institution that can join the agents in structuration. 
Through the routinisation of conduct, individuals have the opportunity to ease 
their anxiety about complexity. But can this routinisation, for example through 
consumption, offer individuals enough chances for satisfactory meaning 
creation? 
It seems that structural conditions assimilate in a way (i.e. the tradition of 
modernity, Giddens 1997) that the meanings that are unconsciously necessary, 
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yet not legitimate in the given structural conditions, are left unsignified (i.e. the 
Habermasian motivation mechanism of individuals, the loss of which can 
jeopardise the reproduction of the system). The dissatisfaction with the world 
order is certainly there. For example, the Sony youth research (2009) revealed 
that six out of ten 11–16-year-old youths from developed European countries 
are confused by conflicting messages about the environment and do not know 
whom to believe; they feel helpless and apathetic. Although the everyday life of 
young people may not reflect complexity very often, it does involve the possible 
routinisation of practices that are needed for the protection of the environment. 
Why can't individuals involved in structuration reorganise the structure by 
interpreting it discursively so that the meanings not expressed in the given 
structural conditions are expressed without increasing the complexity of the 
structure? 
Based on Luhmann, the reason is that individuals cannot interpret their 
motives external to the conditions of the communication system, whose natural 
course is to develop in complexity with every observation. This is supported by 
the type of reflection widespread in society, in Luhmann’s terms “first-order 
observation” (1993, 1995), which lures the observer into making incremen-
talising choices without confusing himself with complexity14. Similarly, as in 
the case of the communication system, individuals also have no access to their 
unconscious motivations. As both interdependent carriers of truth are 
inaccessible to observation, the attempts to balance differences between the 
unconscious and the system are condemned to failure. 
The development of autopoietic complexity is clearly illustrated by the 
comparative media analysis (Kiisel et al. 2011) referred to in the article ON 
THE ENVIRONMENTAL CONSCIOUSNESS (I) (see the example in the 
empirical chapter, p. 25), which shows how researchers are unable to interpret 
situations by implementing the same system of categories that was used in the 
study conducted 25 years ago, although it was very complex and multi-layered 
for its time. The system of science has also changed. In addition, no one could 
have predicted 25 years ago that there would be scientific journals dedicated to 
such specific issues as can be found today. Complexity is something that can’t 
be avoided, although there may be a desire to avoid the frustration arising from 
the difficulty in finding solutions. But is there an intolerable degree of 
complexity for the lifeworld? 
A Luhmannian social system is comprised of functional systems that are 
unable to represent society independently and function only through self-
reflection; they can do this only in interaction with other functional systems. 
Each functional system has its own code (1989: 116–118, 1995: 36) that enables 
environmental events to be seen by the system as information, and permits the 
                                                                          
14  Luhmann (1994: 29): “…communication is set up in such a way that it fascinates 




system to distinguish between information and non-information. It is inevitable 
that ecological resonance functions through different systems, such as the legal 
system (which reflects compliance with the law, not the motive or reason for an 
act), the political system (the definition of the areas of power: has/does not have 
power) or the media. Although functional systems are important for each other, 
their codes are incompatible. The contacts between the communications of 
different functional systems only lead from one event to another. Disruptions in 
one functional system are transferred to other systems so that the unitas 
multiplex remains a paradox, becoming apparent only as non-transparency, an 
illusion or turbulence. 
An economy, for example, depends on scientific discoveries, environmental 
resources and education. Also, environmental issues have to be brought to the 
centre of an economic system in order to solve them because the economy is 
unable to react to problems that are not expressed in prices. As seen in the 
articles ON PLANNING (II), ENVIRONMENTAL CONSCIOUSNESS (I) and 
CONSUMPTION (IV), the functional economic system has a special meaning 
in the social system because it socialises individuals into society by institutio-
nalising consumerism and initiating pressure for environmental resources.  
The economic system/institutions require constant justification to be able to 
function, therefore realising themselves through self-usage. Here, the opinions 
of the authors I've referred to diverge. For Giddens, the economy involves the 
everyday practices of individuals, the discursive meaning of which is revealed 
to them in another social system. The unification of social meaning in the 
context of complexity may hide the degree of complexity from the individual. 
According to Luhmann (1989), an economic system is reproduced through the 
possibility of continuing payments. If making further payments becomes 
impossible, it is necessary to develop contacts with other functional systems. 
Therefore, the complexity should be tolerable if an individual can afford 
reflexivity and also payments in very different and multiple fields of social 
activism. Indeed, the study “Me. The World. The Media” revealed that activists 
who had been socialised in society through very different practices and routines 
were well informed about different risks, but also had very optimistic world-
views. Therefore, complexity is not a problem for individuals who follow the 
tempo of system reflection. 
While Luhmann’s approach to the development of complexity is linear, i.e. 
functional systems are constantly developing in mutual interaction, according to 
Habermas’s (1976) theory of crisis, the development of complexity is circular, 
oscillating between the socio-cultural, political and economic systems. 
According to Habermas, in a situation of insolvency the administrative-political 
system is pressured by capitalists to rationalise the conditions, which can be 
used to create new conditions for the accumulation of capital. The side effects 
of production (e.g. pollution and ethical dilemmas) are established in the 
lifeworld through the legitimation process, assuming that the cultural tradition 
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of the lifeworld adapts itself accordingly by socialising the new generality-
claims-based meanings (see: the article ON PLANNING, empirical part). 
Referring to system theorists, I pose the question: what is the ability of the 
individual to generate abstract ideas that are born from the logic of unitas 
multiplex (e.g. sustainable development) and to routinise those in everyday life 
at the speed that they develop? Referring to Luhmann, all intentional attempts to 
equalise or balance the relationship between the environment and society should 
be arbitrary (e.g. sustainable development as the unity of the economy, the 
environment and the social sphere). Such a construction can emerge only when 
different functional systems come into contact. According to Giddens, the 
formulation of abstract ideas can only be grounded discursively: they are not to 
be found in real life, but are determined by the rules and resources available in a 
particular situation. 
But this is a problem of the system, not the individual. The individual is 
attracted by first-order observation (or routinised everyday life, in Giddens’ 
terms). In his book The Reality of the Mass Media, Luhmann (2000) describes 
the mass media as a system that interprets the information that has already been 
interpreted by other functional systems. It is the media that enable individuals to 
process information so that it does not burden them with an excessive need for 
reflection and does not jeopardise their identity. The media form a reservoir of 
options, even if people talk about a lack of communication or resonance. Media 
institutionalise the meanings behind unknown events. My media analysis, 
briefly described in the article ON THE ENVIRONMENTAL CONSCIOUS-
NESS (I), revealed that the media increasingly provide content that represents 
consumerist viewpoints. Those are the reflection of the code of the market: in 
parallel with the segmentation of the social system, coding according to the 
economy is more and more available as socially meaningful communication. 
The analysis in the article ON PLANNING (II) reveals how business 
interests legitimise the consumer role as the identity of the individual. The 
analysis of the oil shale development plan showed that although consumers 
were not involved in the decision-making process, the “national interest” in oil 
shale mining was legitimised as “[...] to guarantee Estonian consumers an 
uninterrupted supply of electricity, heat and refined oil shale products [...]”, 
despite the fact that “consumer” is a notion that is not related to state borders. A 
similar and more revealing example is the pressure from the GMO industry on 
the administrative-political system. The rhetoric used by the GMO industry 
emphasises consumers’ (political) right to take advantage of the innovative 
products of Monsanto. But at the level of the lifeworld, the attitude is quite the 
contrary: 58% of individuals claim they are opposed to the use of GMOs 
(Eurobarometer 2008). There are no protesting citizens’ associations that 
support GMOs, only those that promote GMO-free labels.  
Until the summer of 2010, the cultivation of GMOs was prohibited in the 
European Union and this prevented business interests from accessing the 
territories of member states. The sceptical attitude in Europe is understandable, 
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as the rationalisation of GMO industries’ arguments involves policies that will 
legitimise certain groups by adding additional costs. For example, farmers’ 
crops are not protected from gene transfer and are threatened by the cycle of the 
immunisation growth of insects. This ends in the withdrawal of legitimation of 
the goal values of the system (such as the right to a clean environment or self-
expression as a private entrepreneur). The opponents of legitimising utterances, 
such as “consumers’ will”, are typically blamed for irrational and emotional 
communication, as they, being at the same time also consumers, irrationally 
resist the right of consumers to be provided with the goods of development. 
Unlike the case of the oil shale development plan described in the article ON 
PLANNING (II), the administrative-political system was prepared for pressure 
(drawing on the experience of the US). Still, the lobbying of US industries in 
the halls of the European Commission was successful; they succeeded in 
breaking the central veto of the cultivation of GMOs in Europe. The European 
Commission’s suggestion was to add to the directive 2001/18/EU a new article 
(Art. 26b). Its aim was to allow member states “to adopt measures prohibiting, 
restricting or impeding the cultivation of all or particular GMOs & including 
GM varieties placed on the market, in accordance with relevant EU legislation 
on the marketing of seed & plant propagating material in all or part of its 
territory.” 
The language of the text as an utterance was formed as a condition that 
permitted democratic debate over the object of risk. A supplementary clause, 
however, added the information value of the legitimation mechanism: “provided 
that these measures are based on grounds other than those related to the 
assessment of the adverse effect on health and environment which might arise 
from the deliberate release or the placing on the market of GMOs or related to 
the need to avoid the unintended presence of GMOs in other products.” 
Therefore, actually the only measure that a member state can use to prohibit the 
cultivation of GMOs is to use ethical arguments, which have no influence in 
political-administrative practice. Ethical questions cannot be raised with the 
support of the system’s steering media. They can arise only from the cultural 
opposition of the lifeworld. The example of GMO policy reveals that un-
certainty is introduced into the social system in parallel with the institutionali-
sation of consumerism (i.e. consumers do not pose questions about possible 
setbacks; they just consume). Following this line, the institutionalisation of 
consumerism may also be a sign of the rising degree of uncertainty and 
uncontrolled complexity in the system. 
A system crisis can also manifest itself at the unconscious level when the 
complexity of the system, with the help of meta-concepts, begins to undermine 
the basic sense of security without any legitimate opportunity to express it. The 
article ON PLANNING (II), which concerns the environmental decision-
making process, includes an example of the notion of home. This notion 
includes both an unconscious element related to the sense of security (i.e. 
something that is stable and recurrent) and a network of practical relations. It, 
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and especially its dynamics, cannot be described linguistically, but it can only 
be designated by the rather simple word “home”. It exists through the shared 
experience of people who should understand what “home” is. However, this 
word is crammed into the process of environmental impact assessment, which is 
guided by meta-concepts (i.e. Habermas’s generality claims): sustainable 
development, Section 5 of the Constitution, national interest, consumer interest 
etc. The mediated core values of the system are internally logical, yet they 
cannot rationalise the social reality of the lifeworld. The meaning of home is de-
legitimised. Home is reproduced in development plans, consumerism and 
relevant projects that disguise the crisis of the lifeworld in the context of home. 
The institutions that have particular connection to the unconscious are de-
legitimised in parallel with the institutionalisation of consumerism. This helps 
to explain how modernity operates in Giddens’s terms. Growing complexity, 
with its demands for signification and legitimation, places pressures on the 
individual ability for reflection. It replaces the plurality of institutionalised 
practices with the standardisation of consumption practices. Although such 
institutions as family and home are still alive in discursively sophisticated 
routines, the institutionalisation of “compulsive” consumption practices is 
taking over. 
The endless re-creation of the difference in autopoietic communication 
makes it possible for human thought to structure time and space and vice versa: 
human thought creates the social system in the partition of time and space. Both 
Habermas and Luhmann claim that capital is critical in this partition. Capital is 
needed because there is a time gap between payment and economic re-
production. During that time, money as a means of communication has no 
meaning and urgently requires new legitimation, i.e. an exchange transaction. 
An example provided by Kaupo Vipp in the cultural weekly Sirp (2011) 
indicates that capital carries the function of the generalisation of time and space: 
the contextualisation capacity of both is decreasing: 
“Sumerian metrology stressed the connection between barleycorn and the 
human body through the mutual exchange of energy. Barley (energy from food) 
gave life to the human body and ensured connection with the world; the human 
body (energy from work) gave life to barley and ensured connection with the 
world. In a normal year, a reasonable yield was considered to be 30 grains of 
barley returned for each grain sowed. The human body, a grain of barley and the 
world were linked through human hands. Each bend of a finger counted for 
three barley grains, each joint for one (with the thumb two grains in joints, and 
one with the tip of the thumb in the palm). [...] The human body as the earliest 
basis of numbers and calculation constituted a universal medium combining 
numbers, work/energy, mass, time and space. The basic unit of measurement of 
the sophisticated and ingenious system was the gin, corresponding in our 
system to approx. 0.5 m, 1/60 l, 1 m2 or 9 g, or one value unit, the basis of the 
notion of money. [...] In the history of economics, the gin, a unit of 
measurement created by human work, reflected the energy of life contained in a 
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grain of barley, the smallest unit of weight used in trading the fruits of human 
work, and the basic payment unit.” 
For an individual to be able to communicate with others, he must be 
confident that the means of communication is functioning properly. In a 
developed society, people cannot have confidence in money because the 
physically measurable dimensions of time and space are gone (as is the physical 
form of money). There is the “frozen trust” (Giddens 1997), which can be 
analysed discursively only in the framework of the set of rules of signification 
used by social institutions. For the economic system to have meaning through 
money, it has to be determined in systemic preconditions. 
Habermas argues that a political system must ensure that the value of money 
is organised in time and space, in a way that it can be reproduced. Therefore, the 
administrative-political power that gives meaning to capital is becoming 
increasingly differentiated. But, according to Luhmann (1989), the system has 
already surrendered the possibility of controlling communication agreements by 
legitimising the free market. This is where “double contingency” ends and the 
freedom to make decisions in uncertainty, without forming a system bound by 
the arbitrariness of the decisions made by others, begins. The result is an 
extraordinary increase in the tempo of communications. For example, there is 
increasing pressure to replace old technology with new technology, despite the 
fact that the old still functions. Based on Luhmann, the tempo of system 
communication has exceeded the degree to which it can attract the individual 
with difference: as the individual has no time for reiteration, communication 
contains only utterance, not information value. 
The complexity caused by the increasing speed of communication results in 
over-communication, which has the same effect as silence. 
In the context of everyday life, the world is created in utterances defining 
and distinguishing the world. Each utterance is a reaction to something, carrying 
information that can be subjected to analysis under the given systemic 
conditions. At the same time, little attention is paid to what is not said: to say 
something, the rest has to be left out. Problems in the expression of truth can 
also be found in what is not said, in non-communication. For example, 
according to the media analysis referred to in the article ON THE 
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSCIOUSNESS (I), the expression of ethical and 
ideological viewpoints was relatively high during the cowboy capitalism of the 
1990s. This was a reaction to the silence that was imposed by rapid liberal 
reforms. The subsequent development of fragmentation diminished the role of 
ethical, philosophical and humanistic questions in media content.  
Silence, however, is eternal. A system theoretical analysis does not say much 
about silence (Luhmann 1994), because silence is understood only in the 
context of self-referential reflection, not in the context of interaction between 
individuals (which is enabled by the social system or structural conditions). The 
system can interpret silence only in the context of active silence, in a context 
where the system chooses not to rationalise uncertainty. In a Habermasian free 
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discussion, it is probably possible to come closer to the truths of silence (e.g. the 
protest movements of the past that formulated their dissatisfaction with silence, 
i.e. non-communication), but the increasing complexity of the system may 
create barriers that do not make it possible to pay any attention to such silence. 
Still, complexity and fragmentation may also provide silence for individuals if 
fragmentation becomes the theme of the communication. Complexity creates 
silence regarding problems that are bigger than complexity (i.e. problems that 
cannot be addressed in a positivist way) because this would create too much 
controversy in the basic structures of society. For example, the social critique 
has no place in scientific journals oriented to problem solving and it is not 
possible to adopt decisions at a meeting of bank management based on the 
criticism of historical materialism, etc. 
However, there are cases where the generation of active silence through 
increasing complexity may cause temporary turnarounds, and opposition to the 
silence. Mazur (1998) found that the flood of climate change news during the 
1980s was caused by coinciding accidents and news about the environment 
(fires in Yellowstone, the Exxon Valdez, news about the ozone hole, 
biodiversity extinction, the greenhouse effect etc.). These upheavals of 
reflection of the late 1980s that connected different (functional) systems cannot 
be interpreted by individuals from the perspective of the shared perception of 
problems. In the article ON THE ENVIRONMENTAL CONSCIOUSNESS (I), 
I have lamented the fact that Estonians tend to look at the Phosphorite War and 
their liberation movement from an egocentric perspective, disregarding the 
global changes that allowed all this to happen. Therefore, the formulation of 
problems or raising awareness is not enough to solve the problems. Problems 
formulate themselves according to the configurations of a system (e.g. the 
magic phrase of the 1980s: “sustainable development”). Only the accumulation 
of the random mistakes of a system’s development dynamics can have a 
liberating effect on the system. 
 
 
2.3. System renewal and system overlap 
How can complexity be reduced and meanings be brought closer to the 
immediate experience of individuals with time and space? 
The fact that the modern society differs from the traditional or primitive 
society, which functioned on a different basis, does not nullify the 
differentiating and complexity-increasing nature of communication. A separate 
question is whether Luhmann’s other-reference or Giddens’ formulaic truth15, 
                                                                          
15  Giddens (1997: 64): “Tradition involves formulaic truth, to which only certain persons 
have full access. Formulaic truth depends not upon referential properties of language but 
rather upon their opposite; ritual language is performative, and may sometimes contain 
words or practices that the speakers or listeners barely understand. Ritual idiom is a 
mechanism of truth because, not in spite, of its formulaic nature. Ritual speech is speech 
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which is understood as a reference to something that is neither self-referentially 
nor functionally comprehensible, is possible. Transcendence is, in Luhmann’s 
interpretation (1989), a type of communication that restricts the communication 
of indigenous people, thus ensuring the ecological tolerance of culture. It is 
impossible to argue about mystical predestination, especially if it does not 
submit to the rules of cultural arrangement (as in Protestantism). Yet, such 
submission must be a system phenomenon. 
The ability to reflect is limited by the preconditions of the system and vice 
versa. The communication of indigenous people is inevitably determined by 
nature. It is determined by time (seasons and the length of human life) and 
space (material resources and territory), in which each action is linked to the 
social system. Actions must refer to the principle of the continuity of the social 
system (although the idea of the continuity of communication probably cannot 
be formulated in the lifeworld); the physical environment and available time 
must be linked to meaning directly, in personal experience. A primitive group of 
humans cannot take the risk of examining the laws of nature under complex 
conditions because the transfer of meanings by rituals, storytelling, etc. is very 
time-consuming. Referring to formulaic truth through the person of a shaman 
was, therefore, very rational. This reduced the need for reflection, which would 
have jeopardised the survival and interaction capacity of a small tribe, and 
organised time, thus allowing meanings to organise themselves (i.e. meaning as 
a contact point between interaction and the social system), creating a new basis 
for the renewal of the system without increasing the need for reflection 
(difference) and helping to manage the repetitive practices which had lost their 
meanings. 
Although Luhmann sees religion as a subsystem that refers to God and 
whose code is immanence/transcendence16, in my opinion transcendence is, at 
least in the case of primitive peoples, a restart programme of time. When the 
ancestors of the Estonians allegedly decided to go to war based on which side a 
slaughtered ox fell, this was primarily the practice of time coordination, which 
gave meaning to communication. In a situation where the possible recurrence of 
a situation would be too far away time-wise to offer meaningful communication 
about difference (e.g. in a discussion of historical experience between elders), 
there is a natural need for contact with formulaic truth. Where the social system 
does not allow extensive learning due to low reflection capacity, there is a good 
opportunity to restart the integration of the system. A complex system offers 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
which it makes no sense to disagree with or contradict – and hence contains a powerful 
means of reducing the possibility of dissent. Formulaic truth is an attribution of causal 
efficacy to ritual; truth criteria are applied to events caused, not to the propositional content 
of statements. Guardians are believed to be the agents of the causal powers of tradition. 
Their arcane skills come more from their involvement with the causal power of tradition 
than from their mastery of any esoteric knowledge.” 
16  Luhmann’s unfinished book A Systems Theory of Religion was published in English 
only in 2013 and I have not yet had a chance to read it. 
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great learning capability, yet its ability to restart time, which could reduce 
complexity or overlook system goal values, is limited. This time reduction 
effect is essentially still valid, functioning through strategic management and 
policies, but it lacks a liberating effect because the rituals that would offer 
access to formulaic truth are not used. Therefore, discussions of the natural 
environment move away from the experience that remains “outside the system”. 
The evolving of a simple system into a complex one is a natural process. 
What confuses the picture is the exposure of the system to other social systems. 
Systems cannot be transferred or assimilated. A different system can be 
understood only through projection, which recognises the other as sovereign, 
subordinate/subordinating or one that can be ignored, that one can be silent 
about. Although subordinate and subordinating social systems are likely to 
include functional systems that use similar codes (e.g. environmentalism in 
different countries), these functional systems do not merge, but create new 
functional systems, which further develop the reproduction of the difference 
between the systems. However, functional systems cannot control the 
environmental conditions that trigger the performance of their functions. For 
this, individuals are required. In the context of a subordinate system, it is 
inevitable that individuals adopt double standards and relevant practices of 
signification that give way to the operation of the codes of a system. There are 
practices that fulfil the needs of general system integration and practices that 
give meaning to the motives of individuals. Functional systems of a sub-system, 
such as Estonia in the European Union, cannot have double codes because this 
would result in system-theoretical nonsense. Only the lifeworld can interfere 
and let situations appear as through double-coding – in favour of both systems - 
by applying the code of the main system at the level of utterance, and the code 
of the subordinate system at the level of information, and vice versa. The 
behaviour of a functional system (e.g. education, law or media) in the context of 
a main (EU) and sub-system (Estonia) depends on the needs that have been 
actualised in the lifeworld if the complexity of the social system makes this 
contradiction possible. A good example is the problem of policy-making, as 
well as the project and reporting culture in Eastern Europe, described in the 
article ON THE ENVIRONMENTAL CONSCIOUSNESS (I). A similar 
application of double standards was common in Estonia during the Soviet era. 
For example, former “phosphorite warriors” (Sikk 2013) admit that the local 
industry, which reported to Moscow, intentionally exaggerated the environ-
mental impacts in public communication in order to increase general anxiety, 
which boosted the independence movement and opposition to Moscow. On the 
other hand, under the cover of the climate and energy policies aimed at Europe, 
the fortress of sustainable development, attempts have been made in present-day 
Estonia to develop the wasteful and inefficient oil shale industry. 
It is possible that in functional systems that are susceptible to an ecological 
crisis the internal resonance will become so strong that it will lead to turbulence 
in other functional or sub-systems. It is important to understand what types of 
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connectivity between system communications take place in a situation of such 
turbulence that trigger new meaning-searching debates between individuals. 
Such a dynamic is briefly described in the article ON RISKS (III). It appears 
that dissatisfaction with the generality claims of the system creates a new basis 
for seeking solutions in interaction between individuals. It is possible that 
unexpected configurations that reduce complexity will emerge in this 
interaction: after all, a social system needs individuals to develop. It may be that 
the movement of Estonia to the West took place in such a calm manner because 
of the systems and individuals’ inability to rationalise the West. The 
Phosphorite War and its mythical stage (Lauristin and Vihalemm 1997) 
functioned as an experience of formulaic truth, which restarted time and 
cancelled previously legitimised meanings, therefore reducing the opposition to 
system legitimation and beginning the new process of signification. Later, at the 
end of the nineties, the motivation of the requirements of the lifeworld in the 
administrative-political system gathered strength, but those were hindered by 
the overlap of the systems. 
 
 
2.4. Main conclusions from the attempts of 
institutionalisation of environment 
 Environmental values and issues can be understood only through commu-
nication and its conditions, because individuals have no understanding of the 
intrinsic value of nature and the environment. Even direct nature experience 
has to become an object of communication in order to understand it. 
 Both the communication of a social system and interaction between 
individuals can offer only a distorted picture of time and space, and the 
events structuring them. But it is precisely the systematically created 
distortion that helps individuals to understand the environment. 
 Despite an infinite amount of communication, concern about the environ-
ment becomes too burdening for the institutions of society at a certain stage 
of complexity. This leads to communication through silence, i.e. to a 
decision not to deal with the rationalisation of certain problems (e.g. 
concerns of local people). The dynamics of silence develop according to the 
maturation and learning of the system. For the individual, the complexity of 
communication may also provide silence, as it loses its contact with the 
lifeworld: the use of meta-concepts, no time for reiteration, and utterances 
instead of information. 
 In understanding the environment, relations with social institutions are 
inevitable because they provide a common set of rules for individual 
interaction. This helps to resolve the conflicts between the everyday 
experiences of individuals that arise from different patterns of socialisation 
in the structural relations. 
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 Communication of environmental issues is not possible without mutual 
interaction between functional systems (education, law, economics etc.). 
Mutual connectivity between functional systems through coding makes the 
discussion of environmental issues complex and such complexity cannot be 
reduced intentionally. 
 Focussing on environmental values in decision-making progressively 
increases the complexity of the system because environmental issues are 
unquantifiable. To do so, nature needs to be treated as a resource (in the 
Giddensian concept) or as the steering medium (in the Habermasian 
concept). In such a case, environmental value becomes universal (as money 
has) and loses its meaning in relation to natural processes. 
 Complexity does not allow reaching fundamental environmental agreements 
and principles, such as in Section 5 of the Constitution, to be introduced in 
discussions. Complexity means that, due to the ruling instrumental approach, 
there are fewer chances for deviations that would anchor the contradiction 
between social experience and system prescriptions. The issues of nature and 
the environment are, however, sensitive to social context; although the 
instrumental approach is internally logical, it cannot explain changing 
contexts or the social nerve. 
 Consumerism is an institution that is unable to dissolve and unify other 
institutions. Consumption legitimises uncertainty through routinisation. 
Although participation processes enable new meanings to emerge in the 
context of the social system, they are unable to reduce complexity. This 
means that, in parallel with fulfilling democratic ambitions, they help to 
colonise the lifeworld with new abstract requirements. 
 The subordinate and subordinating systems cannot communicate simulta-
neously, but only one at a time. Therefore, there are different truths in both 
systems and the lifeworld can enforce communication in one or the other. 
The complexity of the system can be reduced by mistakes in system 
reflection, which may emerge with the increase in tempo and disturb the 
order of the algorithm of the unitas multiplex, but also by individuals who, 
for some reason, ignore institutionalised rules. 
 
 
2.5. Formation of meanings of the environment 
 
II Why are individuals unable to converge around environmental issues? 
 
Why can't we discuss how to improve our society? Habermas and Giddens 
demand a dialogue and democratic debate, and it seems that we have that, 
maybe even more than necessary. But tensions are not relieved. It is not the lack 
of freedom of speech that irritates present day activists, but the fact that there 
are not enough people who listen to them. What is the problem? Theorists 
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believe that the gap between interaction and society has become un-
precedentedly wide and deep. The traditions born out of repetition have lost 
their power. Does the complexity of a system also express itself as changes in 
the reflection mechanisms of individuals? Can individual reflection initiate or 
direct changes in the system? I have analysed the positions of the above-
mentioned authors on these questions. 
Habermas (1976, 1989: 137, 140, 183) states that the fragmenting influence 
of the steering media disrupts the cultural reproduction of the lifeworld, 
threatening the continuity of tradition and the coherence of the knowledge 
necessary for coping with everyday life. This puts the individual’s motivation 
and ability to act at risk, diminishing the ability to engage in the communication 
necessary to cope with uncertain situations. According to Habermas, 
socialisation or system integration alone is not sufficient, but he fails to define 
those “given” and threatened elements in the lifeworld that are inevitable in 
order to ensure the individual's communication capacity. 
Based on Giddens, whose approach to individuals is socialisation-centred, 
we can assume that individuals may not necessarily ask themselves the critical 
questions arising from the colonising influence of the steering media because 
the reflective capacity of individuals is realised through worlds that are more 
accessible to them than is required for the analysis of the system. What an 
individual knows about the world cannot be separated from his world. 
Similarly, individuals have some knowledge about how to behave when the 
familiar environment begins to blur. It is possible that the world, which is 
becoming more and more complex, is creating its own practices of the 
implementation of discursiveness. 
In addition, Luhmann (1995: 418–419, 430–436) does not believe that 
meanings can disappear; otherwise, both interaction and society would also 
vanish. From his viewpoint, the social system does not limit the meaningful 
choices of individuals, or the opportunities to diverge from those choices; it just 
attracts individuals with what is easy to agree with17. Thus, the complexity of 
the system does not bother an individual who is using first-order observation 
(the reasons why individuals opt for a first- or second-order observation are 
explained in the article ON RISKS). Comparing Giddens with Luhmann, we 
can assume that a second-order observation (discursiveness) is used when the 
practices of realising the complexity of the system become too burdensome for 
the body and unconsciousness of the individual, whose time and space 
resources are limited. If certain types of practices start to dominate in the 
context of the colonisation of the system, the unconscious needs of individuals 
may find no relief. They just do not have the time for the necessary practices. It 
is also possible that certain practices lead to an institutional dead-end: at a 
certain point they become useless and their rules and resources cannot be 
transferred to alternative social relations. For example, the practices of the 
                                                                          
17  Cf. Elizabeth Shove (2010) on practice theories: practices recruit practitioners. 
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natural economy do not enable individuals to sustain themselves because 
industrially produced food is much cheaper and the barriers to the entry of 
industrial food into the market are much lower. Nowadays, agricultural 
producers are required to know how to prepare business plans, manage projects 
and sell their products, use appropriate amounts of chemicals and use modern 
technology, in contrast to the way that natural processes work. The practices 
necessary for making ends meet do not leave any room for additional practices 
that would protect the environment. At the same time, the lack of natural raw 
materials and industrial-scale production frustrate people. How can the tension 
be relieved? The system and individuals are still mutually related. 
If the semantic field of the lifeworld clashes with the system, it should, in 
Giddesian terms, take place through certain discursive beliefs or practices (or 
the lack thereof, e.g. abstaining from voting or making a purchase). Because an 
individual is socialised into society and involved in its integration through his 
practical life (an accomplice), he cannot be opposed to himself as the 
reproducer of the structure. Without discursive observation, it is difficult for an 
individual to see himself as the source of the problem because he is 
participating in society through the normality of his routinised practices. He can 
“clash” only with the world that is no longer normal and that differs from the 
previous life-experience of the individual, i.e. with the practices of other 
individuals or institutions. Although individuals are connected with each other 
through everyday relations, they do not necessarily understand the ways of life 
of other people and their reasons. In practical awareness, the problems always 
lie somewhere else, not in the practitioners' actual practices. 
When lifeworlds diverge, members of society have an opportunity to see the 
world from very different perspectives and through different types of relations. 
While these relations are brought together, they are incompatible and cannot be 
merged. For example, an environmentalist can combine his truth with that of an 
entrepreneur only through system integration because there are no short-cuts to 
understanding and solving problems between them. Therefore, the oppositions 
of the lifeworlds are solved in societally legitimised practices, so practitioners 
may not even be aware of their opposition. For example, environmentalists’ 
everyday routine is based on project management, and the bureaucratic 
systematisation that takes up most of their time has, for the bystander, no 
particular relation to “natural” nature and environmentalists’ critical ideology. 
The same phenomenon is seen in the analysis of the article ON PLANNING 
(II), in which the environmental process itself appeared more important than the 
environmental issue in question. 
Although the practical activities of individuals are arranged according to the 
freedoms and restrictions of social integration, they may not necessarily offer 
individuals enough motivation to act (everybody is fed up with project 
management), and vice versa: it may be difficult to find a discursively satisfying 
practice to alleviate anxiety. 
26
62 
Giddens (1997: 70) has stated that there is no truth of tradition left in the 
practices of modern society; all that remains is compulsiveness, which is in 
effect tradition without traditionalism, just an emotional drive for repetition, and 
that nobody has a clue as to “why this endless treadmill”. While in a traditional 
society it was accepted that truth couldn’t be tested discursively (truth was 
managed by a guardian who had direct contact with formulaic truth), today 
individuals are compelled to be reflective and to pursue the truth, despite the 
fact that with each attempt the truth becomes more and more imperceptible. The 
need to be constantly reflective in order to make personalised choices may, 
indeed, lead to a Habermasian motivation crisis and fatigue, as the only thing 
that is certain is the specific positivist practice of reflexivity, which tries to 
combine and separate similar pieces of information into something new, yet still 
similar. For example, every day articles are published in the media containing 
similar recommendations for more environmentally friendly lifestyles, but these 
recommendations are never followed in real life. Giddens does not offer a 
sufficient explanation of such monotony. It is better explained by Luhmann. 
According to Luhmann (1995: 418–419, 430–436), meanings are not fixed 
to specific interactions, thus allowing meaning-based distinction in society. 
Communication is guided by difference, which is perceived as the non-identity 
of society and interaction. The social system enables the participants in 
interaction to divide time into episodes and this helps them to perceive the 
freedoms and restrictions that are not found in the interaction itself. The 
increase in the pace at which differences are produced diminishes individuals’ 
ability to learn and control, so all that is left is a compulsive and endless desire 
to control. 
Time-systemising repetition becomes a topic of culture (a need to keep pace 
with time), but it is impossible to discuss its causality because there is no 
relevant authority or holder of truth. Repetition that determines differences 
requires individual practices in order to be realised. Based on Habermas, 
Giddensian compulsive behaviour may be an attempt to motivate the 
requirements of the economic system in the lifeworld. This gives rise to a 
consumer culture and attitude and also to the need to be active in the 
increasingly complex world in order to ensure the reproduction of capital. But 
consumers with similar preferences (e.g. environmentally aware consumers) and 
environmentalists can “unite” only through the perception of similar 
differences, which, in turn, unmasks the demands of the legitimation of the 
economic system, presented as environmental. 
The article ON PLANNING (II) also concludes that community identity is 
born from opposition to the challenges of a system, i.e. it is based on the 
perception of similar differences and is ready to change in response to 
challenges. The article ON CONSUMPTION (IV) provides an example of the 
Russian diaspora in Estonia, whose identity, which is oriented to consumerism, 
is a response to the closedness of the social system. Although the lifeworld of 
the Russian diaspora is weakly connected through the practices of opposition 
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and eclectic media consumption (Vihalemm & Hogan-Brun 2013), Russians 
can perceive common differences in terms of their integration into the system, 
i.e. the perception of rejection. The same phenomenon is seen in the focus group 
analysis of the article ON RISK (III), in which the cut-off Russian diaspora 
formulate a collective solution to the situation, contrasting themselves with the 
colonising messages of social institutions. The article ON THE ENVIRON-
MENTAL CONSCIOUSNESS (I) points out that the united front of the 
Estonians during the Phosphorite War and the heritage protection movement 
emerged in opposition to the Soviet system. When the latter fell apart, the 
uniting motive and feeling of solidarity disappeared. Next, I will ask: can the 
lack of meanings as a similar, anxiety raising difference unite individuals and 
thus send a signal to the system? 
 
 
2.6. Anxiety and converging 
Luhmann, in his book on ecological communication (1989), treats anxiety as a 
motivator of social movements. Anxiety that is born from the perception of 
incompatibilities in society cannot be suppressed or alleviated by money or 
religion. The codes of functional systems do not apply to anxiety and an 
individual may feel anxiety without the fear of contradiction. This creates a 
fertile ground for the rise of topics related to anxiety (such as concern for the 
environment). However, anxiety also needs to be regulated, and guidance is 
required on how to deal with it. This requires a definition and a relevant 
practice. Again, the integration of the system is required. Anxiety was discussed 
in the article ON RISK (III). It appeared that it was difficult for individuals to 
give a name to anxiety, in particular because industrial risks were not yet 
institutionalised in Estonia (i.e. risks were not publicly recognised). The lack of 
institutionalised risks was perceived as active silence from the system, which 
increased anxiety. If a risk becomes real before people are even aware of it, that 
means that no preventive measures are taken by institutions and this decreases 
trust in institutional reassuring communication. Therefore, anxiety is a 
phenomenon of communication, not of the selected topic. 
Anxiety does not explicitly reveal the source of the anxiety. Anxiety is 
perceived in structurally open conditions, for example attracting either 
environmentalists or those who are concerned about food risks. These groups 
are united by one thing (Luhmann 1989: 125): they give meaning to their 
actions through the social system, which distinguishes them from the society as 
the excluded ones (based on the code: included/excluded) and what develops as 
they become the included excluded. This kind of identity was also a basis for 
the formation of the risk strategy of the Russians in the article ON RISKS (III). 
According to Giddens, more attention must be paid to which social systems 
the practical activity of the environmentalists can be understood within. It 
appears that an environmental protection organisation that has legitimised itself 
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as opposing the system also realises itself by using rules and resources that 
amplify structural features: essentially as an extension of the political-
administrative system and a translator of legitimation attempts into the lifeworld 
(Sõerd, forthcoming). Their opposition may exist only at the discursive level18. 
The appearance of anxiety can be interpreted by using Giddens’s human 
body-centred approach. The economic system has to legitimise itself for 
individuals but the human body sets restrictions on this process. You cannot 
drive several cars or eat several dinners at the same time. Therefore, in order to 
rationalise itself economics is forced to create new meanings that can be 
expressed in the act of payment/non-payment. For this purpose, economics 
needs to find a way into the Habermasian lifeworld of individuals by reducing 
economic independence and replacing its components with suitable services. 
Here the practice that is valid is payment, not existence, such as saving money 
or an environmentally friendly existence that abstains from consumption. An 
individual may become anxious if he has to adapt to too many services in order 
to save, or if he cannot use those services because they are too expensive: 
spending to save contradicts common sense. 
Besides participating in social movements and making conscious 
consumption decisions, an individual can relieve his anxiety by acting as a 
citizen. The political practices of an individual are realised in a way that 
rationalises new possibilities for the economy. This is done in the course of 
unconscious everyday practices (e.g. being involved in the development of 
education, science or law) and also by taking part in administrative-political 
debates. The participation practices related to the latter legitimise public 
discursive beliefs: for example, voting or participating in discussions, such as 
the discussion of the development plan described in the article ON PLANNING 
(II). 
Participation processes are structural situations in which linguistic processes 
help people to arrange their anxiety internally in the context of a system’s rules. 
In participation practices, new situations are legitimised linguistically, an 
occurrence which may not be possible in real life. For example, the notion of 
sustainable development is nice but it is possible only within system 
communication. Arguments related to economics, nature and society have no 
                                                                          
18  A study of the practice that has become central for citizen’s associations – project 
management – showed that the activity of citizens’ associations is very little connected with 
the bottom-to-top legitimation of the lifeworld (because of anxiety that is born from the 
opposition to the system projected in Luhmann’s approach). The objectives formulated in the 
articles of association exist linguistically at the level of utterance. Instead of being ready to 
react at a critical moment when the values of the lifeworld are at risk, the project managers 
of the organisation are busy arranging their projects according to institutional rules. Project 
managers are recruited by international cash flow to cooperation with organisations for 
whom the main criteria of selection is the skill of managing time and budgets. The shared 
lifeworld and its basic values as the basis of an ideological approach are not the basis of 
international integration. Therefore, citizens’ associations do not have the capability of the 
legitimation of critical discussion. 
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common denominator and, therefore, involvement in those arguments would 
require endless comparisons. However, as Luhmann says, we see the world only 
through first-order observation, and second-order observation is too much. The 
increasingly frequent participation processes are a priori good in the positivist 
paradigm, but in the critical paradigm they are signs of crisis. According to 
Luhmann (1993:154), participation processes indicate a loss of confidence, 
rather than a means of gaining confidence. If individuals protest against not 
being listened to, the problem probably lies not in not listening but in increasing 
unconscious anxiety, as the linguistic solutions achieved in participation are not 
able to loosen structures. 
This conclusion is consistent with the peculiarity of the risk society pointed 
out by Beck (1986/92, Beck & Beck-Gernsheim 2002): accelerating time 
requires reaction without time shift (reflex). Life experience loses the possibility 
of testing different situations in practice and seeing what works and what does 
not, because it is impossible to “communicate” time (in linguistic logic, 
interaction is simultaneous). But time is what is needed to overcome the 
paradox of communication mistakes (we cannot describe reality; the only thing 
we can describe is the difference as compared with the prior situation). When 
people react to differences by acceleration, it is difficult for them to realise the 
truths of their practical and unconscious experience. Therefore, they tend to 
overreact because the practice of resolving differences requires the creation of 
an additional practice that aims to solve the identified problem (less often the 
reshaping of the old practices). This limits individuals’ time and space and 
creates an increasing need to deal with side effects etc. This forms the basis of 
the snowball effect. Control over the dynamics of anxiety will be lost and 
offering an opportunity to participate no longer works to relieve anxiety. 
The articles ON PLANNING (II) and ON RISKS (III) emphasize that 
individuals’ emotions may be a good indicator of moments of system 
colonisation. As the “urgent” colonisation demands of a system are always 
internally logical, the emotional side of the individual may succumb in the 
contradiction to them. Therefore, the human mind must be able to express 
linguistically its unconscious motives in order to resist colonisation. Next, I will 




2.7. Capability of language to communicate anxiety 
Communicative interaction between people does not convey meanings directly, 
although we expect this to happen in the everyday context, in which it seems 
that we understand each other. For Giddens, language use is a practice that is 
structured through socialisation and the requirements of everyday life. 
According to Luhmann (1995: 150–153, 272–275), language use is neither 
thinking nor communication in which the world comes to life. An utterance 
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always has another, informative side. The difference between and dependence 
on information and utterance also help to explain meanings, by conveying a 
message when the world is not holding together naturally but only with the help 
of communication. Information depends on the observer. Therefore, language is 
a means of system integration despite being only a distortion of the world and 
unable to express it as a whole. The world remains a difference that depends on 
the practice of using language (e.g. in a planning meeting, art, poetry or intimate 
private conversation). 
In addition, language always indicates different things for different language 
users because it separates time and space for each user differently. The meaning 
of linguistic expression, in particular of the text, which can be read over and 
over, constantly changes. If something is firmly claimed by relying only on a 
text, the structural relations on the basis of which the meaning was created at a 
given moment of time are denied. This is seen in political processes where 
meanings are expressed not only in linguistic but also in numerical terms. The 
bigger number abolishes the meaning potential of the smaller: for example, a 
numerical limit determines the safe rate of pollution. A study conducted by 
Spee and Jarzabkowski (2011) on organisational strategic planning showed that 
the practices of integrating oral and written discourses in the course of the 
communication process made a document more authoritarian and participants, 
in particular those at lower levels, had to constantly make concessions regarding 
their visions of the future for the benefit of the leaders of the process. 
Colonisation occurs through the creation of meta-concepts that bridge structural 
relations. 
The adjusting of language practices to the conditions of structuration (in the 
Giddensian approach) is the reason why we cannot assume that Habermas’s 
ideal discourse is unlimited or that participants can be included in a discussion 
as equals. The situations of interaction are always designed, not only in terms of 
the topic or participants, problem proposition or ways of directing the 
conversation, but also in terms of structuration mechanisms that predetermine 
their own hierarchy through language (however, hierarchy manifests itself even 
earlier, in the possibility of linguistic interaction). We can speak of the freedom 
of speech or the “glasnost” effect only as examples of the designs of the 
situations of interaction that creates their own symmetry and asymmetry (in 
Luhmann’s terms) and enable us to interact with each other at all. 
Language always leaves the other side unpresented, representing what exists 
and opposing it to something that could exist but actually does not. It is the 
aspect of silence that is most difficult to analyse in linguistic interaction and is 
actually only sensed contextually. The rules of institutional speech (Jaworski 
2005) may assume the introduction of silence. It may be practical (e.g. order of 
speech) or metalinguistic (e.g. drawing attention to the meaningful aspects of 
speech) or aimed at establishing power. Jaworski points out that meaningful 
silence occurs in situations where an individual cannot say anything (yet) or 
does not know what to say (e.g. news is delayed), and also in situations where 
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the important vocabulary required for expressing meaning is missing. While 
Luhmann speaks of active silence (1994) as something that requires the 
system’s attention (but does not receive it and is still perceived as 
communication through active silence), Jaworski stresses the inability of 
language to express everything that is perceived. This means that many 
phenomena that cannot be expressed linguistically still play a role in guiding the 
meanings of a conversation and, vice versa, they have a meaning but are denied 
their natural role of correcting interaction due to the power discourse 
(Habermasian culture elements). The article ON RISKS (III) also speaks of 
commonplaces as a means of overcoming anxiety caused by uncertainty: 
language helps to overcome unknown situations, but also to construct situations 
that do not exist (various risk calculations that are never realised and exist only 
in documents). 
While the article ON THE ENVIRONMENTAL CONSCIOUSNESS (I) 
refers to the Soviet era and its censorship (which created new practices of 
information consumption: a significant, yet telling gap between information and 
utterances), today we cannot speak of a very new or different situation. The 
information presented in the Soviet era was made understandable by double 
standards found in interaction and the fact that system coordinates were in place 
(Beck claims that nowadays the system coordinates are also changing). 
However, this is not the main precondition of the functioning of communication 
(that communication concerns differences) that has changed, but the nature and 
stage of organisation in which people can interact. 
In a structurally tightening context, the possibility of asking questions (e.g. 
how to protect the environment) is inevitably restricted to an increasingly 
narrow context. 
The media analysis referred to in the article ON THE ENVIRONMENTAL 
CONSCIOUSNESS (I) shows that Estonia is moving towards a situation where 
environmental meanings are understood in a very narrow social context. 
Because of the structural preconditions and the logic of development, people are 
forced to leave behind their direct perception of the environment and replace it 
with one appropriate in a modern society (the discourse of climate change 
instead of direct nature-experience and practices of the natural economy). This 
means that linguistic practices are also being replaced and the linguistic 
reproduction of certain nature experiences is likely to become impossible. This 
does not mean that people will stop going out into nature, only that the 
meanings will be different, e.g. an aesthetic garden (a “pleasure” garden) 
instead of a functional one (an allotment garden). 
Linguistic expression is practically simultaneous, but for the emergence of 
meaning a shift in time and space is required. If there is no shift in time and 
space, no meaning can be created because it can only be born from difference, 
at the point of contact between interaction and society. Because communication 
cannot stop, it may happen that it will occur through “empty” repetition, 
imposed through structuration mechanisms on the rest of life practices without 
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the ability to question the lack of meaning. Even if they were desired, there are 
no linguistic practices for that because those are also concentrated in an 
increasingly rigid power structure (how else could such a legitimate poetic 
expression as “winning the trust of the markets”, etc. emerge). The growing 
abundance of consumer-oriented media texts shows that there are linguistic 
translation practices (and people behind such practices) that translate the 
diminishing bits of environmental information into a language that follows the 
code of the economic system (economic man). Such texts are based on 
repetition and do not carry any new information except for the repetition itself. 
There is a certain type of media addiction whose unconscious mechanism is the 
anticipation of breaking news (truth). The same applies to environmental 




2.8. Main conclusions from individuals’  
opportunities to converge 
 Individuals’ anxiety and anguish are born not out of immediate observation 
of the environment but out of an unconsciously perceived conflict that will 
be reflected by and shaped to practices that are understood in system 
communication. At the same time, the found or proposed solution may not 
relieve the perceived anxiety. 
 The meanings of environmental issues become topical for an individual as 
distant discursive questions because after having been socialised into society 
through personal practices it is difficult for the individual to judge himself. 
Opposition to the problematic world occurs when its complex colonisation 
claims start to challenge the individual’s body (it is impossible to be in 
several places at the same time and to act in different times) or his 
unconscious. 
 Structuration fragments the world of individuals’ rules and resources so that, 
despite being mutually connected through citizens’ associations, shopping or 
educational choices, the repertoire of individuals’ common choices becomes 
narrower and narrower. It is their physical ability (the use of the body in time 
and space) that forces individuals to make choices (e.g. to bake your own 
bread or to have a well-paid job and buy organic foodstuffs). At the same 
time, certain reflection practices are harmonised, e.g. the development of 
consumer and information sharing cultures. 
 Individuals understand environmental issues through difference and 
repetition. Difference gives meaning to problems, through comparing them 
with the identity of society or the individual (How environmentally friendly 
am I?). Repetition provides the basis for difference: if nothing was repeated 
there would be no meanings. To understand difference and perceive 
repetition, time and space experiences have to alternate. Accelerating speed 
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jeopardises those conditions. The growing need for reflexivity and the 
perceived contradictions in environmental messages may jeopardise the 
individual’s motivation for environmental practices and discussions. 
 Individuals unite to solve a common problem based on similarly perceived 
differences: for example, based on similarly perceived silence (our concerns 
are ignored) or the ambition of institutional communication to colonise the 
lifeworld. 
 The interaction between individuals with regard to decision-making is 
linguistic. On the one hand, language can abstract, distort or give meaning 
only through the social system. On the other hand, the lifeworld is colonised 
through language practices that attempt to assimilate and combine different 
structural problems. Participation processes and discussions create numerous 
meta-concepts that colonise the lifeworld further. 
 
In the conclusion section of the dissertation, I will combine empirical analysis 
and theoretical discussion in order to interpret the processes that have occurred 




The objective of this paper is to identify the conditions required to ensure that 
communication of environmental issues through reproduction would not 
incrementalise but instead would enable individuals to find better solutions to 
environmental issues and risks at both personal and collective levels. The 
empirical analysis helped to bring out the theoretical insights and possibilities 
that had not been emphasised by the theoretical authors themselves. The 
theoretical analysis helps to understand the logic of the change and give value to 
the empirical data. It appears from an empirical analysis, which was based on 
the studies on the communication of environmental issues and risks over the 
past 25 years, that environmental topics have fragmentised – which is 
characteristic of late modernity – and that environmental issues have become 
more complex at the level of public communication, at the institutional level 
and at the level of interaction between individuals’ life experiences and 
institutional solutions. Based on a theoretical analysis of the empirical 
conclusions inspired by system and structuration theories I will provide answers 
to the research questions. At the end of both theoretical conclusions there is also 
the example of the Estonian experience. 
 
I Why doesn’t the institutionalisation of environmental issues in complex 
societies offer solutions without rebound effects? 
 
It was mainly the Brundtland Report (1987) by the UN that legitimised the goal 
of sustainable development in public communication. This ideal aimed to 
combine three domains of public discourse – environment, economy and 
culture, most recently, however, also politics. In terms of the theories of 
structuration and social systems this aim involves enormous challenges. In 
terms of Habermas the problems lie at least in two domains – the possibility of 
the advocate of the outer nature of the society such as nature that cannot speak 
to her by herself, and the colonising influence of the political-administrative 
system that introduces such meta-concepts to the lifeworld in order to legitimise 
the motivations of the economy. According to Luhmann, the issue is not about 
ideal discourse. In his view meta-concepts as public utterances cannot represent 
information about situations where the aims of different parties are merged. 
According to Luhmann every functional system of a society is opposed to any 
other functional system, although being also in need of them to develop. 
To “merge” the ideas and three (four) fields of sustainable development, 
there should be the possibility to communicate those fields in whole and at the 
same time. However, in a social system the decisions concerning alarming 
communications from different fields can be made only separately, one at a 
time. The reason here is in the fact that communication in Luhmann’s terms 
begins from the differentiation of the unknown, not from the search for 
similarities. Therefore, the difference between different arguments always 
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remains and is also the cause of the continuation of the demands emanating 
from each field participating in communication. 
But the problem does not lie only in the everlasting difference between 
function-systems. In the globalising world, especially in Europe, there are many 
different states that are found on different preconditions (in Habermas’s term, 
goal values), but still joined in one superior system such as the EU and several 
constellations. Here too the difference between superior and subordinate system 
remains; these systems do not merge. 
According to Luhmann, communication in a social system cannot proceed 
simultaneously from two types of power-relations, such as an educational and 
economic system or super-system uniting multiple countries and national 
democracy, nor alleviate the tensions between them. Integrating different social 
systems without assimilating one into the other is possible by exchanging 
viewpoints in time and space. For example, Estonian institutions either agree 
with the EU climate policy or protect the interests of local polluting energy 
producers – it is impossible to do both at the same time, despite linguistic 
utterances, which claim that it is possible (sustainable development). But as 
demanding communications from different parties are simultaneous, this 
enables us to apply double standards. By utterance a decision that is made in the 
interests of both parties is, in fact, by information made in favour of one 
authority. 
Such double standards enable the identity of society to survive as the 
development of utterances in a manner that they would exactly respond to 
different informational contexts would incrementalise the lifeworld level and 
would make the ability of understanding between individuals impossible. This 
is the reason why at the lifeworld level the meta-concepts are only declarative 
(utterances, not information). For example, Article 5 of the Constitution of the 
Republic of Estonia stresses, at the linguistic level, the sustainable use of 
natural resources, but in real life its impact may be assessed differently. 
The magnification of double-standards happens especially in the context of 
the globalising world – e.g. in the communication of different function-systems 
in the context of communication of superior and subordinate systems. Double-
standards exist naturally in the lifeworld view, not in system communication. 
According to Habermas the system integration requires a legitimising 
discussion at the lifeworld level, as the system is based on its goal values. In the 
context of subordinating systems (in the example of nation states) this 
connection of legitimation will disappear, as a superior system needs, in order 
to survive, interaction with a subordinate system, but not so much the lifeworld. 
This will increase the distance between the lifeworld and the system. 
However, for Luhmann, the system needs no goal values, but only the 
coherence of inner rationality, and interaction of different systems that act as 
environments to each other. This provides a new fulcrum for instru-
mentalisation, which is a challenge for the individuals also in Luhmann’s 
approach. Luhmann has called the interrelation between systems unitas 
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multiplex – functional systems do not merge, they just create new differences 
and the logic of its sequence remains elusive. Still, can the logic of unitas 
multiplex be found? 
The article ON PLANNING (II) deliberates about whether social institutions 
can have a memory of their own, a memory of their hierarchy of coding 
between functional systems that will be applied uniformly to similar situations. 
What is the guarantee of its continuation? Luhmann speaks rarely about the 
individual, although he agrees that the social system needs individuals for 
existence and vice versa. Institutions however function through the action of 
individuals. Here Giddens’ approach to agency will contribute an insight. 
Although his approach to individual socialisation through constant reiteration of 
conduct is not unique, here his approach to practical consciousness as the 
function to avoid anxiety is useful. The social conduct is routinised. The 
established (power-) relations on the one hand and personal time and space on 
the other hand shape the continuation of routines of how and on what kind of 
signs of anxiety to react to. In the context of complexity – as long as the 
routines fit to personal space and time, the logic of unitas multiplex should be 
continued. For this reason, the separation of the conditions of the time and space 
are crucial. Therefore, the increase in complexity is in large part the cause of the 
reflexivity and routine of everyday practical life. Can we find however other 
types of practices of reflexivity by reflecting on those? 
Giddens’ structuration theory reminds us that the meaning behind routine 
action functions as a given and unquestioned truth, therefore, it is very difficult 
for the individuals to define themselves as a problem in the overall picture. Also 
Beck finds that as the causes of environmental pollution are the institutionalised 
actions of the society, these can’t be institutionalised as the sources of the 
problems at the same time (at least by the institution itself). Therefore, it is 
logical that individuals use their discursive potential only to analyse the ‘others’ 
practices that are visible in communication. Here we find that the opposition of 
the lifeworld to the system (Habermas’ approach) cannot be solved as this 
opposition at the agency level is directed against another agent. Common 
opposition to another “other” can ease this opposition. However, each of this 
kind of opposition will increase the need to look for differences and therefore 
also reflection, increasing also the complexity of the system. 
Intentional simplification of the system is impeded by the socialisation of 
individuals into the modern world, whose meanings and practices enable 
rationalisation only through practices that are legitimised within present day 
conditions. This adds to the complexity, not to the reduction of the system. In 
order to simplify the system the expected order of the hierarchy of unitas 
multiplex should be disrupted. This would allow unexpected institutions to 
emerge (following the logic of the functioning of a social system, of course) and 
simplify the practices that are today legitimised as the only possible ones. 
In Giddens’ approach individuals’ personal time and space that is left for 
their routine behaviour may be important. Due to the lack of personal time and 
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space in the increasing complexity the breaking with traditions and changes in 
the routine may, in principle, lead to fluctuations in both functional systems 
(such as politics, law, science, education, economy, etc.) and superior or 
subordinating systems. This may change the ways the system is reproduced 
(unitas multiplex) because the fluctuation causes too many mistakes in system 
rationality, which will restart it in order to find again the differentiation between 
the environment and the system. 
The possible fluctuation in the system will oppose the lifeworld with new 
problems, which will cause the change in Habermasian goal values. 
Communication can give a meaning only in relation to something. For example, 
the opposition of the lifeworld and the system during the Phosphorite War 
created an input for a new communication system. At the linguistic, utterance 
level, nationalism, sovereignty and values of nature were given a central role in 
the new Constitution (laying down the main values of the system). Therefore, 
the memory of lifeworld is shaped together with the fluctuations of the system. 
However, total simplification is still impossible, as institutional memory 
through the practices of individuals survives even if the regime changes. 
The social system can avoid incrementalisation also by the activation of the 
lifeworld. This means that individuals acknowledge in their discursive 
consciousness that the way they use their time and space captures a political 
choice. Therefore, the lifeworld can force an option for the social system to 
choose a more convenient communication in the tradition of the unitas 
multiplex. For example, the social system can use ‘blind spots’ in rationalisation 
of other systems, decreasing the connection with them at the informational 
level, although the ties remain at the utterance level. For instance, in the help of 
the lifeworld and for the lifeworld it is possible for a subordinate system to 
appear as the contradicting system to the superior system if needed and vice 
versa, legitimate part of it. 
The vacuum of meaning during the fluctuations period can be filled also by 
the other-reference (formulaic truth) that cannot be rationalised in the system. 
For example, in the early years of independence many inconvenient reforms 
were carried through with little lifeworld legitimation and system integration – 
these were justified by Estonia’s mythical belief in the supremacy of Western 
practices. 
For the simplification of the system there is also an option learnt from Soviet 
modernity. The system may limit its rationalisation activities itself (in the help 
of the institutional routines that enforce “blind spots” to possible feedback from 
the lifeworld level, reflection). This opposition to the system will impose 
reflectivity practices at the lifeworld level that despite being based on the 
opposition, remain plain as they lack the variability offered by complexity in 







Twenty-five (25) years ago, Estonia moved from one modern communication 
system to another: from the disintegrated socialist bloc to Western capitalist 
modernity. In the system-theoretical meaning Estonia functioned in both the 
Soviet Union and functions in the European Union as a subordinate system, 
which means that its decision-making rights in reacting to the tensions of the 
lifeworld and forming supporting institutions were and are constrained, 
although in a different way. 
 
 
The end of the Soviet period 
The end of the Soviet period showed that environmental concern as well as any 
other concern is always a choice of a particular opposition. It is likely that 
among the issues that raised the anxiety at the end of the Soviet period the most 
important was Russification instead, id est the fear of the local lifeworld to 
loose its uniting routine through language. Routines are not questioned as far as 
they are not put in danger, as routines ease anxiety. 
It may be that the Phosphorite War of the late 1980s broke out because the 
Soviet regime obstructed the learning of the social system (internal rationalising 
of the system), which created a distance between different functional and 
subordinate systems. The virtually unlimited power of the industry to dictate to 
the political-administrative system created too much uncertainty. The impact of 
production was not legitimised at the level of lifeworld (e.g. consumers and 
consumption were neither used nor legitimate in justification of environmental 
issues) during the Soviet time. Therefore, during the Soviet period the gap 
between public utterances (promise of progress) and information (pollution) 
became an independent theme of reflection, a link between individual 
observations. The relative homogeneity of the lifeworld amplified the formation 
of internal contradiction to the system progressively and improved the chances 
of the system’s unitas multiplex to work in support of disintegration. The 
integration of the Estonian subordinate system (the system must not be equated 
to the state) and local lifeworld strengthened. While previously the local 
industry had been manoeuvring between the interests of the union and local 
legitimation, during the Phosphorite War the chemical industry united with the 
local opposition and started to exaggerate the impact of phosphorite mining in 
their reports submitted to Moscow (Sikk 2013). Such institutional behaviour 
contributed substantially to the political turbulence together with other global 
changes (the fall of the Berlin Wall, the impact of the Chernobyl disaster, 
‘glasnost’, and the overall rise of concern about the environment). Thus, the 
simplification of the social system was supported by the low level of internal 
integration, homogeneity of the lifeworld, rationalisation practices allowing 
double standards and the inability of the system to find a suitable outlet for the 
growing anxiety of individuals. 
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Transition period 
Transformation from one system (USSR) to another (EU) was not smooth. It 
occurred in stages, by adapting and translating. In the 1990s, which are also 
called ‘the mythical stage’ (Lauristin and Vihalemm 1997), the system was 
simplified, which in turn enabled enormous changes. With the disappearance of 
the framework of the old system (except for the opposition to the USSR) what 
became important were the projections of the pre-war Republic of Estonia and 
the illusions of Western society, of which only a few ex-pats who had returned 
to Estonia had a clearer idea. Although the legitimisation of the new system was 
based on Habermasian linguistic discussions of the main values of the system, 
the discussions could not consider the experience of living in the West (in order 
to find suitable adaptation mechanisms). Discord between practices and their 
legitimising meanings increased after the accession to the EU. While in the 
1990s the ‘bottom-up’ justification was used during integration into Europe (the 
requirements of the EU system remained on paper, instead of being 
implemented in policies – deception at the level of utterance), the opposite 
occurred at the beginning of the new millennium: EU regulations and directives 
started to dominate. The EU requirements were enforced at the levels of both 
lifeworld and institutions. The enforcement was carried out through the 
development of functional systems following European practices, in particular 
with the financial support from the EU. The increasing complexity created more 
social tension in Estonia than in the West, where the consumerism that 
integrated the lifeworld and the system developed gradually. The in-
compatibility of the justification of the integration of the superior system and 
the lifeworld prevented the system from learning from traditions and supported 
the disembedding (notion coined by Giddens, 1990) of the shared experience 
that had unacknowledged united local individuals. 
For example the waste recollection practices were implemented in a way that 
did not match the practices of the people (low-density population and distant 
grand ‘Euro’ landfills). Today, an economically efficient method (sorting by 
marketing methods, not by the qualities of the material) is used for sorting 
waste. Recently built ‘Euro’ landfills have to compete with brand new thermal 
stations that use waste burning as an energy source. This has a message to the 
individuals that instead of waste separation and reduction they have to produce 
more waste in order to keep enterprises going (contradiction with common 




Although the integration into the EU meant that people had to be involved in 
decision-making and the environment had to be protected (which was also an 
acknowledged requirement in the lifeworld), it increased tension in the system. 
The rationale of lifeworld had to be taken into account but it did not match the 
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rationalisation system managed from-top-to bottom (Habermasian legitimation 
crisis). This means that the EU regulations on the protection of the environment 
have been transposed (the environmental paradigm) but their implementation 
(system memory) is still too strongly biased in favour of the business sector (if 
this were possible to measure). 
Today, Estonia is a subordinate system of the EU, which itself is going 
through a major crisis and is increasingly less able to reduce its complexity 
through, for example, parliamentary elections.  
Nowadays, the discussion of environmental issues is not acknowledged as 
being constrained in public communication. On the contrary, tight internal 
integration of the system supports the development and legitimisation of 
environmental issues in the lifeworld. On the other hand, the lifeworld 
integration is becoming more and more fragmented despite participation in 
consumerism also increasing homogeneity through practice pattern. However, 
the consumer culture does not link individuals unilaterally and it has so far not 
functioned as a political power. 
 
 
II Why are individuals unable to converge around environmental issues? 
 
In the world of today communication is usually presumed to be a linguistic act. 
However, people’s experience with nature cannot depend on linguistics (e.g. by 
naming objects). Human action is regulated strongly by direct observation and 
reiteration of conduct, through linguistically rarely expressed knowledge. 
Experience and traditions act as a systematising component of interaction, 
though remaining a silent partner. These silent partners shape our time and 
space in order to create meaning. As the present complex world presumes high 
reflectivity, it needs also a high degree of abstraction. Although experience 
cannot be discussed without abstraction, the same fact decreases the information 
value of experience. 
What is discussed in decision-making is usually not the practical experience 
of the micro-level, but discursive ideas. Those are based on the opposition to the 
challenges of a system (rationalisation problems) and exactly in such opposition 
the interaction of individuals becomes meaningful for the system. This enables 
the system to develop policies that can be used to mitigate the perceived anxiety 
of people (external experts, compensatory development projects) or to neutralise 
the anxiety through silence or labelling in case its rationalisation exceeds the 
capabilities of systems complexity. 
The development of the social system and methods of abstraction do not 
allow one to react to the perceived anxiety in the lifeworld in the way one 
desires. The system integration and lifeworld meet in an accelerating time and 
unifying space. This decreases the ability to create meanings. Dependency 
relations may be born which are unable to make the changes necessary for the 
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integration of the system (sub-consciousness, interaction and the system do not 
meet in meaning-creation). 
Anxiety is triggered by active silence, i.e. a situation where something 
should but is not discussed. Anxiety cannot be denied because denial makes it 
only stronger. As individuals can ask questions about the causes of anxiety only 
through the world that is open to them (one cannot relate to sub-consciousness), 
there are also particular practices for finding solutions. These might not be 
enough, but it is impossible to be anxious all the time. 
The system uses anxiety by constructing risks and proposing solutions, by 
describing the risks as environmental or food hazards, technological risks or the 
risk of poverty. Anxiety enters the system of reproducing itself – the economic 
system is rationalising the risks, often through the scientific and other systems, 
by bringing new products to the market, designed to neutralise the risks, and by 
giving labels to the relevant practices (sustainable, ‘eco’). The political-
administrative system legitimises anxiety (sustainable development), providing 
the economic system with input but failing to reduce anxiety. Anxiety creates 
new cultural topics, obtained from the increasingly fragmented world – 
communication cannot be stopped. Thus, anxiety is directed to increasingly 
complex possibilities of the system, while the integration of the system and 
lifeworld is linked by successfully irresponsive meta-concepts. For example, 
while individuals have to deal with very different personal financial risks (life 
insurance, loan insurance, pension schemes, etc.), the irrationality of everyday 
life is justified by the meta-need for ‘winning the trust of markets’. 
The plurality of risk communications increases in line with society becoming 
more complex, exceeding the ability of the audience to receive the 
communication. Individuals’ general relationships with society contextualises 
the way they create strategies to manage environmental risks and uncertain 
situations: which risk messages should I pay attention to if there are so many 
and they are so difficult to implement without contradictions? Therefore, the 
risk strategies used by individuals become more varied. There is still something 
that can unite individuals in a complex world of risks. Since more often than not 
institutionally defined risks and their solutions cannot alleviate the anxiety of 
individuals, it is opposition to institutional risk communication in itself that can 
unite people. 
The perceived anxiety about environmental risks does not necessarily match 
the solutions offered by institutions and institutional predetermination may 
prevent individuals from seeking other solutions that are more appropriate in a 
given situation. Anxiety and tension is expressed at the emotional level where 
an emotion often reflects the conflict between the offered solution and its 
unsuitability in the specific context, but offering no solutions by itself. The 
lexicon and set of rules used by institutions lack the means for dealing with 
emotions and ‘translating’ individual solutions into universal solutions. While 
in the past individuals could rely on shared experience, nowadays shared 
30 
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experience may be related to a failure of the system, i.e. individuals may be 
united by opposition to institutional risk communication. 
Individuals are incapable of translating the hidden temporal and spatial 
experience found in social relations into abstractly expressed communication, 
fragmentation of time and space that creates the conditions for concealing 
legitimation issues and distorting time and space in linguistic communication. 
At the same time, language creates an opportunity and temptation to conceal 
complex relations behind legitimate words (sustainable development, 
ecological, etc.), which enables the hiding of power games and the achieving of 
illusory consensus. Although at the level of utterance the feedback forms 
provided by the system legitimise the role of the citizen (participation 
practices), the informational level of public decisions indicates that the system 
is reproduced in the name of consumers. 
It is true that communication is always distorting time and space and the 
relations within through abstraction; but in late modernity, declarative common 
interests and abstract meta-definitions prevail. Linguistic communication in a 
modern society enables us to disregard direct experience and links that give 
structure to time and space. Therefore, it is linguistically possible to create 
situations that are legitimate, yet impossible. An analysis of meta-concepts 
(article ON PLANNING, II) indicates that it is the economic system that is 
establishing the meta-definitions shaping power-relations – but individuals use 
them, not the economy. The system compresses time and space, in particular in 
the demand of the economic system in order to enable the reproduction of 
market relations. Here the individual’s ability to manage systems claims in their 
lifeworld may fail (Habermasian concern), as systemic prescriptions to the 
individual do not take into account the time and space available to them 
(perceived scarcity of time, rise in tempo). 
In order to decrease the influence of complexity and increase possibilities for 
possible converging, community relations should be promoted in order to help 
individuals find better joint solutions. Relations between various community 
members may pluralise the options of the systems the individuals may choose in 
coping with risk. The diminishing of shared knowledge, even if it is routine and 
something that the individuals are often not even aware of it, increases the need 
for discussion, which means that comprehensive knowledge/experience needs to 
be simplified, which in its turn will distort time and space. Developed 
community relations decrease the need for mutual reflectivity as the supporting 
intersection is already there. Furthermore, the development of relations with 
nature may offer a solution, as this diminishes the need to discuss practical 








Despite the fact that the end of the Soviet period was characterised by exploitive 
practices, the public communications approach to nature was more humanitarian 
than at present – it supported the appreciation of direct nature relation and 
giving meaning to the relationship of man with nature. Similar shared 
experience was common to the practices of natural economy, although the 
meaning of nature behind them was not acknowledged. Although during the 
Soviet time nature united culturally oriented people it was not often the main 
topic for them. Nature conservation movement was just a less restricted 
opportunity for socialising and pursuing one’s hobbies. This movement kept 
alive the discourse of opposition to Soviet powers. It is possible that these 
relations became the social resource to be used during the mobilising 
Phosphorite War. 
Estonia’s development towards Western modernity did not lead to the 
uniform distribution of environmental interest or concern (to replace previous 
shared direct nature experience). The experience-based and unacknowledged 
nature relations of Estonians decreased and the mediation of nature relations 
and fragmentation of solution seeking increased. Environmental issues are now 
communicated through other social relations, in particular through consumption 
(with late modernity nature steps back to society as environment (see Beck 
1986/92, 1995). However, the time and space in these relations have shifted. 
For example, when in the Soviet era people’s active relationship with nature 
was focussed on working on a personal allotment, present day ‘communities of 
practice’ are united by modern consumer culture, infrastructure and technology. 
Gardening is not a personal sphere anymore, but a practice of consuming global 
species, reshaping the soil and showing off. Moreover, the recollection practices 
that involved earlier culturally external domestic conduct and hidden spots in 
the courtyard, are today a matter of the lifestyle and social attitude. At the same 
time the frugality has been replaced by consumption. 
The discussion about environmental issues is diversifying. For example, 
citizens’ associations include so-called old-school protest movements, project 
organisations, sub-cultural and virtual communities, those based on personal 
preferences, consumer associations, etc. Although the accession to the EU has 
created various legitimised practices for involving individuals in decision-
making, it seems that their opinions are still not taken into account sufficiently 
(Ehitusmaavarade... 2009). Although the perception of risk should be growing 
gradually in the course of the development of complexity, Estonian people have 
inherited it without local institutional reflection – through consumption and 
experience of travelling in developed countries. Environmental concern and 
perception of risk is a product of the types of population who are actively 
involved in social structure. They, also being active in the institutionalisation of 
risk, take part in the structuration of society around the risk, being more likely 
to be found in the position of those who win from the institutionalisation of risk 
(at least at the discursive level). This positions individuals against each other – 
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different risk perception that is related to the social position prevents them in 
finding common understanding about the social problems. 
 
The objective of this paper was to identify the conditions required to ensure that 
communication of environmental issues through reproduction would not 
incrementalise but instead would enable individuals to find better solutions to 
environmental issues and risks at both personal and collective levels. 
Although this task is almost a mission impossible, it can be concluded from 
the analysis that the incrementalisation of the system can be avoided with the 
help of fluctuations in the subordinate or functional systems, id est: with the 
help of the side effects of the enforced enlightenment itself. These fluctuations 
can be brought to life in several ways. The ruptures in individuals’ routines of 
reflexivity may cause side effects that have an effect on a larger scale. This 
can’t be intentional – although the individuals may know what they want and 
do, the result may turn out different when looking from a perspective. To have 
an effect, the fluctuation also needs a context of a widespread anxiety, which 
could support the formation of the lifeworld in its opposition to a new meaning 
frame. This new frame (like pollution) and lifeworld’s opposition to it may lead 
a superior or subordinate system to reorganisation and rejuvenation. 
In order to avoid incrementalisation, the system may also limit its action by 
avoiding possible feedback from the lifeworld level, despite the opposition that 
this causes. Institutionalised silence will support the converging of the 
lifeworld. This will lead the lifeworld to seek for new meaning frames. Periods 
of vacuum of meaning during the fluctuations period can be filled by the other-
reference (formulaic truth) that is unfamiliar to the system. But other-reference 
may not always support individuals converging in the long run. In order to 
decrease the influence of complexity and increase possibilities for converging, 
community relations should be promoted in order to help individuals to find 
better joint solutions. The plurality of the late modern lifeworld will enable 
individuals to be more creative in the search for risk alleviation if brought 
together. But community relations and also direct nature relations will also help 
the individuals to diminish the need to discuss practical experience and 
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SUMMARY IN ESTONIAN 
Keskkonnaprobleemide ja -riskide kommunikatsiooni 
kriitilise analüüsi probleeme 
Töö eesmärgiks oli leida, milliseid tingimusi tuleks kujundada, et kommu-
nikatsioon keskkonna üle läbi enda taastootmise ei inkrementaliseeruks, vaid 
võimaldaks indiviididel leida paremaid lahendusi keskkonnaprobleemidele ja  
-riskidele nii isiklikul kui kollektiivsel tasandil. Empiirilise analüüsi baasil, mis 
tugines Eesti viimase 25 aasta keskkonnaprobleemide ja -riskide kommu-
nikatsiooni uuringutele, ilmnes hilismodernsusele omane keskkonnateemade 
killustatus ja probleemide komplekssus nii nende avaliku kirjelduse, neile 
institutsionaalsete lahenduste otsimise tasandil kui ka indiviidide elukogemuse 
ja institutsionaalsete lahenduste vastastikuse „tõlkimise“ tasandil. Lähtudes 
süsteemi- ja strukturatsiooniteooriatest inspireeritud empiiriliste järelduste 
teoreetilisest analüüsist vastan püstitatud uurimisküsimustele, integreerides 
empiirilise ja teoreetilise analüüsi leiud. 
 
 
I Miks ei paku keskkonnaküsimuste institutsionaliseerimine kompleksses 
ühiskonnas tagasilöökideta lahendusi? 
 
Eesti liikus 25 aasta eest ühest modernsest kommunikatsioonisüsteemist teise – 
lagunenud sotsialismileerist lääne kapitalistlikku modernsusesse. Nii Nõu-
kogude kui Euroopa Liidus on Eesti süsteemiteoreetilises mõttes toiminud 
alluva süsteemina, mis tähendab, et süsteemi iseotsustusõigus eluilma pingetele 
reageerimisel ja seda toetavate institutsioonide kujundamisel on piiratud. Kui 
süsteemi integratsioon eeldab ennast legitimeerivat arutelu eluilma tasandil ja 
tugineb selles sõnastatud põhiväärtustele, siis alluva süsteemi sidusus sotsiaalse 
integratsiooniga on teistsugune. Luhmanni käsitluses ei saa kommunikatsioon 
sotsiaalses süsteemis lähtuda korraga kahte tüüpi võimusuhetest ega lahendada 
nendevahelist pinget – näiteks eri riike ühendava supersüsteemi ja rohu-
juuretasandi demokraatiast sündivate nõudmiste vahel. Erinevate sotsiaalsete 
süsteemide sidumine ilma üht teisesse “sulandamata” on võimalik vaatepunkte 
ajas-ruumis vahetades. Näiteks on Eesti institutsioonid kord ELi kliima-
poliitikaga ühes paadis, kord kaitsevad jälle kohaliku energiatööstuse huve – 
mõlemat korraga teha on võimatu, kuigi seda on võimalik lingvistiliste 
lausungite abil välja mängida. Giddensi strukturatsiooniteooria tuletab meelde, 
et kõrvaltvaates kritiseeritavat ja problemaatilise tulemusega tegevust viivad 
oma igapäevastes praktikates ellu reaalsed inimesed. Et rutiniseeritud tegevuses 
peituv tähendus on indiviidile üldjuhul antud, rakendab indiviid diskursiivset 
potentsiaali pigem talle avanevas kommunikatsioonis nähtavate “teiste” 
analüüsimiseks. Ühiskonna eri institutsioone kujundavatel indiviididel on oma 
rutiniseeritud tegevuste kõrval seega ka võimalus oma rutiine vastavalt tajutud 
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ärevusele “teiste” seas ümber kujundada, väga keeruline aga iseennast nö 
problemaatilise indiviidina pildist välja lõigata. Valikuid selles, millistele 
ärevusnootidele reageerida, kujundavad indiviidi jaoks üheltpoolt välja-
kujunenud (võimu)suhted, teisalt aga ka isiklik aeg ja ruum. Mitut tegevust 
korraga teha ja mitmes kohas viibida on keeruline. Et ärevusttekitavate 
kommunikatsioonide üle otsustamine toimub fragmenteerunud ühiskonnas 
üldjuhul ükshaaval ja eraldiseisvalt, kuigi eri osapoolte kommunikatsioonide 
“nõudmised” on simultaansed, muutuvad võimalikuks ka nö topeltstandardid – 
otsus on langetatud ühe võimustruktuuri kasuks, kuid lausungiliselt justkui teise 
või mõlema huvides. Sellised kunstlikud topeltstandardid võimaldavad hoida 
ühiskonna identiteeti eluilmas elus ka siis, kui süsteemi kommunikatsioonis on 
see kasutusel üksnes deklaratiivsel (lausungi, mitte informatsiooni) tasandil. 
Näiteks on põhiseaduse paragrahvis 5 rõhutatud keelelisel tasandil loodusvarade 
säästlikku kasutamist, kuigi reaalses elus võib selle mõjule anda vastandlikke 
hinnanguid. 
Luhmann räägib sellest, et üks sotsiaalse süsteemi funktsioonisüsteem vajab 
arenguks teist – see pakub instrumentaliseerimiseks uue pidepunkti. Sellist 
funktsioonisüsteemide vastastikust toimet nimetab ta unitas multiplexiks – 
funktsioonisüsteemid ei sulandu üksteisesse, vaid loovad algsega võrreldes 
lihtsalt uusi erisusi. PLANEERIMISARTIKKEL (II) postuleerib selle üle, kas 
ka sotsiaalsetel institutsioonidel võib olla oma mälu, nö funktsioonisüsteemide 
koodihierarhia, mida rakendatakse sarnaste juhtumite puhul ühtviisi (Luhmanni 
vaates ei pruugi olla see nii võimalik kui Giddensi omas, sest indiviidide 
rutiniseeritud tegevus võiks sellist sisseharjunud kodeerituse eeldust kanda). 
Kompleksses ühiskonnas toimuvatest aruteludest sündiv rutiinide ohustamine ja 
traditsiooni lõhkumine võib põhimõtteliselt tuua kaasa fluktuatsioone nii 
funktsiooni- (nagu poliitika, õigus, teadus, haridus, majandus...) kui ala-
süsteemides, millel on potentsiaal muuta süsteemi taastootmise viiside hetkelist 
kulgu läbi selle, et ootamatult toimub palju sarnase funktsiooni- või alasüsteemi 
kasuks tehtud otsuseid. Kui sotsiaalne süsteem võib rakendada sisemise 
ratsionaalsuse säilitamiseks kommunikatsiooni piiramist (nö pimepunktid), siis 
võib ta seda rakendada ka mõne oma alasüsteemi suhtes ja vastupidi (mis võis 
olla fosforiidisõja kontekst), kuigi olukord peaks selle võimaluse justkui 
välistama. Näiteks on võimalik, et alluv süsteem avab end vastavalt eluilmas 
jagatud pingetele kesksüsteemi vastandsüsteemina, valides vastandumise alu-
seks mõne avalikult kommunikeeritud, päevakorras oleva teema (russifitseeri-
mine, Pandivere veevarude ohustatus). 
Näiteks 1980. aastate lõpu fosforiidisõda puhkes ehk seetõttu, et nõukogude 
süsteem piiras sotsiaalse süsteemi õppimist (süsteemi sisemist ratsionaliseeri-
mist eluilma suhtes), mis lõi liigse distantsi erinevate funktsiooni- ja ala-
süsteemide vahele. Tootmisjõudude sisuliselt piiramatu dikteerimisvõimalus 
poliitilis-administratiivse süsteemi suhtes süstis ühiskonda liialt palju 
määramatust. Tootmisega kaasnevad mõjud jäeti erinevalt tänasest päevast 
eluilma tasandil legitimeerimata (nt tarbijakultuuri abil). Fosforiidisõja ajal 
87 
polnud tarbija ja tarbimine keskkonnamõjusid õigustava tähendusena ei kehtiv 
ega kasutusel. Selline sidustamatus legitimatsioonis muutis nõukogude 
süsteemis avalike lausungite ja informatsiooni vahelise lõhe omaette reflek-
siooniteemaks, individuaalseid vaatlusi ühendavaks lüliks. Eluilma suhteline 
homogeensus võimendas süsteemisisese vastanduse kujunemist, mistõttu Eesti 
iseolemist tunnustavad kommunikatsioonid said progresseeruvalt rohkem 
võimalusi. Nii tugevnes Eesti kui allsüsteemi ja eluilma vaheline integratsioon. 
Näiteks kui varem laveeris kohalik tööstus liidu huvide ja kohaliku legitimat-
siooni vahel, siis fosforiidisõja ajal kasutas keemiatööstus ootamatuid võtteid, et 
fosforiidikaevandamise mõjude suurust Moskvale esitatavates andmetes 
forsseerida (Sikk 2013). Selline institutsionaalne mobiliseerumine soodustas 
ootamatult süsteemi turbulentsi, mis haakus samal ajal kulmineerunud teiste 
globaalsete muutustega (Berliini müüri langemine, Tšernobõli järelmõjud, 
NSVLi glasnostipoliitika, üleüldine keskkonnamure tõus). Üleüldine ärevuse 
tõus tõlgiti eluilma tasandil uuteks tähenduslikeks võimalusteks, millega 
süsteemivastasust toita. Seega soodustasid sotsiaalse süsteemi komplekssuse 
lihtsustumist süsteemi vähene sisemine integratsioon, eluilma homogeensus, 
topeltstandardeid toetavad ratsionaliseerimispraktikad ning süsteemi võimetus 
leida indiviidide kasvavale ärevusele sobivat maandajat. 
Lülitumine ühest süsteemist (NSVL) teise (EL) ei kujunenud sulandudes, 
vaid etapiliselt kohandudes ja tõlkides. 1990. aastatel, mida on nimetatud ka nö 
müütiliseks staadiumiks (Lauristin ja Vihalemm 1997), toimus komplekssuse 
lihtsustamine. Süsteemsete raamide kadudes (va vastandus NSVLiga) muutusid 
oluliseks projitseeringud eelmisest Eesti Vabariigist ja kujutelmad läänelikust 
ühiskonnakorraldusest, milles elamise praktikatest oli ülevaade vähestel 
naasnud emigrantidel. Uue süsteemi legitimatsioon sündis küll habermaslikest 
süsteemi põhiväärtuste teemalistest lingvistilistest aruteludest, kuid neis jäi 
vajaka selge järeleproovitud jagatud kogemus. Dissonants praktikate ja neid 
legitimeerivate tähenduste vahel hakkas kiirenema Euroopa Liiduga liitumisel. 
Kui 1990. aastatel rakendati Euroopaga integreerumisel veel ulatuslikult nö alt-
üles õigustamist (ELi süsteemi nõudeid püüti ära petta paberimajanduse tasandil 
ilma neid sisuliselt poliitikatesse sisse viimata, so lausungiline pettus), siis uuel 
aastatuhandel toimus sotsiaalse süsteemi kehtestumine juba vastupidi – 
domineerima jäid ELi regulatsioonid ja direktiivid. ELi nõuded kehtestati elu-
ilma ja insitutsioonide tasandil. Kehtestamine toimus eeskätt läbi funktsiooni-
süsteemide arendamise Euroopa praktikate järgi, eriti läbi integreerimist 
soodustavate eurorahade. Ühildumine juba küpse süsteemiga põhjustas Eestis 
ilmselt rohkem sotsiaalseid pingeid kui läänes – viimases arenes süsteemi ja 
eluilma integreeriv tabijakultuur evolutsiooniliselt, Eestis sissetungina. Kesk-
süsteemi ja eluilma integratsiooni motiveeringu ühildamatus ilmselt ka takistas 
alluva süsteemi õppimist traditsioonist ja toetas pigem indiviide ühendava 
jagatud kogemuse lahtikiskumist (Giddensi disembedding, 1990). 
Näiteks võeti Eesti hajaasustuse juures jäätmete liigiti kogumise jm prakti-
kad üle viisil, millele oleks leidnud eluilma tõlgenduses kohasemaid viise. Täna 
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kasutatakse jäätmete liigitamiseks majanduslikult efektiivset lahendust, mille 
ühilduvus sotsiaalsete arusaamadega on nõrk (kogumine turustamisviiside, 
mitte materjali omaduste järgi). Hiljuti valminud europrügilad võistlevad veelgi 
hilisemate jäätmepõletusjaamadega have. Indiviidile saadab see sõnumi, et 
jäätmete eraldamise ja vähendamise asemel tuleks tal toota hoopis rohkem jäät-
meid, et hoida ettevõtteid käigus. See on aga nö talupojamõistusega vastuolus. 
Olgugi, et ELiga integreerumisega kaasnes vajadus hakata inimesi kaasama 
ja keskkonda kaitsma (mis oli ka eluilmas teadvustatud vajadus), pingestas see 
süsteemi – eluilma tasandi motivatsiooni tuli arvestada, kuid see ei ühildunud 
ülalt alla juhitava ratsionaliseerimissüsteemiga (habermasliku legitimatsiooni-
kriisi käsitluses). Seetõttu on üle võetud küll ELi keskkonnakaitset puudutavad 
regulatsioonid (keskkondlik paradigma), kuid nende rakendamine (süsteemi 
mälu) on endiselt liialt tugevalt ärisektori poole kaldu. 
Täna on Eesti alluva süsteemina integreeritud ELi süsteemi, mis on aga ise 
sügavas kriisis ja üha võimetum komplekssuse lihtsustamiseks (aja taanda-
miseks) näiteks läbi parlamendivalimiste. Süsteemi teadlikku lihtsustumist 
takistab indiviidide sotsialiseeritus tänasesse maailma, mille tähendused ja 
praktikad võimaldavad uut võimalikku ilmakorda mõtestada ainult läbi tänaste 
suhtlusolukordi legitimeerivate praktikate. See aga kasvatab süsteemi komp-
lekssust veelgi. Selleks, et süsteem saaks lihtsustuda, peaks kehtestunud 
kommunikatsioonide kodeerimise võimuhierarhia ootuspärane järjestus segi 
paiskuma. See võimaldaks sündida ootamatutel institutsioonidel (küll mitte 
väljaspool sotsiaalse süsteemi toimimise loogikat), ja lihtsustada täna eksisteeri-
vaid ainuvõimalikuna legitimeeritud praktikate komplekssust. Süsteemi turbu-
lentsist ei saa sündida süsteemi täielikku lihtsustumist, sest tähendused saavad 
tekkida ainult kommunikatsioonis millegi suhtes. Näiteks sündis fosforiidisõja 
perioodi eluilma vastandusest sisend uuele kommunikatsioonisüsteemile – 
rahvuslus, omariiklus ja loodusväärtused said uues põhiseaduses (kui süsteemi 
põhiväärtustes) lausungilisel elik lingvistilisel tasandil keskse koha. Seega 
kandub süsteemi integratsioonil edasi eluilma mälu. Et praktikad püsivad 
endiselt elujõulistena ka riigikorra vahetumisel, kandub edasi ka institutsio-
naalne mälu. Tähenduslikku vaakumit võimaldab täita ka süsteemis mitte-
ratsionaliseeritav other-reference. Näiteks õigustas eluilmas legitimeerimata 
reforme aastaid vastse Eesti Vabariigi (müütiline) usk lääne praktikate ülimus-
likkusesse. 
Täna pole keskkonnaküsimuste arutelu takistatud süsteemi vähese integrat-
siooni tõttu. Vastupidi, süsteemi tihe sisemine integratsioon võimaldab kesk-
konnaküsimuste käsitlemise kasvavat arengut ja kehtestumist eluilmas. Seeläbi 
toimub aga ka eluilma sisemine diferentseerumine, kuigi üha kasvav tarbija-
kultuuris osalemine toodab selles killustumuses ka homogeensust. Siiski ei seo 
tarbimine indiviide üheplaaniliselt (nö peidetud kollektiivne kogemus) ja seni 




II Miks ei suuda indiviidid enam koonduda keskkonnamure ümber? 
 
Eesti on liikunud nõukogudeaegsest kogemusepõhiselt ja keskkondlikult tead-
vustamata loodussuhtelt hilismodernsesse ühiskonda, mida iseloomustab loo-
dussuhte vahendatus ning keskkonnaprobleemide ning -riskide analüüsi ning 
lahenduste otsimise killustatus. Miks on siin vähenev kogemuslik keskkonna-
suhe märgiline? 
Kogemusest on keeruline rääkida ilma seda abstraheerimata. Kuigi primi-
tiivses või traditsioonilises ühiskonnas on inimeste looduskogemus küll ka 
lingvistiliselt kantud (näiteks läbi objektide nimetamise), korrastab looduse 
suhtes tegutsemist ka kogemuslik, kuid keeleliselt väljendamata jäetav tead-
mine. Kogemus ja traditsioonid osalevad interaktsiooni süstematiseeriva 
komponendina, olgugi et vaikiva osapoolena. Vähemfragmenteerunud ühis-
konnas on indiviididevahelise kommunikatsiooni objektiks just kogemuse-
vaatluse vahendamine. Näiteks isegi kui nõukogude perioodi lõppu ise-
loomustas keskkonnateadvuse sotsiaalne paradigma (loodus kui tootmis-
ressurss), siis avalikus kommunikatsioonis oli tänasega võrreldes tugevalt 
esindatud humanitaarne vaade loodusele – see toetas kogemusliku loodussuhte 
teadvustamist ja väärtustamist, inimese ja looduse vahelise suhte mõtestamist. 
Üsna sarnast jagatud looduskogemust täiendasid ka naturaalmajanduslikud 
praktikad. Kuigi nõukogude perioodil oli loodus kultuurihuviliste koondumise 
väljundiks, ei liitnud see inimesi köitva agenda, vaid rohkem vabamate sotsiali-
seerumisvõimaluste ja hobilise tegevuse pakkumise läbi. Võimalik, et just neist 
suhetest leiti sotsiaalne ressurss fosforiidisõja aegseks mobiliseerumiseks. 
Eesti arenguga Lääne modernsuse suunas ei teki ühtlast teadvustatud 
keskkonnahuvi või -mure jaotumist (teadvustamata looduskogemuse asemele), 
vaid keskkonnaprobleemidest saadakse osa läbi muude suhete ühiskonnas, 
eeskätt läbi tarbimise (hilismodernsus toob keskkonna taas ühiskonda, vt Beck 
1986/92, 1995). Tänase Eesti keskkonnaprobleemide ja -riskide avalikku 
kommunikatsiooni iseloomustab keskkondlik paradigma ning instrumentali-
seeritud käsitlusviis, mis väljendub osaliselt tarbijaliku või teadusliku lähene-
misena. Kui nõukogude inimese aktiivne suhe loodusega ei koondunud looduse 
kui probleemküsimuse ümber, vaid loodusega seotud praktikate ümber – ühise 
aiamaa eest hoolitsemine näiteks –, siis ka täna on üheks indiviidide 
koondumise aluseks nö praktikakogukonnad. Uus keskkonnasäästmist toetav 
infrastruktuur ja ülevõetud institutsioonid (sh ka väärtused, ühiskondlikud 
normid) toetavad indiviidide koondumist teistsuguse jagatud kogemuse ümber – 
selleks on erinevad tarbimispraktikad, mille sääst toimib tehnoloogial, mitte 
isiklikel loobumistel (protestantlik eetika). Keskkondliku paradigma normali-
seerumisest võib rääkida just tänu liitumisele Euroopa Liiduga, mille nõudmisel 
rajatud sotsiotehnilised süsteemid on uued keskkonnapraktikad võimalikuks 
muutnud (enne ELiga liitumist oli vastuseis sotsiotehniliste süsteemide 
arendamisele väga tugev). Samas toetavad tänapäeval keskkonnasäästu ka 
praktikad, mis on põhjustatud majanduslikust nappusest. 
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Kitsamates niššides võib rääkida ka ökoloogilise paradigma tõusetumisest – 
toimub keskkonnaprobleemide mõtestamise mitmekesistumine. Näiteks on 
kodanikuühenduste seas võimalik leida nö vana kooli protestiliikumisi, projekt-
organisatsioone, sub-kultuurilisi, maitse-eelistuslikke ja virtuaalseid kogukondi, 
tarbijate kooperatiive jm. Keskkonnasuhte muutumine tarbimiskeskseks haaras 
kõigepealt nooremaid põlvkondi, seejärel normaliseerudes ja hajudes üle eri 
vanuserühmade. 
Ühiskonna võimekus käsitleda keskkonnaküsimusi nö terviklikult muutub 
läbi toimuva killustumise keerulisemaks, sest kommunikatsiooni “toimub” 
rohkem. Kuigi ELiga ühinemine on loonud indiviidide arvamuse otsustesse 
süstimiseks palju erinevaid legitimeeritud praktikaid, nähtub, et elanike 
arvamustega arvestamine on endiselt vähene (Ehitusmaavarade... 2009). See ei 
tähenda, et institutsioonide tasandil ei soovita otsida lahendusi alt-üles sõnas-
tatud probleemidele. Lihtsalt sotsiaalse süsteemi areng ja abstraheerimisviisid ei 
võimalda enam reageerida eluilmas tajutud ärevusele sotsiaalselt soovitud moel.  
Institutsioonidel puudub võimekus tõlkida ühiskondlikes suhetes peituvat aja 
ja ruumi kogemust abstrakselt väljendatavaks kommunikatsiooniks. Keel loob 
aga samas ka ahvatluse peita keerulisi suhteid legitiimsete sõnade taha (säästev 
areng, öko- jms) mis võimaldab edukalt realiseerida ja peita võimumänge ja 
saavutada näilist konsensust. Kuigi süsteemi pakutavad tagasisidevormid 
legitimeerivad lausungi tasandil indiviidi kodanikurolli (osaluspraktikad), näitab 
ühiskondlike otsuste informatsiooniline tasand, et süsteemi taastootmine toimub 
läbi tarbijarolli. Just hilismodernsele olukorrale iseloomulik aja ja ruumi koge-
muste killustumine loob eeldused selliste legitimeerimisprobleemide peitmiseks 
ning aja ja ruumi moonutusteks lingvistilises suhtluses. Kommunikatsioon 
moonutab aega ja ruumi ja selles valitsevaid suhteid läbi abstraheerimise 
muidugi alati ja paratamatult, kuid hilismodernsuses saavad üha rohkem võimu 
deklaratiivsed ühishuvid ja abstraktsed metamõisted. Modernses ühiskonnas 
toimuvas lingvistilises kommunikatsioonis, milles peituvate võimusuhete 
tähenduslikkus avaneb vaid süsteemi ratsionaliseerimisprotsessides, on võima-
lik kogemuslikud aega ja ruumi struktureerivad elemendid ning sidemed 
kõrvale jätta. Lingvistiliselt on seega võimalik luua legitiimseid, kuigi võima-
tuid olukordi. Metamõistete analüüs (PLANEERIMISARTIKKEL, II) näitab, et 
võimusuhteid kujundavate metamõistete taga on majandussüsteem. Süsteemis 
surutakse aega ja ruumi kokku, eriti majandussüsteemi nõudel, et võimaldada 
turusuhete taastootmist. Siin aga võib alt vedada indiviidide kogemuslik oskus 
eluilmas talle esitatavaid süsteemi nõudeid ühildada (Habermasi mure), sest 
süsteemi ettekirjutused indiviidile ei võta arvesse talle kättesaadavat aega ja 
ruumi, suurendades (alateadvuslikult) tajutavat nappus.  
Just kogemuslik keskkonnataju (sh taju selles keskkonnas toimetavatest 
inimestest) on see, mis ühendab tänaseid kogukondi, kes võitlevad arendus-
protsesside vastu. Igal sellisel juhul on loodus erinev nagu ka inimeste kogemus 
sellega, põimudes keskselt ümber “kodu”, elik emotsionaalselt tähendusliku 
kommunikatsioonide keskuse. Indiviidide interaktsiooni vaatepunkt lähtub enda 
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vastanduses süsteemiga süsteemis, muutudes süsteemile mõtestatavaks just läbi 
sellise vastanduse. See võimaldab süsteemis areneda poliitikail, mida on võima-
lik rakendada kohalike tajutud ärevuse legitiimseks maandamiseks (ekspertide 
sissetoomine, kogukonnaarenduslike kompensatsiooniobjektide rajamine) või 
neutraliseerida selle läbi vaikuse või sildistamiste. 
Aktiivse vaikuse olukord, kus mõnest teemast peaks rääkima, aga mida ei 
ratsionaliseerita süsteemis, toodab ärevust. Ärevust ei saa eitada, sest siis 
muutub see veel tugevamaks. Et ka indiviidid ise ei suuda enda ärevuse põh-
juste kohta küsimusi esitada muidu kui ainult läbi neile avaneva maailma 
(alateadvusega pole võimalik suhestuda), leiavad praktikad lahenduse selle 
kanaliseerimiseks – kogu aeg ei saa olla ärev. Süsteem värbab ärevust, konst-
rueerides riske ja pakkudes lahendusi, muutudes kultuurilises motiveeringus kas 
mõneks keskkonna- või toiduriskiks, tehnoloogiliseks või vaesusriskiks. Siit 
siseneb ärevus enda taastootmissüsteemi – majandussüsteem ratsionaliseerib 
need riskid, sageli läbi teadussüsteemi jt süsteemide, tulles turule täiendavate 
toodetega, mis on mõeldud nende riskide neutraliseerimiseks, defineerides ka 
vastavad praktikad (säästlik, öko). Poliitilis-administratiivne süsteem legiti-
meerib ärevuse (säästev areng), võimaldades niimoodi majandussüsteemile 
sisendi, kuid endiselt mitte ärevust ära kaotades. Ärevus loob endale üha 
killustatumaks muutuvast maailmast uusi kultuuriteemasid – kommunikatsioon 
ei saa ju lõppeda. Nii suundub ärevuse motiveeritus üha komplekssematesse 
süsteemsetesse võimalustesse, samal ajal kui süsteemi ja eluilma integratsiooni 
jäävad ühendama üha vähekontaktsemad metamõisted. Näiteks tuleb indi-
viididel lahendada väga erinevaid isiklikke finantsriske (elukindlustus, laenu-
kaitse, pensionisambad jne), kuigi samal ajal õigustatakse igapäeva praktilist elu 
kujundavat irratsionaalsust metavajadusega “võita turgude usaldust”. 
Ühiskonna komplekssemaks muutudes kasvab ka riskisõnumite arvukus, mis 
ületab mingis mõttes ka vastuvõtjate suutlikkuse. Läbi üldise suhestumise 
ühiskonna ja looduskeskkonnaga kontekstualiseerivad indiviidid ka keskkonna-
riske ning loovad strateegiad tekkinud määratlematu olukorra mõtestamiseks: 
millele pöörata üldse tähelepanu riskisõnumite ülekülluses ja komplekssuses? 
Indiviidide riskistrateegiad on nende valikute tõttu üha varieeruvamad. Midagi 
saab selles kompleksses riskimaailmas aga indiviide ka ühendada. Et institut-
sionaalselt määratletud riskid ja lahendused ei suuda sageli maandada indi-
viidide ärevust, siis just institutsionaalsetele riskisõnumitele vastandumine võib 
indiviide ühendada. Sellisteks kogukondadeks on näiteks vaktsineerimisvastaste 
virtuaalsed võrgustikud. 
Indiviidide poolt tajutav ärevus keskkonnariskide pärast ei pruugi ühtida 
institutsionaalselt loodud võmalustega erinevate pingete maandamiseks ning 
institutsionaalne etteantus hakkab takistama ka individuaalsete, situatiivselt 
sobivate lahenduste otsimist. Ärevus ja pinge väljendub emotsionaalsel tasandil, 
kus emotsioon peegeldab konflikti pakutava lahenduse ja selle elukonteksti 
sobimatuse vahel, samas siiski võimalikke lahendusi mitte pakkudes. Institut-
sioonide sõnavaras ja reeglistikus puuduvad vahendid emotsioonide käsitle-
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miseks ning individuaalsete lahenduste „tõlkimiseks“ universaalsetesse lahen-
dustesse. Kui varem aitas indiviide rutiinne jagatud kogemus, siis täna võib see 
jagatud kogemus tekkida ka situatiivselt, süsteemi tõrke või ohuolukordades, st 
indiviide võib ühendada ka institutsionaalsetele riskisõnumitele vastandumine.  
Selleks, et aidata indiviididel ühiseid parimaid lahendusi leida, oleme soovi-
tanud edendada kogukondlikke suhteid. Kogukonnasuhete arendamine võib 
pakkuda lahendusi institutsionaalsete vajaduste ja võimaluste ning indiviidide 
ärevuse vahelisel pingeväljal. Arvestades vähesemate ühiskondlike suhetega 
indiviidide arvukuse kasvu ja inimeste killustumist läbi erinevate infokesk-
kondade pole see lahendus siiski probleemitu. Jagatud, kuigi rutiniseeritud ja 
isegi mitte kõneaineseks oleva teadmuse vähenemine suurendab kogukondade 
omavahelise arutelu vajadust, mis tähendab, et terviklikum kogemus-teadmus 
tuleb lihtsustada, moonutades taas aega ja ruumi. Võimalik, et selle kogemuse 
ülekanne riskiolukorras eeldab liiga suurte barjääride ületamist. 
Tähendus vajab tekkeks nihet ajas ja ruumis, aga kui süsteemi ja eluilma 
integratsiooni kokkupuutepunkt korrastab aja üha kiirenevas tempos ja ühtse 
loogika alusel korrastatud ruumis (tarbimispraktika), siis sünnivad sõltuvus-
suhted, mis ei suuda luua süsteemi integratsiooniks vajalikku muutust (ala-
teadvus, interaktsioon ja süsteem ei kohtu tähendusloomes). 
 
Töö eesmärgiks oli leida, milliseid tingimusi tuleks kujundada, et kommunikat-
sioon keskkonna üle läbi enda taastootmise ei inkrementaliseeruks, vaid 
võimaldaks indiviididel leida paremaid lahendusi keskkonnaprobleemidele ja  
-riskidele nii isiklikul kui kollektiivsel tasandil. 
Kuigi sellise ülesande lahendamine on praktiliselt võimatu, on analüüsi 
põhjal siiski võimalik järeldada, et süsteemi inkrementaliseerumist aitavad väl-
tida fluktuatsioonid süsteemi funktsiooni- või alasüsteemides – elik refleksiivse 
modernsuse enda kõrvalmõjud. Need fluktuatsioonid võivad juhtuda erinevatel 
viisidel. Katkestused indiviidi refleksioonirutiinides võivad põhjustada taga-
järgi, millel on omakorda sotsiaalset keskkonda laiemalt ümberkujundav efekt. 
Reeglina pole see teadlik algatus – kuigi indiviidid võivad teada ja arvata, mida 
nad teevad, võib kõrvaltvaatajale nähtuda midagi muud. Et fluktuatsioon ei 
sumbuks, on vaja teatud ärevuse fooni, mis toetaks elulma koondumist vastan-
dusse valitud tähendusraami suhtes. See raamistus (kasvõi reostus) ja eluilma 
vastasseis võib viia süsteemi ümberorganiseerumise ja noorenemiseni. 
Ärevuse fooni aitab luua eluilma tagasiside vähendamine, mis on süsteemi 
strateegia inkrementaliseerumise vältimiseks (olgugi, et see toob kaasa eluilma 
vastanduse süsteemi mõne institutsiooniga). Institutsionaliseeritud vaikus 
koondab eluilma, viie selle uue tähendusraami otsingutele. Siiski võib eluilma 
poolt pakutud täide tähenduslikule vaakumile olla ebapiisav, ebaõnnestunud. Et 
vähendada komplekssuse mõju ja suurendada indiviidide koondumise võima-
lusi, tuleks edendada kogukondlikke suhteid, mis aitaksid indiviididel jõuda 
ühises kommunikatsioonis loomingulisemate lahendusteni. Hilismodernne indi-
viidide eluilmade variatiivsus võib aidata riskide leevendamiseks loomingulisi 
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lahendusi luua. Kogukonna- ja loodussuhete arendamisel on ka varjatud pool – 
jagatud kogemus ja vahetu kontakt loodusega vähendab teatud määral vajadust 
tuua praktilist kogemust ja alateadlikku hirmu kommunikatsiooni objektiks. See 






Appendix 1. Short explanation of the composition of clusters of social involvement 
 
The clusters of social involvement that are referred to in the first chapter are based on 
the data bases of the social inquiries ‘Me. The World. The Media’ from the years 2002, 
2005, 2008 and 2011. For the analysis the method of K-means is used from the SPSS 
package of statistics. The clusters of social involvement are constructed by the author 
based on aggregated variables, id est index variables that are composed of single 
variables. The aim of the composition of the index variables was to measure everyday 
routine practices of individuals: what do people claim they do with this kind of 
frequency and goal. There were six bigger groups of variables formed (aggregated 
variables) that describe different aspects of the relations between the individual and 
society: 
 
The index of personal relations shows whether the person has in addition to their 
family circle also other supporting informal social relations. This index is composed of 
single variables that describe their social life and activeness of socialising with friends 
and relatives. 
 
The index of consumerism describes the participation of the individual in society 
through the consumerist dimension. The single variables characterise the 
acknowledgement of their consumption choices (preferences for style, design, use of 
fitness and other services) and use of the signs of consumer culture (e.g. brands) in 
creating social relations. 
 
Index of the participation in civic society describes the involvement of the respondent 
to society through participation in various different half-formal networks and unions 
from apartment societies to singing choirs. The index characterises first hand the 
variability of the networks and unions in which the individual takes part. 
 
The index of nature relations expresses the relation with the natural environment 
through direct practical activities like gardening and hiking, but also through interest to 
nature (consumption of information about nature, books and films). This expresses the 
ability of involvement of the individual in society through direct perception of the 
environment that can also be partly institutionalised (e.g. organised camping in nature). 
 
The index of participation at the elections shows the involvement of the respondent in 
society through traditional political participation and civic duty. The index involves data 
about participation in about the five latest elections. 
 
The index of cultural participation expresses the involvement of individuals through 
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Table 1.1: Means of constitutive index variables of clusters in 2002, 2005, 2008, 2011 




















2002       
Index of personal relations 2.08* 1.75 3.15 4.46 1.37 0.000 
Index of consumerism 1.22* 1.23 5.91 2.33 1.01 0.000 
Index of participation in civic 
society’s organizations 
.26* .43 .55 .26 .12 0.000 
Index of the interest in nature 5.48* 4.39 4.10 2.10 1.58 0.000 
Index of participation at the elections 1.06* 4.66 2.45 .68 1.18 0.000 
Index of cultural hobbies 1.81* 1.63 1.93 1.60 .68 0.000 
2005       
Index of personal relations 1.45 1.80 2.80 2.71 3.86 0.000 
Index of consumerism 1.74 1.84 5.71 3.44 5.56 0.000 
Index of participation in civic 
society’s organizations 
.35 .31 .87 1.48 .61 0.000 
Index of the interest in nature 3.37 2.05 3.11 5.45 2.12 0.000 
Index of participation at the elections 5.21 .93 5.15 3.11 .81 0.000 
Index of cultural hobbies .94 .76 1.01 2.48 1.33 0.000 
2008       
Index of personal relations 2.56 1.95 2.57 1.94 2.85 0.000 
Index of consumerism 6.59 1.92 3.43 2.02 4.93 0.000 
Index of participation in civic 
society’s organizations 
.63 .24 1.64 .37 .92 0.000 
Index of the interest in nature 1.72 1.79 5.37 2.86 4.46 0.000 
Index of participation at the elections 1.89 .66 4.45 4.52 .73 0.000 
Index of cultural hobbies 1.08 .60 2.56 .74 2.28 0.000 
2011       
Index of personal relations 2.85 2.77 2.05 2.50 1.96 0.000 
Index of consumerism 4.37 5.54 1.77 6.49 1.86 0.000 
Index of participation in civic 
society’s organizations 
4.18 .70 .50 .61 .29 0.000 
Index of the interest in nature 3.88 5.30 3.62 1.60 1.93 0.000 
Index of participation at the elections 3.66 2.78 4.38 2.54 .89 0.000 
Index of cultural hobbies 3.55 2.36 1.17 1.19 .69 0.000 
* The cluster “Active in everything” did not form before 2005. Instead, another cluster formed in 
the five-cluster solution that did not appear in 2005, 2008 and 2011. Thus the clusters in 2002 
cannot be compared directly with the clusters in 2005, 2008 and 2011. 
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Graph 1.1: Means of constitutive index variables of the same cluster in 2002, 2005, 
2008 and 2011. The number of respondents belonging to the relevant cluster in different 
years is given in the brackets 
* This cluster did not form in 2002 
** This cluster formed only in 2002 
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Appendix 2. Cluster member’s beliefs about the future, opinions about (global) 
environmental problems and the solutions to environmental problems.  
 
Table 2.1: Life satisfaction, future optimism and trust in society. Means of single 
variables across the cluster groups and statistical significance or correlations. Highest 
means in the rows are marked with bold. 
















Life satisfaction (4=high, 
1=low) 
3.67 3.33 3.10 3.40 2.91 0.000 
Optimism towards the future 
(4=high, 1=low) 
2.92 2.84 2.53 3.18 2.48 0.000 
Evaluation of changes during 
last twenty years (4=positive, 
1=negative) 
3.72 3.52 3.32 3.39 2.98 0.000 
Trust in the Estonian state 
(4=high, 1=low) 
3.70 3.36 3.47 3.05 2.98 0.000 
Trust in the civic society 
organizations (4=high, 
1=low) 
3.61 3.11 3.14 3.10 2.96 0.000 
Trust towards entrepreneurs 
(4=high, 1=low) 




Table 2.2: Opinions about (global) environmental problems and the solutions of 
environmental problems. Means of single variables across the cluster groups and 
statistical significance or correlations. Highest means in the rows are marked with bold. 
















Concern about pesticides as a 
risk (1= no aware, 5=high 
risk) 
4.43 4.31 4.17 4.05 3.81 0.000 
Global epidemics as a risk 
(1= no aware, 5=high risk) 
4.00 4.22 4.12 4.09 3.97 0.000 
Food crisis, shortage of food 
as a risk (1= no aware, 
5=high risk) 
3.40 3.57 3.46 3.27 3.20 0.000 
Catastrophes as a risk 
(storms, floods) (1= no 
aware, 5=high risk) 
3.78 3.88 3.82 3.68 3.50 0.000 
Global environmental 
condition is critical (natural 
resources, pollution, climate) 
and the person must restrict 
their activities (4=agree, 
1=disagree) 
3.04 3.22 2.93 2.90 2.73 0.000 
Possibilities to preserve 
environment are clear and 
and easy to practice (4=agree, 
1=disagree) 
2.60 2.53 2.31 2.44 2.22 0.000 
New energy sources will 
create a new world for future 
well-being (4 = agree, 1 = 
disagree) 
2.50 2.40 2.18 2.46 2.18 0.000 
In the future, a global 
agreement on the 
environmental-friendly 
economic management is in 
force and works (4 = agree, 1 
= disagree) 
2.26 2.17 1.82 1.94 1.64 0.000 
How well prepared are the 
national institutions in order 
to prevent accidents in 
Estonia’s main industrial 
sites, transport terminals, 
etc.? (1 = good 4 = poor) 
2.58 2.66 2.72 2.66 2.84 0.000 
Appendix 2 (cont.). 
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Appendix 2 (cont.). 
 
Table 2.3: Belief in the solutions of environmental problems. Shares in percent of 
single variables across the cluster groups and statistical significance or correlations. 
Biggest shares in the rows are marked with bold. 
















Is ready to buy green 
products even if they cost 
more 
34% 51% 25% 41% 20% 0.000 
.256 
Is ready to cut down 
consumption, give up 
consumption rewards 
58% 41% 35% 29% 27% 0.000 
.158 
What do you think people 
should do to avoid the 
(global) risks in the future? 
46% 52% 47% 31% 37% 0.000 
.154 
Return to the traditional skills 
and natural way of life 
55% 45% 42% 45% 33% 0.000 
.121 
What do you think people 
should do to avoid the 
(global) risks in the future? 
27% 31% 29% 24% 19% 0.001 
.108 
Increase their skills in the use 
of new technologies, the last 
word of science 




Appendix 3. Clusters’ verbal description 
 
Table 3.1: Clusters’ short verbal description according to the correlations between 
cluster membership and other variables 



























although it has 
fallen in the 





to be positive, 










































future both at 
social as well 


























Societal trust The highest 
trust in the 
public, 
business as 






















state and civic 
sector.  
The lowest 
trust in the 










































Appendix 3 (cont.). 
 
 





























































































































less in the need 









Appendix 4. Socio-demographic profiles of clusters in 2002, 2005 and 2011 
 
Table 4.1: Age, gender and education. The biggest shares of certain socio-demographic 
sub-group are marked in bold. The column percentages may not add up as 100% 


















age 2002      
15–29 * 30% 4% 76% 27% 
30–44 * 43% 22% 20% 28% 
45–59 * 21% 35% 4% 25% 
60–74 * 6% 39% 0% 20% 
2005      
15–29 21% 25% 6% 63% 33% 
30–44 41% 28% 20% 26% 25% 
45–59 27% 28% 33% 10% 26% 
60–74 10% 20% 41% 1% 15.5% 
2011      
15–29 31% 26.5% 13% 42.5% 36% 
30–44 33% 31% 24% 30% 23% 
45–59 20.5% 29% 30% 24% 23% 
60–74 15% 13% 33% 3% 18% 
gender 2002 *     
male * 44% 44.5% 47% 47% 
female * 56% 55.5% 53% 53% 
2005 *     
male 33% 36% 36% 43% 54% 
female 67% 64% 64% 57% 46% 
2011      
male 40% 36% 36% 40.5% 54% 
female 60% 64% 64% 59.5% 46% 
education 2002      
Basic * 9% 19% 30% 31% 
Secondary * 54% 53% 55% 54% 
Higher * 37% 28% 15% 15% 
2005      
Basic 5% 13.5% 18.5% 20% 28% 
Secondary 44.5% 63% 53% 60.5% 57% 
Higher 49% 21% 26% 19% 11% 
2011      
Basic 17% 15% 16% 13% 32% 
Secondary 36% 56% 57% 51% 57% 
Higher 47% 28% 28% 36% 12% 
* the cluster formed since 2005. 
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Appendix 4 (cont.). 
 
Table 4.2: Ethnicity and urban-rural inhabitance. The biggest shares of certain socio-
demographic sub-group are marked in bold. The column percentages do not add up as 


















ethnicity 2002 *     
Estonian * 73% 84% 65% 46% 
Russian or 
other 
* 27% 16% 35% 54% 
2005      
Estonian 76% 79% 84% 58% 58% 
Russian or 
other 
24% 21% 16% 42% 42% 
2011      
Estonian 92% 72% 85% 49% 53% 
Russian or 
other 
8% 28% 15% 51% 47% 
urban-rural 
inhabitance 
2002      
urban * 83% 71% 85% 84% 
rural * 17% 29% 15% 16% 
2005      
urban 92% 77% 76% 89% 77.5% 
rural 8% 23% 24% 11% 22.5% 
2011      
urban 50% 66% 67% 88% 73% 
rural 50% 34% 33% 12% 27% 
* the cluster formed since 2005. 
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Appendix 4 (cont.). 
 
















2002 * 11% 30% 18% 22% 
2005 14% 12% 26% 18% 29% 
2008 16% 12% 24% 16% 33% 
2011 5% 16% 32% 18% 30% 
* This cluster did not form in 2002. Instead, another cluster formed in the five-cluster solution 
that did not appear in 2005, 2008 and 2011. The ‘disappeared’ cluster was characterised by high 
scores in interest in nature but in low scores in all other index variables. Thus the clusters in 2002 
cannot be compared directly with the clusters in 2005, 2008 and 2011, but in order to get some 
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